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A-2459 the Coats Viyella Employees Vs. 1. Harvey Nagar Residents - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Judge
AppellantA-2459 the Coats Viyella Employees
Respondent1. Harvey Nagar Residents
Excerpt:
before the madurai bench of madras high court dated:28. 11/2013 coram the honourable mr.justice m.jaichandren and the honourable mr.justice m.venugopal w.a.(md).nos.738, 744, 891, 892 of 2013 a n d w.p.(md) no.13589 of 2013 w.a.(md) no.738 of 2013 a-2459 the coats viyella employees co-operative housing societies ltd no.15 p.t.rajan main road narimedu madurai. ... appellant vs 1. harvey nagar residents welfare association rep. by its secretary regn.no.23/187 14/14, 1st street harvey nagar madurai 625 016.2. the district collector madurai 1.3. the director of town and country planning 807 anna salai chennai.4. the chief town planning officer madurai municipal corporation madurai.5. the deputy director of town and country planning 4 hakkim ajmal khan road chinna chokkikulam madurai.6. the.....
Judgment:

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED:

28. 11/2013 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.JAICHANDREN AND THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL W.A.(MD).Nos.738, 744, 891, 892 of 2013 a n d W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 A-2459 The Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Housing Societies Ltd No.15 P.T.Rajan Main Road Narimedu Madurai. ... Appellant Vs 1. Harvey Nagar Residents Welfare Association rep. by its Secretary Regn.No.23/187 14/14, 1st Street Harvey Nagar Madurai 625 016.

2. The District Collector Madurai 1.

3. The Director of Town and Country Planning 807 Anna Salai Chennai.

4. The Chief Town Planning Officer Madurai Municipal Corporation Madurai.

5. The Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning 4 Hakkim Ajmal Khan Road Chinna Chokkikulam Madurai.

6. The Commissioner Madurai Municipal Corporation Madurai.

7. The Madura Coats Pvt. Ltd rep. by its Regional Director Human Resource Madurai.

8. ".Devaki Diagnostic Pvt. Ltd rep. by its Managing Director Dr.P.S.Nagendran 1 A Harvey Nagar Madurai 16.

9. The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies Madurai Region Lady Doak College Road Chokkikulam Madurai.

10. Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Building Society Door No.76/21B Theni Main Road (Near Union Bank of India) Arasaradi Branch P.P.Chavadi Madurai 16. ... Respondents PRAYER.. Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the order dated 13/3/2013 passed in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010. - - - - - W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013 A-2459 The Coats Viyella Paniyalarkal Mattrum Pothu Sevai Cootruravu Veettu Vasathi Variyam rep. by its Secretary (in-charge) P.T.Rajan Road Madurai 625 002. ... Appellant Vs 1. M/s. Devaki Diagnostics Pvt Ltd rep. by its Managing Director 13 Theni Main Road Arasaradi Madurai.

2. The Revenue Divisional Officer Madurai South Madurai.

3. The Tahsildar Madurai (South) Madurai 625 020.

4. Harvey Nagar Residents Welfare Association rep. by its Secretary Regn.No.23/187 14/15, 1st Street Harvey Nagar Madurai 625 016. ... Respondents PRAYER.. Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the order dated 13/3/2013 passed in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012. - - - - - W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 Harvey Nagar Residents Welfare Association rep. by its Secretary Regn.No.23/187 14/15 1st Street Harvey Nagar Madurai 625 016. ... Appellant Vs 1. The District Collector Madurai 1.

2. The Director of Town and Country Planning 807 Anna Salai Chennai.

3. The Chief Town Planning Officer Madurai Municipal Corporation Madurai.

4. The Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning 4 Hakkim Ajmal Khan Road Chinna Chokkikulam Madurai.

5. The Commissioner Madurai Municipal Corporation Madurai.

6. The Madura Coats Pvt Ltd rep. by its Regional Director Human Resource Madurai.

7. Devaki Diagnostic Pvt Ltd rep. by its Managing Director Dr.P.S.Nagendran 1 A Harvey Nagar Madurai 16.

8. The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies Madurai Region Lady Doak College Road Chokkikulam Madurai 9. Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Building Society Door No.76/21B Theni Main Road (Near Union Bank of India) Arasaradi Branch P.P.Chavadi Madurai 16.

10. A.2459 The Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Housing Societies Ltd No.15 P.T.Rajan Main Road Narimedu Madurai. ... Respondents PRAYER.. Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the order dated 13/3/2013 passed in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010. - - - - - W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 Harvey Nagar Residents Welfare Association rep. by its Secretary Regn. No.23/187 14/15 1st Street Harvey Nagar Madurai 625 016. ... Appellants Vs 1. M/s. Devaki Diagnostics Pvt Ltd rep. by its Managing Director Dr.P.S.Nagendran 1 A Harvey Nagar Madurai 16.

2. The Revenue Divisional Officer Madurai South Madurai.

3. The Tahsildar Madurai South Madurai.

4. A2459Madurai Viyella Paniyalarkal Mattrum Pothu Sevai Cootruravu Veettu Vasathi Variyam rep. by its Secretary (incharge) P.T.Rajan Main Road Madurai 625 002. ... Respondents PRAYER: Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the order dated 13/3/2013 passed in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012. W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 Harvey Nagar Residents Welfare Association rep. by its Secretary Regn.No.23/1987 14/15, 1st Street Harvey Nagar Madurai 625 016. ... Petitioner Vs 1. The District Collector Madurai District Madurai.

2. The Director of Town and Country Planning 807 Anna Salai Chennai.

3. The Chief Town Planing Officer Madurai Municipal Corporation Madurai.

4. The Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning 4 Hakkim Ajmal Khan Road Chinna Chokkikulam Madurai.

5. The Commissioner Madurai Municipal Corporation Madurai.

6. The Madura Coats Pvt Ltd rep. by its Regional Director Human Resource Madurai.

7. Devaki Diagnostic Pvt Ltd rep. by its Managing Director Dr.P.S.Nagendran 1 A Harvey Nagar Madurai 16.

8. A.2459 The Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Housing Societies Ltd No.15 P.T.Rajan Main Road Narimedu Madurai. ... Respondents Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents 1 to 5 to forbear the respondents 6 and 7 from converting the play ground in T.S.No.1300, 1302/2, 1309/2, 1310, 1311 New T.S.No.48, 49, 52, 21 Town Survey Ward No.5 Building bearing No.2 Harvey Nagar, 1st Street, Technical School West 13th Street, Madurai 16 into any concrete structure or alter the usage of land for any other purpose and to consequently direct the respondents to restore the play ground to its original position, within the time stipulated by this Court. For Appellants and For Petitioner ... Mr.M.Ajmal Khan, Senior Counsel for Mr.R.Gandhi For Respondents in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 ... Mr.C.Selvaraj, Spl.G.P for R.R.2 to 4 and 8 Mr.R.Murali for R.5 Mr.M.Rajaraman for R.7 Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, Senior Counsel for Mr.M.Suresh Kumar for R.8. For Respondents in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013 ... Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, Senior Counsel for Mr.M. Suresh Kumar for R.1 Mr.C.Selvaraj, Spl.G.P. for R.R.2 and 3 For Respondents in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 ... Mr.C.Selvaraj for R.R.1 to 4 and 8 Mr.R.Murali for R.5 Mr.M.Rajaraman for R.6 Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, Senior Counsel for Mr.M. Suresh Kumar for R.7 For Respondents in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 ... Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, Senior Counsel for Mr.M. Suresh Kumar for R.1 Mr.C.Selvaraj, Spl.G.P for R.R.2 and 3 For Respondents in W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 ... Mr.C.Selvaraj,Spl.G.P for R.R.1 to 4. Mr.R.Murali for R.5 Mr.M.Rajaraman for R.6 Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, Senior Counsel for for R.7 - - - - - :COMMON

JUDGMENT

********** [Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.VENUGOPAL, J]. W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013:- The Appellant/Tenth Respondent has focussed the instant Writ Appeal (MD) No.738 of 2013 as against the order dated 13/3/2013 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 passed by the Learned Single Judge in dismissing the Writ Petition (filed by the First Respondent/Writ Petitioner.

2. W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013:- The Appellant/Fourth Respondent has filed the instant Writ Appeal (MD) No.744 of 2013 as against the order dated 13/3/2013 in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 passed by the Learned Single Judge in allowing the Writ Petition (filed by the First Respondent/Petitioner.

3. W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013:- The Appellant/Writ Petitioner has filed the present Writ Appeal (MD) No.891 of 2013 as against the order dated 13/3/2013 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 passed by the Learned Single Judge in dismissing the Writ Petition.

4. W.A.(MD)No.892 of 2013:- The Appellant/Respondent has filed the instant Writ Appeal (MD) No.892 of 2013 as against the order dated 13/3/2013 in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 passed by the Learned Single Judge in allowing the Writ Petition.

5. W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013:- The Writ Petitioner has preferred the instant writ of mandamus praying for the issuance of a direction by this Court in directing the respondents 1 to 5 to forbear the respondents 6 and 7 from converting the play ground in T.S.Nos.1300, 1302/2, 1309/2, 1310, 1311 New T.S.Nos.48, 49, 52, 21 Town Survey Ward No.5 Building bearing No.2 Harvey Nagar, 1st Street, Technical School West 13th Street, Madurai 16 into any concrete structure or alter the usage of land for any other purpose and to consequently direct the respondents to restore the play ground to its original position, within the time stipulated by this Court.

