Labour and Industrial - constitutionality - Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966, Sections 1, 3, 38 and 85 of Factories Act, 1948, Industrial Disputes Act , Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and Articles 14, 19 and 301 of Constitution of India - petitioners challenged vires of 19(1)(g), particularly, as the Act has been applied irrespective of the number of the employees and as there is artificial concept of employment which includes even contract labour and home-workers and as it imposes unbearable burdens in such cases where the employer had no master and servant relationship at all and could not effectively control the independent contractors or the home-workers who had merely taken raw materials for work at their homes. As mentioned in the said report the Commission had at that time recommended enactment of a separate Act for these beedi workers. The beedi and cigar labour satisfied many of the criteria of sweated labour such as sub-contract system. It was desirable to abolish the outwork system and to encourage establishment of big factories, if protective labour legislation was to be enforced with any degree of success. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was held to be satisfied. 2(s) of the term 'workman' in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the labour employed in the beedi industries, even though it was employed in the manufacturing process, was denied these benefits of the Factories Act and of this vital piece of industrial legislation like the Industrial Disputes Act if the employment was as contract labour or as home-worker. Therefore, if the employer chooses to reject the beedis as sub-standard beedis, these employees could not even get minimum wages which were sought to be secured to these workers and they were helpless in raising any labour or industrial dispute in this connection because of the restricted definition of the term 'workmen' even in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In these circumstances an attempt was made by some State Government like the State of Bombay to issue a notification under S. For that purpose it seeks to impose upon the owners or the occupiers certain obligations to protect workers unwary as well as negligent and to secure for them employment in conditions conducive to their health and safety. The duty of the employer was to secure the health and safety or workers and extended to providing adequate plant, machinery and appliances, supervision over workers, healthy and safe premises, proper system of working and it further extended to giving reasonable instructions. The Factories Act undoubtedly imposed numerous restrictions upon the employers to secure to the workers adequate safeguards for their health and physical well-being. It was to carry out effectively the object underlying the Act that power had been given to the State Government to decide with reference to local conditions whether it was desirable that the provisions of the Act or any of them should be made applicable to any establishment which was not covered by the definition of 'factory' or to workers in a factory who were not entitled to the benefits of the Act because of the definition of 'employment'.That is why in this context this extension of the provisions of the Factories Act of the benefit of these deemed workers who were working in the premises which were deemed factories was regarded as not unreasonable within the meaning of Art. Employer-employee relationship not being well-defined the application of the Factories Act has met with difficulties. The Bill seeks to provide for the regulation of the contract system of work, licensing of beedi and cigar industrial premises and matters like health, hours of work, spread over, rest periods, overtime, annual leave with pay, distribution of raw materials etc. In addition to the contract labour, a home-worker as well as any person even though not employed by the employer or the contractor who works with the permission or the agreement with such an employer or contractor is also covered. That is why by an inclusive process, the 'establishment' is defined so as to include all industrial premises so that that expression could be conveniently used to cover mere establishments as well as 'industrial premises' in the Act. Under the relevant Rule 24, which prescribes the register of leave with wages in case of home-workers, such register under Rule 24(2) has to be maintained in Form VII and the home-worker is to be given under Rule 25 a leave book like other regular workers in Form VII. Section 35 is usual indemnity clause for acts done in good faith. It is well-settled that the legislative competence has always to be judged on the doctrine of pith and substance and not by the test of incidental encroachment. ' The pith and substance of this legislation is that it is a labour welfare measure prescribing conditions of employment in the beedi and cigar industry regulating the terms of employment and resulting in better relations by avoidance of industry, and labour disputes in this industry, providing where necessary for the employer's liability, maternity benefits etc. 38 shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life. The is the sine qua non for the success of the industrial enterprise, wherein not only the capital and labour are interested but the State as a whole and the community at large are also vitally interested. 2(1) of the 'worker' in the Factories Act, 1948, as well as in S. 2(s) 'workman' in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, had been interpreted in various binding decisions in a restricted way to cover only the case of employment which was under a contract of service which satisfied this prima facie test of the common law concept of the master on the servant's work. The ground given was that this extension was to be resorted to to meet the felt necessity to prevent circumvention of this salutary labour welfare measure like the Factories Act. These two decisions, therefore, clearly lay down the settled legal position that the concept of employment is inherently a very wide concept. 11. Further, the test to be applied for distinguishing the contract of service from contract for service are now well-settled. 34).'It is therefore, clear from these observations that the modern industrial conditions would require these indicia to be restated, especially as the statutory provisions could very well affect this prima facie test of right of control. 12. This discussion clearly establishes that the term 'employment' had always a wider connotation. Therefore, the control test in this limited sense and the other test of the person being one of the labour force to produce the ultimate product of beedis or cigar manufactured in this industry would clearly show that the Legislature was regulating the real employer-employee relationship in this industry. If any further authority in this connection is needed, it is clearly supplied by the decision of the Supreme Court in Nielma Textiles Finishing Mills Ltd. Merely because the process adopted by the Industrial Tribunal was application of the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience, the legislation could not be challenged on the ground that the Legislature had abdicated its functions. A contention was raised that the judicial decisions had interpreted the term industry in the wider sense covering even non-industrial concerns like hospitals, educational institutions and the business houses of chartered accountants, and, therefore, such a labour legislation would not fall within entry 29 of the List III of VII Schedule to the Government of India Act 1935, Trade Union :industrial and labour disputes',corresponding to present entry 22 in List III. ' Even, if the wide definition of the term 'industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was not covered by the aforesaid entry 29, it would be clearly covered under this entry 27 as a labour welfare measure. Therefore, the first ground of attack must fail that the Parliament had no legislative competence to enact this act. It is now well-settled that the right to trade is not a right to exploit the workers. On the other hand, the employers cannot be heard to complain if they are compelled to pay minimum wages to their labourers even though the labourers, on account of their poverty and helplessness, are willing to work on lesser wages. 19(1)(g) on the short ground that the extension of benefits of Factories Act to premises and workers not falling strictly within the Factories Act served the same purpose which was served by the Factories Act itself, which in the context of modern outlook on industrial relations could never be held to be unreasonable, because the State has a vital concern in preventing exploitation of labour and in insisting upon proper safeguards for the health, safety and well-being of the workers. Therefore, it is well-settled that looking to the economic realities in such cases of contract labour engaged in the work which is ordinarily a part of the real employer's business, the real employer could be statutorily made liable for implementing the provisions of such welfare labour measures. 1103, it is well-settled that the rule adopted by American Courts that a vague statute violates the very essence of the due process clause has no application in our country. Professor Willis's observations in his Constitutional Law at pages 586-587 would be quite instructive in this context :Perhaps the best view on the subject is that 'due process' and 'equality' are not violated by the mere conference of unguided power, but only by its arbitrary exercise by those upon whom conferred. 4(3)(b) is capable in this context of the meaning 'previous experience of the applicant, if any'.It is well-settled principle of construction that when an expression in a statute is capable of two meanings, it is that meaning which must be given to it which would make the section valid and not the other one which would make it invalid. Rule 3(4) is clearly within the scope of S. 4(5) was challenged which provides that the competent authority would not grant or renew a licence unless it was satisfied that the provisions of this Act and rules made thereunder have been substantially complied with. 23. In the result, no ground whatever has been made out would justify any attack on the relevant provisions of the Act and both the petitions must fail and the rule is, therefore, discharged in each case. We are satisfied that the first two questions would fall under Art.