6. The Learned Single Judge, while passing the common Order dated 13/3/2013 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012, in paragraph 32, has inter alia observed as under:- ".32. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer some decisions relied on by the 7th respondent. In 2001 (3) CTC757(supra), this Court has held that the issue with regard to right could be decided only on adducing evidence and Court cannot consider disputed questions of fact and also decide rights of parties governed by agreement in writ jurisdiction. In 2011 (5) CTC94(supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held that if there is a dispute regarding title between the parties, this Court normally will not entertain the writ petition and adjudicate the disputed questions. So far as the present case is concerned, even according to the petitioner Association, they are using the auditorium and other places only with the permission of management of the 6th respondent. If really the disputed land belongs to the petitioner Association, there is no need for them to get permission from the 6th respondent Management. Under such circumstances, they ought to have filed a civil suit at the relevant point of time itself seeking declaration of their right. Therefore, I am of the firm view that the writ petition by the petitioner Association is not maintainable on the ground of not only laches but also there are series disputed questions of fact. When there are disputed questions of fact, the Revenue Divisional Officer ought to have directed the parties to approach the civil Court and instead of doing so, he had cancelled the patta, which, in my view, is not proper and correct. Therefore, the said order is liable to be quashed.". and consequently, dismissed the Writ Petition (MD) No.14451 of 2010 without costs and allowed the Writ Petition (MD) No.1473 of 2012 without costs by setting aside the impugned Order dated 2/2/2012 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai.

7. Counter averments of the Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013, Sixth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 and Sixth Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010:- The Appellant/Welfare Association {in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013)/Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010} has nothing to do with the property and further that the Association has no right, title or interest whatsoever in the property. Further, the Appellant/Association has no connection whatsoever with Madura Mills Employees. Moreover, as per the byelaw of the Association, any person owning the building in Harvey Nagar is a Member of the Association/Petitioner and has no right in the Building Society. Also, the Appellant/Association has nothing to do with the acquisition of the property.

8. The Madura Mills Company, the predecessor Company of the Sixth Respondent {in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010} had submitted a plan for construction of building and it was duly signed. After obtaining sanction from the then Madurai Municipality, Madura Mills constructed a club building and sports club was formed. The Madura Mills Sports Club was formed as a welfare measure only for the employees of Madura Mills and the Members of the Building Society were not allowed to use the club and other facilities. All the facilities were utilised by the Employees of Madura Mills and neither the Building Society nor its Members have anything to do with the Sports Club.

9. The Club building and the property was assessed to property tax in the name of Madura Mills from the year 1973 onwards and the said Mills were paying the property tax in its name from the year 1973 and the entire club property including the auditorium and other grounds were the property of Madura Mills and it was used by the Employees of Madura Mills through out. The impugned property belongs to Madura Mills and it is not meant and used as a public property at any point of time. There was no park in the property at any time as per the plan. Added further, the issue raised by the Appellant/Association is a question of fact which cannot be decided in the writ proceedings. The Sixth Respondent/Madura Coats Private Limited {in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013), filed a suit in O.S.No.334 of 2009 on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Madurai and an order of Interim Injunction in I.A.No.273 of 2009 was passed against the Appellant/Welfare Association and its Members from using the Sports Club and its property and the suit is pending. The Madura Mill applied for construction of compound wall around the club property during the year 1975 and it was also sanctioned by the authorities. Thereafter, the Mill constructed a compound wall and the property was in its exclusive possession and enjoyment of the Members of the Mill. The Employees of the Mill were using the club as a welfare measure provided by the Mills.

10. The Mill proposed to dig a heavy bore well in the property and the residents around the property had filed a suit on the ground that digging heavy bore well in the area will adversely affect the ground water level in the residential area and that they would not get sufficient water in the bore well of the houses. After considering the request of the residents, the proposal was dropped and that mere filing of the suit would not give any right to the Appellant/Petitioner's Association. The Appellant/Petitioner's Association tried to trespass into the property taking advantage of the closure of the Sports Club and therefore, the Sixth Respondent {in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013} filed a suit and Interim Injunction was granted in its favour after an elaborate enquiry. The Secretary of the Appellant/Petitioner's Association trying to break open the lock and forcibly intercepted the property in violation of Court order and therefore, a criminal complaint lodged and the case was registered by the Police and the same is pending. The Mill is in total control and possession of the property and they are paying the salary for the persons employed in the sports club. Also that, the title of the property cannot be decided in the labour dispute and any admission made by the Employees in the Mill in the labour proceeding could not be pressed into service for deciding the nature of the property. The Sixth Respondent {in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013}, the Association of the Company sold the property to Seventh Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010/Private Hospital for valuable consideration.

11. Further, in the concerned register, the property tax was transferred in the name of the Seventh Respondent/Hospital in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and Eighth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 and therefore, there could not be any injunction against the real owner of the property. Since no right of the Appellant/Association/Petitioner was infringed and in as much as the property was not ear marked for public purpose in any public records, the Appellant/Welfare Association is not entitled to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

12. The Counter averments of the Fourth Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and Fifth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 and Fourth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013:- An application was submitted by Madurai Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society for approval of plan of their proposed site. On considering the application, plan approval was granted vide LPH.DTP/13/73. In the said plan, 88 plots in total admeasuring 1482 cents were sought for approval. Out of the total area, 148.2 cents being 10% of the total area was ear marked for public usage. The same was strictly followed and adhered to by the Society. The public are utilising the same as on date. No application was received from any source for reconverting, altering or change of usage or de-reserving the land which was ear marked for public usage. Public are utilising the said area as a Shuttle Cock Court, Badminton Court, Basket Ball Court (mini) and Football Court, proposed club building were also ear marked in the said area. Further, as per Rules, no permission could be granted to de- reserve the land earmarked for public usage.

13. The gist of counter averments of Fifth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 and W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010:- The admitted fact is that the Appellant/Association used to seek permission from the Sixth Respondent (Madura Coats Private Limited), whenever they want to conduct their meetings, if really, the property belongs to the Appellant/Petitioner's Association why did they seek permission from the Sixth Respondent for conducting meeting. The Appellant/Association failed to file a suit against the Sixth Respondent/Madura Coats Private Limited in any manner to establish the right over the said property or to prove that the said property is a public property for common use. The Sixth Respondent was paying the property tax and electrical charges on their name for several years which was not disputed by the Appellant/Association had not challenged the said property tax being levelled in the name of the Sixth Respondent (Madura Coats Private Limited) by filing an appeal to the Corporation or by filing a Civil Suit. When the Appellant/Petitioner's Association came to know that the Sixth Respondent (Madura Coats Private Limited), alienated the said property, they should have challenged the said sale deed before the Civil Court. The Appellant/Association failed to follow an effective remedy by following the law and rushed to this Court by filing the present Writ Petition without any basis, but with delay and laches. As such, the Writ Petition filed by the Appellant/Association is not maintainable.

14. The Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 approached the Madurai Corporation for entering the name in the property register by furnishing the sale deed dated 12/11/2010 executed by the Sixth Respondent (Madura Coats) in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2013. On perusing the said sale deed and other required records, the Corporation entered the name of the Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital in the official records and register. Further, as per the property register maintained by Madurai Corporation, the said place is not shown as park or public utility place. Also, Madurai Corporation had not handed over the said property for maintenance. If the Appellant/Association has any right over the said property, they could very well file a Civil Suit and establish their right and title in as much as it needs proper appreciation of evidence. The Revenue records such as patta and property receipt and electricity connection stand in the name of Seventh Respondent/Hospital as on date. The layout was passed by Madura Mills and the Employees Co-operative Building Society but not in thename of Appellant/Petitioner's Association. Further, the alleged disputed property was shown as Club.

15. The Essence of counter averments of the Third Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 and Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 and 892 of 2013:- The Appellant/Association was formed for the welfare of their members and it was registered under the Societies Registration Act bearing No.23/87 till date, the Association was functioning smoothly. The workers of Madura Coats (Sixth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013) formed an Association called Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society. At the request of the said Society (it was registered under Societies Registration Act bearing No.2459). On 29/1/1958, the then Government of Madras, acquired the lands in S.Nos.1300, 1308/2, 1309/2, 1310, 1311 which belong to various persons for the purpose of constructing houses for members of the Society. After acquisition of lands, the Government of Madras assigned the lands to the Society. The Magistrate submitted a plan approval on 16/8/1971. The Town Planning Officer, Madurai Corporation has approved the plan in L.P.A No.18/1967, total extent of acquired lands is 4 acres 82 cents in which 1 acre 10 cents was allotted for public purpose like road, drainage, park, playground and club etc. The building plan was also shown that certain extent was allotted for public purpose. Thereafter, on 13/3/1973, the Society submitted a revised plan. The same was sanctioned by the Fifth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 and W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2013 in No.13/1973. After obtaining sanction, the Madura Mill constructed an Auditorium, measuring an extent of 1800 Sq.feet in the earmarked place and also established a place for Volley Ball Court, Shuttle Cock Court, Basket Ball Court. The members of the Society were allowed to utilise the above said facilities.

16. During the year 1992, the Sixth Respondent attempted to dig borewell in the public place and therefore, the Member of the Society filed O.S.No.346 of 1992 for mandatory and permanent injunction against the Sixth Respondent. The said suit was decreed ex parte. At one point of time, the Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society had become defunct. Therefore, the Members formed a new Association in the name of Harvey Nagar Residents Welfare Association (Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 and 892 of 2013) and Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2010).

17. The Welfare Association Members were allowed to convene a meeting in the Auditorium, after obtaining permission from Madura Coats. Later Members of the Petitioner/Appellant were not allowed to utilise the place which was earmarked for public purpose by the Management of Madura Mills and the Management claimed exclusive right over the public place by showing the property tax (kist) receipt which stands in the name of the Management of Madura Coats. After knowing the illegal action of the Management, on 5/8/2010 under the Right to Information Act before the Public Information Officer, the Fifth Respondent/The Commissioner, Madurai Municipal Corporation in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 gave a reply on 24/8/2010 through Public Information Officer that according to the Plan Approval No.374.L.P.A/OTP1373 showed that certain place called as Club Building and playground. At the hands of the Management of Madura Coats, the Fifth Respondent/Corporation, changed the name of the place viz., Club Building and Playground of Madura Mills. From the counter filed by Madura Mills House Building Society before the Second and Third Respondents/Revenue Divisional Officer/Tahsildar in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013. It was learnt that in addition to the land acquired, the State Co-operative Society had also purchased about 8.76 acres. As such the total extent was 12.36 acres. After obtaining planning permission and allotting space for road, sewerage, park, playground and Club, the planning permission was granted to the Society. Initially, the Third Respondent/Appellant in W.A.(MD) Nos.891 and 892 of 2013 Madura Mills were under the false impression that Cooperative Society was defunct. Later, they came to know it was very much in existence as the Fourth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013. Hence the impleading Petition in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 was filed by the Appellant/Residence Welfare Association.

18. In W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 while extending an Interim Order of demolition of Club Building, this Court, issued the following directions to the Respondents therein. ".The Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning, is directed to file an affidavit indicating the following:- (i). The name of the applicant, who has applied for approval of layout. (ii). The documents produced along with the application for layout so as to give indication about the person in ownership and possession of the property at that point of time. (iii). Whether the subject property was earmarked for public purpose in the layout. (iv). In case there was mutation of records in favour of the fifth respondent, the name of the party who transferred those lands to the sixth respondent. The Commissioner, Madurai Municipal Corporation, is directed to file counter affidavit indicating the following:- (i). the person of possession of the property as per the assessment register maintain by the Corporation. (ii). Whether the subject property was retained as a public purpose site in the lay out approved by the Director of Town and Country Planning and if so, the person in whose name the subject lay out was sanctioned.".

19. When the Writ Petition was pending, the Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital (writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2010), deliberately closed the access of playground for the Members of the Society. It is only for that purpose they had submitted a petition before the Collector, Madurai to set right the illegality. In the Petition, it was also stated that there was alleged blocking of the access that was being done by the Petitioner only on the issuance of patta in its favour. Hence that issue was referred to the Third Respondent/Tahsildar (in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013), who is the Appellate Authority for consideration relating to the grant of patta in favour of the Seventh Respondent.

20. The First Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai (Second Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013) passed an order only after perusal of the records submitted by the parties. Only on an overall consideration of factual aspects, the Second Respondent in {W.P.(MD) No.892 of 2013)/Revenue Divisional Officer passed the impugned order dated 2/2/2012, there is no illegality or error apparent on the face of record. An untenable reason mentioned in paragraph 5 of the affidavit in C.M.P.No.1473 of 2012 by the Writ Petitioner/Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital that only because the father-in- law of the present District Collector, Madurai is also a Member of their Society to the Petitioner/Seventh Respondent had not preferred an Appeal before the Revisionary Authority and the same was mentioned to prejudice the mind of this Court. So, the Writ Petition filed by the Writ Petitioner/Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 without following the statutory remedy is not at all sustainable. The Petitioner/Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital is to establish as to how the property of the Co-operative House Building Society viz., Fourth Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 (Fourth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 was transferred to Madura Coats, who was the alleged vendor of the Petitioner/Hospital.

21. Filing of suit in O.S.No.334 of 2009 on the file of the Learned Additional District Munsif, Madurai Town for grant of Interim Injunction and filing of an Appeal by the Third Respondent/Welfare Association is not at all germane for consideration of the issue involved. The Petitioner/Seventh Respondent had chosen to buy the public property without verifying the title of Madura Coats. Now, O.S.No.334 of 2009 had become almost infructuous. The Third Respondent/Welfare Association is not at all concerned with the title of the Petitioner/private Hospital. The only contention in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and in W.P.(MD)No.1473 of 2012 by the present Third Respondent is that as to how 70 cents of land ear marked for public purpose under planning permission of the year 1973 obtained by the Fourth Respondent were sought to be abused by the Madura Coats and by the Writ Petitioner/Private Hospital to the detriment of the Members of the Association. The open space was earmarked for recreation purposes of the residents of the Housing Colony floated and sold by the Fourth Respondent by Veettu Vasathi Variyam to its Members.

22. The counter averments of the Fourth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 and W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012:- The Fourth Respondent/Co-operative Housing Society has 1340 members with an annual turn over of Rs.680 lakhs, continued to function effectively. It is one of the Housing Societies in the State, actively rendered in service to its members without any complaints whatsoever. Earlier, at the request of the Society, the Government of Madras acquired an extent of 5.66 acres of land for the purpose of construction of houses, the Madurai Mill Employees Co-operative Building Society Limited under the Land Acquisition Act and the compensation was paid by the Society. Later, another extent of 8.76 acres of the land were purchased by the Society and applied for layout approval in the name of Harvey Nagar for a total extent of 12.30 acres and layout was also approved by the Director of Town and Country Planning for 88 plots in OTP/13/1973 dated 3/3/1973. At the time of obtaining approval of the layout as per the legal requirement, open space reservation area (OSR) land for public purpose like Road, Drainage, Park, Playground etc. were provided. After obtaining the plan approved, the house sites were distributed to its members and the Open Space Reservation land was kept intact and the Society strictly used the land for the purpose for which the land is reserved in the layout and they are holding the OSR land for the benefit of the public in general, and regularly paying the Urban Land Tax to the Revenue Authorities regularly in the name of the Society. The land said to have purchased by the Writ Petitioner/Private Hospital is the land reserved as Open Space Reservation for playground and till today, the public are using the playground playing various games. Since the land is reserved as Open Space Reservation area, the Madura Coats cannot claim any right over the property in pursuant of the order in favour of the Writ Petitioner/Private Hospital is totally void in law. The Writ Petitioner/Private Hospital cannot claim any right over the alleged sale deed executed in their favour. No one has any right to sell the land which is earmarked as Open Space Reservation area. Even though the land is earmarked as Open Space Reservation, the patta for the land stands in the name of the Respondent/Housing Society and they are only paying the Urban Land Tax in the name of the Society till date.

23. The Writ Petitioner/Private Hospital after the alleged purchase of the property, projected an application for transfer of patta in its name and the Revenue Authority viz., the Second Respondent/Tahsildar, without issuing any notice to the Housing Society and without conducting any enquiry simply transferred the patta in the name of the Writ Petitioner/Private Hospital. Only recently, after the Third Respondent/Welfare Association, preferred an Appeal before the First Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer challenging the order of transfer of patta, it came to know about the same and filed objection before the First Respondent. The First Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai, after conducting a detailed enquiry, passed the impugned order cancelling the patta which was transferred in favour of The Madura Coats Limited, which does not have any right of title over the disputed property. Hence the Mill cannot sell the property in any third party like the Writ Petitioner/Hospital and they cannot claim any right based on the alleged purchase, since the said transaction is void in law. By means of the impugned order passed by this Court on 9/2/2012, the Writ Petitioner/Hospital is continuously preventing the public from raising the playground and thereby causing disturbance to the public.

24. The Contentions of the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013:- The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contends that the Order of the Learned Single Judge dated 13/3/2012 passed in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 is contrary to Law and in fact, the Writ Petition should not have been dismissed because of the fact that the lands being the subject matter in issue were ear marked in the lay out as play ground and was so used for more than fifty years.

25. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant urges before this Court that when once a land was ear marked for a certain public purpose, the same could not be allowed to be converted for used or otherwise than for the purpose for which such lands were ear-marked.

26. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, the Fifth Respondent/the Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning, Madurai {in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013} had categorically stated in his counter affidavit that the lands were ear marked for public purpose and the same was used as a play ground by the public. As such, it is the plea of the Appellant that no permission could be granted for alienation of the land ear marked for public purpose and therefore, the Writ Petition ought not to have been dismissed.

27. That apart, it is the forceful submission of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that it is the well settled principle of Law that the owner of the land ear marked for public purpose holds such land in public trust for the benefit of general public and as such no alienation of such land was permissible if such intended conveyance involves altering the reservation of land and as such the Eighth respondent/Devaki Diagnostic Pvt. Ltd., Madurai {Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 and First Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013, in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013 and Seventh Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013}, cannot claim any right or title to the property because of the reason that the very sale of such lands ear marked for play ground in the lay out is illegal.

28. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant projects an argument that the Learned Single Judge should not have dismissed the Writ Petition (MD) No.14451 of 2010 on the ground that the Writ Petition at the instance of the Appellant/Society is not maintainable. Added further, the stand of the Appellant is that only the Members of the Society/Association, who are the direct beneficiaries or to, preserve the lands ear marked as a play-ground and the Appellant is very much affect by any conversion of the usage of land.

29. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contends that every Member of the public has a right to use the land ear marked for a play-ground for the purpose of Recreation and Sports and the said right is an intangible property vested with the Members of the public. Therefore, the very version of the land ear marked as a play ground into a Hospital for the private gain of the Eighth Respondent/Devaki Diagnostic Pvt Ltd., Madurai is violative of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India.

30. The Appellant's submissions in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013:- The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant/Fourth Respondent submits that the Order of the Learned Single Judge, in allowing the Writ Petition (MD) No.1473 of 2012 is contrary to Law.

31. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contends that the Learned Single Judge ought not to have allowed W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012, by setting aside the Order passed by the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai, in and by which the order effecting Transfer of Patta in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice made by the Third Respondent/Tahsildar, Madurai (South), Madurai was set aside.

32. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, the Learned Single Judge, ought not to have entertained W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 filed by the First Respondent/Writ Petitioner challenging the Order of the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, when there exists an effective and efficacious alternative remedy of filing Revision Petition before the District Revenue Officer, Madurai.

33. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submits that the land set apart for public purpose could not be alienated to a private individual, whereby the land would be put to a use other than for which it was ear marked and further, there was no disputed question of fact to be agitated before the Civil Court and in fact, the Learned Single Judge should have relegated the parties to approach the Civil Court.

34. It is the stand of the Appellant that the patta in respect of the lands ear marked for public purpose stood in the name of the Appellant and the same was changed in favour of the First Respondent/Devaki Diagnostics Pvt Ltd., Madurai without issuance of any notice to the Appellant and this important aspect was not taken into account by the Learned Single Judge, while quashing the order passed by the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai (South), Madurai dated 2/2/2012 in setting aside the order made by the Third Respondent/Tahsildar, Madurai (South) dated 2/12/2010.

35. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submits that even the vendor of the First Respondent/Devaki Diagnostics Private Ltd., Madurai had no title to the property in issue and therefore, the First Respondent, who claims right through such vendor has no legal footing to file W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012. However, this vital perspective of the matter was not appreciated by the Learned Single Judge in real perspective at the time of allowing the Writ Petition. In effect, the stand taken on behalf of the Appellant is that W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 filed by the First Respondent (Writ Petitioner) ought to have been dismissed in limine by the Learned Single Judge.

36. The contentions of the Appellant in W.A.(MD) Nos.891 of 2013 and 892 of 2013:- The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submits that the Learned Single Judge should not have dismissed the Writ Petition (MD) No.14451 of 2010 and also that the Learned Single Judge should not have allowed W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012.

37. It is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that the lands set apart in the lay out as a playground was used for more than fifty years and when the said land was ear marked for a public purpose, the same could not be converted or used other than the purpose for which it is allotted.

38. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant vehemently submits that the owner of the land holds the lands ear marked for public purpose in public Trust and when there was a rival claim to the title of the property between the Seventh Respondent/Devaki Diagnostics Private Ltd., Madurai and the Tenth Respondent/The Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Housing Societies Ltd., Madurai, the Learned Judge should not have dismissed the Writ Petition (MD) No.14451 of 2010.

39. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contends that the Learned Single Judge, should not have allowed W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 filed by the First Respondent/Devaki Diagnostics Private Limited, Madurai, because of the fact that even the vendor of the First Respondent had no title to the said property and therefore, the First Respondent, who claims right through vendor has no legal basis to file the Writ Petition (MD) No.1473 of 2010.

40. The Long Factual Matrix of the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013:- The Petitioner/Registered Association bearing No.23/87 was formed with the object of undertaking, welfare measure for the benefit of the residents of Harvey Nagar. The Sixth Respondent/Madura Coats Private Ltd Company and their workers formed a Society called Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society. Based on the request made by the said Registered Society, (bearing Registration No.2459), the Government of Madras acquired the lands in S.No.1300, 1308/2, 1309/2, 1310 and 1311, Madurai on 29/1/1958 which belonged to numerous persons for the purpose of constructing houses to the Members of the Building Society.

41. After the acquisition, the then Government of Madras assigned the said lands in favour of the Society. Later, the Society submitted a plan approval and lay out on 16/8/1971 for the formation of Harvey Nagar. The Town Planning Officer of Madurai Corporation, approved plan in L.P.A.No.18 of 1967. Out of 14 acres and 82 cents of land (being the land acquired), an extent of land measuring 1 acre and 10 cents was reserved for public purpose such as road, drainage, park, playground and club, etc. In the building plan, it was shown that certain extent of lands allotted was reserved for public purpose. Subsequently, on 13/3/1973, the Society, submitted a revised plan which was sanctioned by the Fifth Respondent/Madurai Corporation in Proceedings No.13/1973. After obtaining sanction, the Eighth Respondent/Housing Society, constructed an auditorium, measuring an extent of 1800 Sq.feet in the appropriate market place and also established a place for Volley Ball Court, Shuttle Cock Court and Basket Ball Court. The said lands were used as a playground from then onwards and the Petitioner/Welfare Association was permitted to utilise the same as a playground and for recreation.

42. The lands so acquired and ear marked for being used as a playground was originally assigned in the name of Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The said Society was later renamed as Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Building Society/Eighth Respondent herein. By that time, the lands assigned came to be utilised by persons for construction of residential houses, they having purchased the same from the Eighth Respondent/Society. Later, the residents of the locality formed by the Petitioner/Association. Even in the lay out approved by the Local Planning Authority till date and other revenue records, reflected that the land in S.No.1300, measuring an extent of 1 acre and 10 cents was reserved and ear marked for being used as a playground. The residents of the said locality and the members of Petitioner's Association were using the said place as a playground till the year 2010. The said place was an open space which served as a place of recreation.

43. The Sixth Respondent/Madura Coats Private Limited, Madurai, claiming to be an exclusive owner of the lands ear marked for a public purpose as a playground, sought to prevent the members of the Petitioner/Association from using the said lands as a playground. Although the said land was used as a playground since 1967, the Sixth Respondent/Company suddenly claimed the said lands to be its exclusive property and also attempted to sell/transfer the said lands in favour of private individuals.

44. On coming to know of this fact, the Petitioner/Association, filed an application under the Right to Information Act on 5/8/2010 and on 24/8/2010, to the Fifth Respondent/The Commissioner, Madurai Municipal Corporation, Madurai through his reply dated 29/7/2010, informed that the said places were ear marked as a club-building and playground of Madura Mills.

45. Even assuming without admitting that the said lands were ear marked as a playground in the lay out belongs to Sixth Respondent/Company, the Sixth Respondent holds the said lands in Law as a Trustee in the public and the same could not be alienated in favour of third parties. Further, the Sixth Respondent/Company filed a suit in O.S.No.334 of 2009 on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Madurai Town, seeking a relief of permanent injunction restraining the petitioner Association or its members from in any way interfering with its alleged peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property to an extent of 1 acre and 10 cents. In the said suit, I.A.No.273 of 2009 was filed praying for the relief of Interim Injunction. In I.A.No.273 of 2009, an order of dismissal of the application was passed on 29/9/2010. As against the dismissal of I.A.No.273 of 2009, the Petitioner filed C.M.A.No.10 of 2010 on the file of the Principal Sub-Court, Madurai and the same is pending.

46. The Sixth Respondent/Company tried to alienate the lands ear marked for public purpose of the Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital. On coming to know of this fact, the Petitioner/Association submitted a representation to the Sub-Registrar, Arasaradi, on 27/7/2010 and requested him not to entertain any documents witnessing the allegation of the said lands in S.Nos.1300, 1308/2, 1309/2, 1310. To the shock and dismay of the Petitioner Association, the Sub Registrar informed through his proceedings dated 17/8/2010 that the request could not be considered. Taking advantage of the same, the Sixth Respondent/Company, executed a sale deed dated 12/11/2010 in favour of the Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital, notwithstanding the fact that the lands to an extent of 1 acre and 10 cents were ear marked as playground and as such any alienation is illegal.

47. The Petitioner/Association, reiterates its stand that after the acquisition of the lands, the entire lands came to be assigned in favour of the Eighth Respondent/Society and therefore, the Sixth Respondent/Company has no title to convey the said property in favour of the Seventh Respondent. On the strength of the said illegal sale, the Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital admitted to demolish the building on the ground by using heavy machinery on 4/12/2010. But the said attempt was prevented by the Petitioner's Association and the general public with the help of the District Administration. The Petitioner/Association, projected a representation dated 4/12/2010 to the Respondents 1 to 5 and requested them to take action against the Sixth and Seventh Respondents. In the meanwhile, the Petitioner's Association was given to understand that the Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital was attempting to demolish the playground and effect construction in the said lands without obtaining any permission from the competent authorities for the reconversion. As such, the Petitioner's Association filed W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 before this Court seeking a writ of mandamus forbearing the Respondents 1 to 5 from granting any permission to demolish or to make any construction in T.S.Nos.48, 49, 52 and 21 Harvey Nagar, Madurai.

48. In W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010, an Interim Injunction was granted by this Court, by means of an order dated 13/3/2010, restraining the Respondents 1 to 5 from granting any permission either to demolish or to make construction in respect of new T.S.Nos.48, 49, 52 and 21 of Harvey Nagar, Madurai. In the said Writ Petition, the Fourth Respondent/Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning, Madurai, filed a counter affidavit stating that in the lay out approved by them, 10% of total area was ear marked of public usage and the same was utilised as on date as a Shuttle Cock Court, Badminton Court, Basket Ball Court and Foot Ball Court. Also, it was categorically mentioned by the Fourth Respondent that no application for reconversion or for altering or changing the usage of the land ear marked for public purpose was received by his Office and that as per Rules, no permission could be granted after alienation of such land ear marked for public purpose.

49. In view of the fact that the lands ear marked for public purpose could not be alienated and further, the lands are held in public Trust, this Court contrary to the well settled principle of Law had dismissed W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010. As against the said order of dismissal, the Writ Petitioner/Association filed an Appeal before this Court. Soon after the dismissal of the Writ Petition, the Seventh Respondent/Private Hospital, entered into the playground with heavy machineries and began to dismantle the playground with an intention of effecting construction in the lands which were used by the Petitioner since 1963.

50. The contentions of the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013:- The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that inaction of the Respondents 1 to 5, to prevent an unlawful conversion of the land ear marked as a playground is an unjust and an unreasonable one and also in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

51. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that once the land was ear marked for public purpose, the same is held in public Trust by the State and as such any alienation of such property to any private individual, so as to defeat the right of general public to use such lands as playground is illegal and void ab initio.

52. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner puts forward a contention that the Respondents owe a duty to maintain the lands ear marked for public usages and to prevent the usage of such lands for any other purpose, then the purpose for which it was reserved and failure on the part of the Respondents to prevent such illegal conversion of the land in usage is in Breach of Duty caste on them.

53. The stand of the Petitioner is that the lands ear marked as playground since 1967 and was used as a place of recreation and therefore, it is a part of the right to environment and as such conversion of the land ear marked as playground into commercial building is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which speaks of 'Right of Life'.

54. Lastly, it is the submission of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that the action of the Respondents in attempting to convert the lands ear marked as playground into Hospital for the benefit of the Seventh Respondent as against the principle of ".Privatum Commodum Publico Cedit.".

55. The Legal Submissions on Appellant's side in in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013:- The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Order passed by the Learned Single Judge in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 dated 13/3/2013 warrants interference by this Court for the reason that in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in BANGALORE MEDICAL TRUST Vs. B.S.MUDDAPPA AND OTHERS (AIR1991SUPREME COURT1902, wherein in paragraph 24, it is observed as follows:- ".24. Protection of the environment, open spaces for recreation and fresh air, playground for children, promenade for the residents, and other conveniences or amenities are matters of great public concern and of vital interest to be taken care of in a development scheme. It is that public interest which is sought to be promoted by the Act by establishing the BDA. The public interest in the reservation and preservation of open spaces for parks and playgrounds cannot be sacrificed by leasing or selling such sites to private persons for conversion to some other user. Any such act would be contrary to the legislative intent and inconsistent with the statutory requirements. Furthermore, it would be in direct conflict with the constitutional mandate to ensure that any State action is inspired by the basic values of individual freedom and dignity and addressed to the attainment of a qualify of life which makes the guaranteed rights a reality for all the citizens. {KHARAK SINGH V. THE STATE OF U.P. (1964) 1 SCR332 (AIR1963SC1295; MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, RATLAM V. SHRI VARDHINICHAND, (1981) 1 SCR97 (AIR1980SC1622; FRANCIES CORALIE MULLIN V. THE ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI, (1981) 2 SCR515 (AIR1981SC746; OLGA TELLIS V. BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPOATION, (1985) 3 SCC545 (AIR1986SC180; STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH V. UMED RAM SHARMA, AIR1986SC847AND VIKRAM DEO SINGH TOMAR V. STATE OF BIHAR, AIR1988SC1782.". and contends that in the instant case, the lands ear marked for public purpose could not be reconverted or altered, etc.

56. Further, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contends that in the aforesaid decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in BANGALORE MEDICAL TRUST Vs. B.S.MUDDAPPA AND OTHERS (AIR1991SUPREME COURT1902, at special page 1915, in paragraph 36, it is among other things held as follows:- ".The restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in wake of public interest litigation. Even in private challenge to executive or administrative action having extensive fall out the dividing line between personal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing. Law has veered round from genuine grievance against order affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest in the matter. The rise in exercise of power by the executive and comparative decline in proper and effective administrative guidance is forcing citizens to espouse challenges with public interest flavour. It is too late in the day, therefore, to claim that petition filed by inhabitants of a locality whose park was converted into a nursing home and no cause to invoke equity jurisdiction of the High Court. In fact, public spirited citizens having faith in rule of law are rendering great social and legal services by espousing cause of public nature. They cannot be ignored or overlooked on technical or conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or absence of personal loss or injury. Present day development of this branch of jurisprudence is towards freer movement both in nature of litigation and approach of the Court. Residents of locality seeking protection and maintenance of environment of their locality cannot be said to be busy bodies or interlopers. {S.P.GUPTA V. UNION OF INDIA (1982) 2 SCR365. Even otherwise, physical or personal or economic injury may give rise to civil or criminal action but violation of rule of law either by ignoring or affronting individual or action of the executive in disregard of the provisions of law raises substantial issue of accountability of those entrusted with responsibility of the administration. It furnishes enough cause of action either for individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition and the authorities cannot be permitted to seek shelter under cover of technicalities of locus standi nor they can be heard to plead for restraint in exercise of discretion as grave issues of public concern outweigh such considerations.".

57. The plea taken on behalf of the Appellant is that the principles laid down in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in BANGALORE MEDICAL TRUST Vs. B.S.MUDDAPPA AND OTHERS (AIR1991SUPREME COURT1902, squarely applies to the facts of the present case in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and the observation of the Learned Single Judge, while dismissing W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 that the Writ Petition filed at the instance of the First Respondent is not maintainable, is contrary in the aforesaid decision of the Honourable Supreme Court. Viewed in that perspective, it is projected on the side of the Appellant that the Order of the Learned Single Judge dated 13/3/2013 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 in dismissing the Writ Petition is not per se correct in the eye of law.

58. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submits that the assumption of the Learned Single Judge, while passing the order in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 to the effect that there exists a dispute as to the title of the property is a misconceived one for the simple reason that the entire land in S.No.1300, Madurai was vested with the Appellant/Society by means of an acquisition and the playground, measuring 70 cents forming part of the said acquired land belonging to the Appellant/Society. Moreover, there is no dispute as to the title of the property nor it is the adjudication of the present litigation between the parties relates to the disputed questions of fact.

59. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant seeks in aid of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pt.CHET RAM VASHIST (DEAD) BY L.RS Vs. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI (AIR1995SC at page 431), at special page 435, wherein in paragraph 6, it has laid down as follows:- ".Reserving any site for any street, open space, park, school etc., in a lay-out plan is normally a public purpose as it is inherent in such reservation that it shall be used by the public in general. The effect of such reservation is that the owner ceases to be a legal owner of the land in dispute and he holds the land for the benefit of the society or the public in general. It may result in creating an obligation in nature of trust and may preclude the owner from transferring or selling his interest in it. It may be true as held by the High Court that the interest which is left in the owner is a residuary interest which may be nothing more than a right to hold this land in trust for the specific purpose specified by the coloniser in the sanctioned lay-out plan.".

60. To lend support to the contention that the reservation of any land for public purpose continuous to remain the same irrespective of a person who holds the said property, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submits that the reservation of any land for public purpose makes the owner to loose his exclusive right. Enjoyment and the right to sell the property and any alienation of the said land is void ab initio in the eye of law.

61. Added further, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant proceeds to submit that the Legal Body continues to be bound by a legal obligation to maintain the said lands for public purpose viz., to the benefit of the general and in this regard, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant relies on the decision 2010 4 LAW WEEKLY at page 76, at special page 79, wherein it is held as follows:- ".The reservation under the sanctioned lay out creates an obligation on the owner of the land and the Corporation ion the nature of trustee to protect the interest of the public. So too, the purchasers of the plots in the sanctioned layout have the vested right for enjoying the common area fully. The Corporation and the owner have the legal necessity of respecting the expectation of the purchasers of the layout sanctioned plots that the earmarked portion continue to be available for public purpose; that neither the passage of time nor the whims and desires of the land owners affect the reservation of the land for public purpose.". and also cites the decision IN1 K.RAJAMANI AND3OTHERS VS. ALAMUNAGAR RESIDENTS' WELFARE ASSOCIATION, A SOCIETY REGISTERED UNDER THE SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT, HAVING ITS REGISTRATION No.131/2005 1-A ALAMU NAGAR, SATHI ROAD, COIMBATORE641012, rep. BY ITS PRESIDENT M.BALASUBRAMANIAN AND3OTHERS {2011 (1) CTC257and 258}, wherein it is observed and held as follows:- ".A specific area was earmarked by the Town Planning Authority for public purpose while approving a scheme. Subsequently, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department passed an order according permission to change the said land from public purpose to housing plots. The Residents' Association questioned the said order. The Writ Petition was allowed. On Writ Appeal, the power of the Government to order de-reservation of land reserved for public purpose, use of such land for different purpose, need for resort to Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land with reference to Section 36 of Town and Country Planning Act were discussed. Held: In our considered view, such power cannot be extended to alter, revoke or modify the conditions imposed in the layout plan. In that view of the matter, we hold that once such permission is accorded and in that permission if a specified area is earmarked for public purpose, even the Planning Authority shall not have power to exempt that land for being put to use for any other purpose. In that context, the State Government also cannot have any jurisdiction to alter the conditions imposed in the layout, whereby certain lands are earmarked as open space to be used for public purposes. In that view of the matter, the contention of Mr.K.M.Vijayan, learned Senior Counsel that the Government has power to de-reserve the land earmarked for public purpose to housing plots cannot be accepted. The learned Judge has rightly held that the Government has no power to de-reserve the open space and that finding requires no interference. Accordingly, we answer point No.(i). A survey of the above law shows that the land once earmarked for public purpose cannot be earmarked for any other purpose and, particularly, to de- reserve or put to use as housing plots. (See Krishna Nagar Residents Welfare Association V. DIRECTOR OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING {2001 (3) L.W.828}. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that in view of non-compliance of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the land in question shall be deemed to have been released cannot be accepted on the facts of this case.".

62. The Gist of the submission of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant is that once a land is reserved for public purpose, such as a playground (in the instant case before this Court), the owner of the property, looses his right to alienate the said property and any such alienation in law is subject to the reservation for public purpose and irrespective of ownership, the lands earmarked are required to be maintained for the purpose for which they were earmarked. Further, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant goes on to add that even if it is assumed that the Seventh Respondent/Madura Coats Private Limited, Madurai is the owner of the property, it cannot alienate the playground in favour of the Eighth Respondent.

63. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contends that even if the Eighth Respondent/Private Hospital has purchased the property from the Seventh Respondent/Madura Coats, Madurai, the right of the Eighth Respondent/Hospital is subject to the reservation of the said lands being maintained as play ground and at best, he only derives a right to maintain the said lands as a playground and per contra, it could not put the same for any other purpose.

64. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, the Seventh Respondent/Madura Coats Private Limited, Madurai, filed O.S.No.334 of 2009 seeking the relief of permanent injunction and in the description of the suit property, it was said to have been sold to the Eighth Respondent/Private Hospital, the suit property was mentioned as one which comprises of a road, Volley Ball Court, Basket Ball Court, Badminton Court and Shuttle Cock Court.

65. At this juncture, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, invited the attention of this Court that the Fourth Respondent/Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning, Madurai in counter affidavit in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and Fifth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 mentioned in clear terms that the land belonged to Madura Mills Co-operative Building Society and that the layout was approved during the year 1971 and in 1973, according to which 10% of the total area was earmarked for public purpose and was used by general public as a playground.

66. Also, it was averred in the counter affidavit of the Fourth Respondent/Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning, Madurai that the Authority had not received any application for converting or altering or changing the use of land which was earmarked for public purpose and the said land was only utilised as Volley Ball Court, Basket Ball Court, Badminton Court and Shuttle Cock Court.

67. Yet another stand taken on behalf of the Appellant is that the plea of the Respondent/Private Hospital that by revised approval in the year 1973, the reservation was altered and was falsified by the statement of the Fourth Respondent/Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning, Madurai {in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010} that they had not received any application for alteration or conversion and even if such or application was made, no de-reservation could be made of the land earmarked for public purpose.

68. Continuing further, it is the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant even if the property belongs to the Eighth Respondent/Private Hospital, by virtue of the purported sale deed executed by the Seventh Respondent/Madura Coats Private Limited, Eighth Respondent/Hospital could not alter the usage of the land from being used as playground or put the said land to any other house.

69. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submits that even as per the detailed development plan published by the Madurai Local Planning Authority in exercise of its powers under the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 called the West Ponnagaram Detailed Development Plan Part III (C.No.41825/77D2), the lands being the subject matter in the Writ Petition were reserved as a playground, Park and for public purpose and thus, even it was to be assumed such private property of the Eighth Respondent/Hospital, it could not be converted or utilised for any other purpose as such reservation is a statutory reservation irrespective of any layout reservation.

70. In this connection, the plea taken by the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant is that one can equate the same to the reservation made in a Master Plan published by CMDA, whereby even a private property so reserved could not be put to any other purpose other than for which it is reserved.

71. At this stage, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant to substantiate his contention that once an area had been reserved in a detailed development plan, even a private owner having ownership in respect of such land could not be allowed to put it for any other use, cites the following decisions:- (i). In the decision SURIYA Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU {2008 (5) MLJ at page 547, wherein at special page 548, it is held thus:- ".As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the third respondent, the petitioner is stated to have been carrying on commercial activities in the ground floor to the extent of 1043.05 Sq.Mtrs and Cottage industrial activities in an area about 900 Sq.Mtrs., as per the rules the permissible floor area for carrying on a trading activity is only to an extent of 20 Sq.Mtrs. To put it differently, if a blatant violator of the law attempts to take advantage of the safeguard provided in the statute which would otherwise be detrimental to the interest of the public at large the Court cannot remain a silent spectator. The Division Bench finally concluded that the commercial establishment of the petitioner is in a primary residential zone, which is not permissible in law.". (ii). In the decision P.T.PRABHAKAR AND ANOTHER Vs. THE MEMBER SECRETARY, CHENNAI METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, NO.1, GANDHI IRWIN ROAD, CHENNAI8AND7OTHERS {2006 (5) CTC at page Nos.449 and 450} and held that ".The Object of Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 is to regulate development of town, so as to secure present and future inhabitants and sanitary conditions, amenity and convenience, etc. (iii). In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in H.KASHINATH AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS1995(5) SCC at page Nos.647 and 648, it is held as follows:- ".Since the plot was reserved under the Comprehensive Development Plan for a public or semi-public purpose, the lease in favour of Respondent 4 cannot be upheld since it is in violation of the purpose for which the site had been earmarked. The fourth respondent-Society is essentially a society to promote the interests of its members who are film artistes. It cannot be described as an educational, cultural or religious institution. Moreover, what was being constructed is not a community hall but a theatre to train artistes and stage plays or show films in that connection along with a school for training artistes. It is nowhere stated that the theatre would be open to the public at a nominal cost, or that Respondent 4 will not make profits out of running the theatre, or hiring it out to other organisations or individuals. One of the avowed aims of Respondent 4 is to earn income which can be utilised for the objects of the Association. Thus, even though the objects of Respondent 4 are laudable but they do not fall under the category of a public or semi-public purpose. Therefore, the lease cannot be said to be for public or semi-public purpose. It is not covered by Paragraph 1, 2, 7 of the Building Bye-Laws of 1983 or by Paragraph 1.2.71 thereof framed by the Corporation which enumerates uses that are permitted under this category. The activities of Respondent 4 also do not fall under any of the categories mentioned in clause (iv) of Section 2 (bb) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act which defines ".civic amenity".. They are activities of a very specific nature aimed at imparting training and promoting the welfare of film artistes. They are not activities which can be generally classified as educational, social or cultural activities.". (iv). In the decision M.C.MEHTA Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS {2004 (6) SCC at page 588}, at special page 590 and 591, wherein it is observed as follows:- ".The land cannot be permitted to be used contrary to the stipulated user except by amendment of the master plan after due observance of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Inaction by the Government amounts to indirectly permitting unauthorised use which amounts to the amendment of the master plan without following due procedure. The proposal of in situ regularisation has also been opposed by the National Regional Board which has pointed out that the very purpose of the Act would be defeated by such regularisation. It wold lead to further congestion of Delhi instead of decongestion.". (v). In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in PADMA Vs. HIRALAL MOTILAL DESARDA AND OTHERS {(2002) 7 SUPREME COURT CASES564, at page 569, it is held as follows:- ".Laws dealing with development planning are indispensable to sanitation and healthy urbanization. Development Planning comprehensively takes care of statutory, manual, administrative and land-use laws hand in hand with architectural creativity. Development planning is the DNA of urbanization - the genetic code that determines what will get built. A development plan is essential to the aesthetics of urban society. Planned development is the crucial zone that strikes a balance between the needs of large-scale urbanization as it saves the development from chaos and uglification. A departure from planning may result in disfiguration of the beauty of an upcoming city and may pose a threat for the ecological balance and environmental safeguards.". (vi). In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in DLF QUTAB ENCLAVE COMPLEX EDUCATIONAL CHARITABLE TRUST Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS {(2003) 5 SCC - 622}, at special page Nos.624 and 625, it is held as follows:- ".The Act was enacted to regulate the use of land in order to prevent ill- planned and haphazard urbanisation in or around towns in the State of Haryana. Although the object of the Act is laudable but does it mean that with a view to achieve the same, the regulatory provisions contained therein should be construed as a total prohibition on transfer of land not only in relation to those which are required for development works but also to schools, hospitals, community centres and other community buildings, is the core question involved in these appeals. Construction of Schools, hospital and community centres and other community building do not come within the purview of the term ".development works".. they come within the purview of the term ".amenities".. The expression ".development work". is not synonymous with ".amenity".. The expression ".amenity". as defined in Rule 2 (b) of the Rules is wider than ".development works".. No principle of construction of statute suggests that a wider expression used in the rule may be read in the statute employing narrower expression. Even in the rule, the said expressions have been used for different purposes. The licence also does not postulate that all amenities must be provided by the colonizer at its own expense. The cost of development words indisputably is to be raised from the plot-holders, but as construction of schools, hospitals, community centres and other community buildings do not come within the purview of the term ".development works"., the costs therefor are not to be borne by them. Right of transfer of land is indisputably incidental to the right of ownership. Such a right can be curtailed or taken away only by reason of a statute. An embargo upon the owner of the land to transfer the same should not be readily inferred. Section 3 (3) (a) (iv) of the Act does not expressly impose any restriction. The same is merely a part of an undertaking. If a transfer is made in violation of the undertaking, the statue does not provide that the same would be illegal or the transferee would not derive any title by reason thereof. The purpose is to ensure that schools, hospitals, community centres and other community buildings are established at the places reserved therefor in the sanction plan but there does not exist any embargo as regards the person or persons who would run and manage the same. A regulatory Act must be construed having regard to the purpose it seeks to achieve. The State as a statutory authority cannot ask for something which is not contemplated under the Act. A statute relating to regulation of user of land must not be construed to be a limitation prohibiting transfer of land which does not affect its user. The present case is not concerned with the question as to whether the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are applicable in the State of Haryana or not. Ownership of land jurisprudentially involves a bundle of rights. One of such rights is the right to transfer. Such a right, being incidental to the right of ownership, having regard to Article 300 A of the Constitution of India, cannot be taken away save by authority of law.". (vii). In the decision KARPAGA NAGAR NALA URIMAI SANGAM, rep. BY ITS SECRETARY, SHANMUGAVEL Vs. MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND WATER SUPPLY DEPT., rep. BY ITS SECRETARY, CHENNAI AND OTEHRS {2007 (4) MLJ at page 1006 and 1007}, it is held as follows:- ".The plots covered by the impugned notification and belonging to the owner was classified as reserved for public purposes by the lay out sanctioned by the Town Panchayat in PR21of 1972. In 1974, the Panchayat village was included in the City Corporation. The Director of Town Planning gave approval for the said lay out in LPMR1of 1975 subject to the condition that the said plots must be kept reserved for public purposes O.S.No.1106 of 1986 filed by two persons purporting to be a representative suit by the Welfare Society (the petitioner) for injunction restraining the owner from selling the lands in dispute and for directing the Corporation to take over the common lands, was terminated by a joint memo filed by the parties... A demand for payment of expenses for providing amenities made by the Corporation was quashed in W.P.No.8962 of 1988 filed by the owner. The owner applied for permission to construct in Section Nos.276 and 369 falling within the reserved area but it was rejected by the Corporation but was allowed in W.P.No.1565 of 1987. G.O.Ms.No.244 dated 23.9.1994 accorded permission for dereservation of the disputed plots on a misconception of the scope of the order in W.P.1565 of 1986. The petitioner welfare society applied in writ to quash the G.O. G.O.Ms.No.244 dated 23.9.1994 is liable to be quashed. The Town Panchayat had already reserved the plots in question for public purposes in approved plan PR21of 1972. The Corporation constituted in 1974 by the Act as the successor is bound by such approved lay out. The Corporation Act would only be prospective. The application filed by the owner before the Corporation and in approved plan No.1 of 1975 keeping the reservation of plots intact cannot be considered to be a mere formality. The same is in accordance with Section 250 (2) of the Corporation Act. The provisions of the Town Planning Act and Corporation Act are to be read together and not in derogation to each other. Both Acts operate in different fields Section 250 of the Corporation Act provides for the obligation of owners to make a street when disposing of lands as building sites reserving some lands as common for the purpose of sanction Town Planning Act is for the purpose of land development and to acquire any land required for purposes envisaged under the Act under Section 37 and Land Acquisition Act Section 250 Corporation Act did not envisage such procedure.".

72. The Legal Pleas of the Appellant in W.A (MD) No.744 of 2013:- The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contends that the order passed by the Learned Single Judge in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 dated 13/3/2013 warrants interference by this Court because of the reason that as against the impugned order made by the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai dated 2/2/2012 in Appeal under Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act, 1983, a Revision lies before the District Revenue Officer has envisaged under Section 13 of the Act. As such, it is the forceful contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that when the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act, 1983 provides for an effective, efficacious and alternative remedy of filing a Revision against the impugned order dated 2/2/2012 passed by the Second Respondent, then it is not open to the Learned Single Judge who have entertained Writ Petition (MD) No.1473 of 2012.

73. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contends that though a plea is taken on behalf of the First Respondent/Private Hospital {in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012} that Father-in-Law of an Officer, superior to the Revisionary Authority, lives in Harvey Nagar and therefore, a statutory remedy was not availed off and further, in the absence of such Superior Officer or Revisionary Authority not added as parties either in their personal capacity or official capacity in the Writ Petition, it has contended on behalf of the Appellant that such vague allegations in the absence of materials could not be countenanced and in fact, prays for dismissal of the Writ Petition (MD) No.1473 of 2012.

74. In support of the contention that when allegations of mala fides or personal bias are levelled against the concerned persons, then such persons should be arrayed as necessary/proper parties and further more, there should be specific and categorical averments made against such Officers/persons and in the absence of the same, the vague allegations should not be accepted by a Court of Law readily, as per the following decisions:- (i). J.N.BANAVALIKAR (Dr) Vs. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF DELHI {1995 SUPP (4) SCC - 89} (ii). JINDAL INDUSTRIES LTD Vs. STATE OF HARYANA {1991 SUPP (2) SCC587 (iii). STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. CHAMAN LAL GOYAN {1995 (2) SCC570 and (iv). I.K.MISHRA Vs. UNION OF INDIA {1997 (6) SCC228.

75. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant to draw the attention of this Court that when an effective and efficacious remedy is very much available, viz., filing of a Revision under Section 13 of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act, 1983 before the District Revenue Officer as against the impugned order dated 2/2/2012 passed by the Second Respondent, then the Writ Petition filed by the First Respondent/Private Hospital in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 is not maintainable, he relies on the following decisions (a). HINDUSTAN STEEL WORKS CONSTRUCTIONS LTD Vs. EMPLOYEES UNION {2005 (6) SCC725 (b). U.P. STATE BRIDGE CORPORATION LTD AND OTEHRS VS. U.P.RAJYA SETU NIGAM KARAMCHARI SANGH {2004 (4) SCC268 (c). RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPN Vs. KRISHNA KANT {(1995) 5 SCC75 (d). CHANDRAKANT TUKARAM NIKAM Vs. MUNICIPAL CORPN OF AHAMED {(2002) 2 SCC542 (e). SETH CHAN RATAN Vs. PANDIT DURGA PRASAD (AIR2003SC2736 (f). A.P.FOODS Vs. S. SAMUEL {(2006) 5 SCC469(g). SANJAY SITARAM KHEMKA Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (AIR2006SC2016 and (h). CENTRAL COALFIELDS LTD Vs. STATE OF JHARKHAND (AIR2005SC3425 for the propositions that a Writ Petition could be entertained by a Court of Law despite availability of alternative remedy only in cases where the order was passed without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice.

76. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submits that the First Respondent filed W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 based on the pleading that the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer had passed the impugned order at the instance of the District Collector and therefore, the Second Respondent had not exercised its quasi-judicial power in appeal in an independent fashion. The District Collector was not arrayed as a party in the Writ Petition and therefore, Writ Petition (MD) No.1473 of 2012 ought to be dismissed by this Court for non-joinder of necessary parties. In this regard, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant places reliance on the following decisions:- (i). STATE OF KERALA Vs. W.I.SERVICES & ESTATES LTD {(1998) 5 SCC583 (ii). A. JANARDHANA Vs. UNION OF INDIA (AIR1983SC769 (iii). STATE OF HIMACHALPRADESH Vs. KAILASH CHAND MAHAJAN (AIR1992SC1277 1308) (iv). HARCHARAN SINGH Vs. FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, REVENUE PUNJAB, CHANDIGARH, (AIR1997P & H40 (v). PRABODH VERMA Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (AIR1985SC167 180) (vi). BHAGWANTI Vs. SUBORDINATE SERVICES SELECTION BOARD {(1995) Supt.2 SCC663.

77. Apart from the above, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submits that the Learned Single Judge allowed W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 filed by the First Respondent/Hospital, wherein the order passed by the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai South dated 2/2/2012 was challenged and the Learned Single Judge, by allowing the Writ Petition, on 13/3/2013, revived the illegal order passed by the Third Respondent/Tahsildar dated 14/12/2010. In this connection, he relied on the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court in MAHARAJA CHINTAMANI SARAN NATH SHAHDEO Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS {1999 (8) SCC page No.16}, at special page Nos.22 and 28, wherein in paragraph Nos.12 and 38, it is observed as follows:- ".12. Therefore, the question is whether the order of the Member of Board of Revenue should be quashed on this ground. If the order is set aside, the result would be that the notice directing the appellant to refund the additional amount of compensation assessed at ten times of the net income would have to be quashed. In other words, the earlier reassessment of compensation made by giving ten times of the net income would revive. If under the law the appellant is not entitled to get compensation more than three times of the net income it would amount to restoring an illegal order.

38. For what has been stated above, we hold that the order of the learned Member of Board of Revenue directing action to be taken for refund of the excess compensation was valid and proper though he had no jurisdiction to pass the order. In the event, it is set aside it would amount to reviving an invalid order of payment of excess compensation to the appellant.".

78. Also that, according to the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, a similar view was taken by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decisions (i). GADDE VENKATESWARA RAO Vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (AIR1966SC828 (ii). MOHD. SWALLEH Vs. III AD (1988 I SCR840.

79. Moreover, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant also cites the decision RV THEVAR MEMORIAL GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL, CHOLAPURAM Vs. THE DIRECTOR OF SCHOOL EDUCATION, MADRAS AND4OTHERS {2002 (4) CTC129, at special page No.140, wherein in paragraph 28, it has observed as follows:- ".In view of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the appellant- management has not obtained any prior approval which is mandatory under the Act 1973 for dispensing with the services of the fourth respondent in the respective Writ Appeals, and so such orders of termination cannot stand in the eye of law and so the 1st respondent is correct in directing the appellant-management to permit the 4th respondent in the respective Writ Appeals to continue in service. Even if the said orders had been passed without following the principles of natural justice, we are not inclined to interfere with the said order, as the 1st respondent has passed the said orders in accordance with law, and if we interfere with the said orders, it amounts to revival of illegal orders of termination passed by the appellant-management.".

80. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant brings it to the notice of this Court that in the present case, Third Respondent/Tahsildar, Madurai (South), Madurai had transferred the patta standing in the name of the Appellant Society in favour of the First Respondent/Hospital without issuing any notice or hearing the Appellant and as such the said 'Transfer of Patta' is an illegal one.

81. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contends that as per Rule 4 (4) of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Rules, 1987, who is the Third Respondent/Tahsildar, who is prohibited from entertaining an application for transfer of patta, when parties dispute title to the property and requires them to approach the competent Civil Court.

82. The pith and substance of the submission of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant is that the action on the part of the Third Respondent/Tahsildar in transferring patta in favour of the First Respondent/Private Hospital, despite their being a purported dispute as to the title of the property and moreso, when the suit in O.S.No.334 of 2009 is pending on the file of trial Court is a clear case of negation of Rule 4 (4) of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Rules, 1987.

83. Further more, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant proceeds to make a further plea that there is no fetter on the part of the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai South, under the Rules to entertain an appeal under the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Rules, 1983 in the Appeal when there exists a dispute as to the title.

84. Finally, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submits that even if the Learned Single Judge had entertained an opinion that the subject matter in issue is to be decided by a Civil Court, then he should not have set aside the order of the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer dated 2/2/2012 and instead, he should have relegated the parties to approach the Civil Court, without setting aside the order passed by the Second Respondent and in support of this plea, he refers to the decisions:- (i) In VISHWAS FOOTWEAR COMPANY LTD., A-2 THIRD PHASE, GUINDY INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, CHENNAI600032, rep. BY ITS DIRECTOR, V.RAVI {2011 (5) CTC at page 94, wherein it is held that ".Writ Court normally will not entertain the writ petition and adjudicate disputed questions.". Further, it is held that ".When there is a dispute as to the title, already should be directed to approach the competent Civil Court of title dispute.". (ii). In the decision KUPPUSWAMI NAINAR Vs. THE DISTRICT REVENUE OFFICER, THIRUVANNAMALAI AND OTHERS {1995 (1) MLJ at page 426 and 427}, it is held as follows:- ".In a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the question of title regarding immovable property cannot be gone into because a mass of evidence may be required for adjudicating the question of title. Even if the Court is to interfere with the order under appeal, it is the other party who has to go to a civil Court and establish title. As far as the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is concerned, it does not matter to it whether 'A' party goes to civil Court of 'B' party. Therefore, the Court is of the view that the question of title has to be decided by the civil Court without reference to the order under question. Hence, the Court declines to interfere with the order challenged in the writ petition.". (iii). The Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant places reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in 1. C.SABESAN CHETTIAR (DECEASED) AND4OTHERS Vs.

1. THE DISTRICT REVENUE OFFICER, COIMBATORE DISTRICT AND3OTHERS {2011 (5) CTC241 (where one of us viz., M.VENUGOPAL,J was a party), wherein it is held as follows:- ".As per Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass-Book Act, 1986 (4 of 1986), the entries in the Patta Pass-Book and the certified copies of entries in the Patta Pass-Book shall be presumed to be true and correct, until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. As a matter of fact, Section 6 of the Act envisages that the entries in the Patta Pass-Book issued by the Tahsildar as per Section 3 shall be prima facie evidence of title of the person, in whose name the Patta Pass-Book has been issued to the parcels of land entered in the Patta Pass-Book, free of any prior encumbrance, unless otherwise specified therein. However, the Patta Pass-Book being a prima facie evidence is a rebuttable presumption in law, as opined by this Court. From a reading of Rule 4 (4) of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Rules, it is clear that if the Tahsildar is satisfied that a dispute concerning ownership of Patta is already pending in a Court or issues are raised before him which impinge on personal laws or laws of succession and all the parties interested do not agree on the ownership in writing, he shall direct the concerned parties to obtain a ruling on ownership from a competent Civil Court having jurisdiction before changing the entries already recorded and existing in the various Revenue Records. The learned Single Judge, in paragraph No.19 of the order, had specifically held that in terms of sub-rule (4) of Rule 4, the First Respondent/District Revenue Officer ought to have directed the parties to go before the competent Civil Forum for adjudication of dispute with regard to the ownership, as the Fourth Respondent/Writ Petitioner and the Deceased Appellant/Fourth Respondent disputes the version projected by each one of them. Admittedly, in the instant case on hand, there is a serious dispute with regard to the title of lands measuring an extent of 7.18 acres in S.F.Nos.547 and 548, Kalapatti Village, Coimbatore District. In cases of this nature, it is not open to the Revenue Authorities, much less the First Respondent/District Revenue Officer, to decide the same. In Civil Law, when there is a dispute between the rival parties touching upon the title to the property, the competent forum would be only the Civil Court. In the instant case, the First Respondent/District Revenue Officer had not followed such a procedure. However, he had chosen to decide the title in respect of the said property mainly relying upon the reports submitted by the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer and the Third Respondent/Tahsildar. On a careful consideration of the factual position presented in the instant case and in the light of the qualitative and quantitative discussions mentioned supra, we have no hesitation to hold that the dispute between the parties relates to title of the lands measuring an extent of 7.18 acres in S.F.Nos.547 & 548, Kalapatti Village, Coimbatore District and the proper forum for the parties to agitate and ventilate their grievances in respect of their title to the said property is only before the competent Civil Forum. As such, we come to an inevitable conclusion that the learned Single Judge had rightly held that it is open to the Fourth Respondent/Writ Petitioner and the Deceased Appellant/Fourth Respondent to work out their remedies before the competent Civil Forum in accordance with law. We are also of the considered view that the dispute between the Fourth Respondent/Writ Petitioner and the Deceased Appellant/Fourth Respondent is one of both mixed question of fact and law, which needs to be gone into in detail by means of adducing oral and documentary evidence by examining witnesses as the case may be and the only course open to the parties is to approach the competent Civil Court.".

85. The Legal submissions of the First Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013, 892 of 2013, Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013, Eighth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 and Seventh Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013: The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent {in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013}/Devaki Diagnostic Private Limited, Madurai 16, submits that the Writ Petitioner/Association in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 is said to be registered under the Societies Registration Act. For evidencing the same, no Memorandum of Association and no byelaws were filed and even in paragraph 2 of the Writ Affidavit, a reference was made that the Workers of Madura Coats, formed an Association called as Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Society's Registration number was 2459 and therefore, as per the admission in paragraph 2 of the Writ Affidavit, the writ petitioner has no enforceable legal right in law.

86. Advancing his arguments, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent contends that in paragraph 2 of the affidavit in Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner/Association, there is a reference to acquisition of land by Government on 29/1/1958 in S.Nos.1300, 1308/2, 1309/2, 1310, 1311 and further, the land extent and village name were not mentioned.

87. According to the Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent, on 29/1/1958, Notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu for acquiring an extent of 4 acres and 90 cents. Section 6 Declaration under the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 8/3/1960 in respect of 2 acres and 620 Sq.feet. Further, on 29/3/1961, an agreement was entered into between the Government of Tamil Nadu and Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Buildings Society Limited as regards the acquisition of lands to an extent of 3 acres and 66 cents and 145 Sq. feet under emergency provisions and 2 acres and 620 Sq. feet under ordinary provision, aggregating in all 5 acres 66 cents and 765 Sq.feet only.

88. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent brings it to the notice of this Court that during the year 1967, Madura Mills Employees Co- operative Buildings Society Limited has applied for a sanction of a layout in LPH/DZTP No.18/1967 and in the said approved layout plan of the year 1967, 88 plots were shown and the certified copy of the plan was obtained on 16/8/1971 and an area was marked as ".Children Play Space"., ".Park". and ".Reading Room".. However, its extent was not mentioned. Besides this, in the said plan, an area was marked as ".Primary School". and ".Playground". and an area was marked as ".Shops". abutting Gnana Oivupuram Road.

89. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent proceeds to submit that according to the affidavit filed in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010, in paragraph 3, a reference was made in regard to the plan approval and further, it was averred that the Assistant Town Planning Officer, approved the plan LPA No.18 of 1967 and the total extent of acquired land was 14 acres 82 cents in which 1 acre and 10 cents was allotted to public purposes like road, drainage, park, playground and club etc. Also, it was stated that on 13/3/1973, the Society (Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society) submitted a revised plan and the same was sanctioned by the Fifth Respondent/Madurai Corporation in No.13 of 1973.

90. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent contends that in paragraph 3 of the Writ Affidavit in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010, it was mentioned that after getting sanction, the Madura Mills constructed an Auditorium measuring an extent of 1800 Sq.feet and constructed a Volley Ball Court, Shuttle Cock Court and Basket Ball Court in the year 1973 itself and the members of the Society were allowed to utilise the facilities and these admissions would itself suffice for a Court to dismiss the Writ Petition.

91. The primordial submission advanced on behalf of the Eighth Respondent is that the Madura Mills, admittedly, during the year 1973, put up the construction after applying for sanction openly and this was accepted by the Society and when that be the situation, the Writ Petitioner/Harvey Nagar Residents Welfare Association, being a third party, has no enforceable legal right to claim the relief of Writ of Mandamus from this Court. Also that the order of the year 1973 had become final given effect to and acted upon openly.

92. A cursory perusal of the modified plan would unerringly point out that what was shown as ".Children Play Area". was converted into 'Club Building and Playgrounds of Madura Mills'. In fact, the caption of the Revised Plan or the order reads as under:- ".Madurai Mills Employees Co-operative Society Site plan of Harvey Nagar showing the proposed Club Building and Playgrounds of Madura Mills and extention to the 40 feet East West road with adjustments to the private party lands in T.S.Nos.1300, 1308/2, 1309/2 and 1310, Ward No.21 Old Dindigul Road, Arasaradi, Madurai (West Ponnagaram).". Moreover, it is the stand of the Eighth Respondent that the Club Building and Playground belongs to Madura Mills.

93. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent contends that pursuant to the order passed in M.P.(MD) No.2 of 2010 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 dated 27/1/2011, the Fourth Respondent/Madurai Corporation filed a counter that the property was assessed to property tax in the name of Madura Coats and from the approved layout of the year 1973, it is evident that the subject matter of the property was not ear marked for any public purpose.

94. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent submits that the Appellant/Tenth Respondent {in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013} filed M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 to implead it as the Respondent in the Writ Petition and the affidavit was sworn to by one K.T.Karuna, claiming to be the Secretary of the Society. However, the rubber stamp at the bottom of the affidavit shows that it was signed by the Special Officer of the Appellant/Society in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013.

95. At this juncture, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent invites the attention of this Court to the averments made by the deponent in the said affidavit which runs as under:- ".Earlier Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society Limited, A- 2459 is registered as a Co-operative Societies under the Act 1932. By amendment dated 18/2/1997, the name of the above society has been changed as Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Housing Societies Limited without changing the byelaws and with the same members.".

96. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent adverse to the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition (MD) No.14451 of 2010, wherein the Appellant/Petitioner in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 had stated the following:- ".In LPA No.18 of 1967, the total extent of lands is 14 acres and 82 cents in which 1 acre and 10 cents was allotted for public purpose like road, drainage, park, playground, club etc.".

97. In fact, one K.T.Karuna of the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013, claiming to be the Secretary of the Society, in the affidavit in M.P.(MD) No.2 of 2012 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 had stated thus:- ".The society got the 5.66 acres lands for the purpose of laying layout in the name of Harvey Nagar Housing Scheme from the Government under the above land acquisition proceedings. In addition to that further extent of 8.76 acres lands were purchased by the Society itself for the purpose of layout in the Harvey Nagar. The above said total extent of 12 acres and 30 cents was utilised for the purpose of layout in the name of Harvey Nagar"..

98. By referring to the averments made in M.P.(MD) No.2 of 2012, in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 {made by one Karuna - Secretary of the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013} to the effect that ".the above said total extent of 12 acres and 30 cents was utilized for the purpose of layout in the name of Harvey Nagar"., the Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent contends that according to the Appellant/Society, only an extent of 12 acres and 30 cents was utilised for the purpose of layout in the name of Harvey Nagar and one has to see the revised plan obtained during the year 1973, wherein there is a change that the extent of land was not mentioned and number of plots were also not stated.

99. It is to be noted that in the original plan of the year 1967 (LPH18of 1967), 88 house sites were provided and the extent was stated to be 14.82 acres. In short, the revised plan completely varies from the original plan and the present road was changed as house site in exchange of Allabaksh's land allotted for four and the balance portion of the Allabaksh's house site was shown. That apart, from that existing channel poramboke utilised as road was converted as path of playground and then existing 40 feet road was modified as 25 feet road leaving 15 feet for playground and club house site proposed club site, club building and playground which could be seen from the plan. The revised plan of the year 1973 was issued showing the portion of the lands of Madura Mill to construct Club Building, Shuttle Cock Court, Badminton Court, Basket Ball Court, etc. Therefore, the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent is that the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 by the Writ Petitioner and the affidavit filed by the Appellant/Society in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 indicates that there was no cause of action at all.

100. Also that it is the plea of the Eighth Respondent that the Appellant/Society in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013, the name was amended on 19/2/1997. There was no provision under the Tamil Nadu Co- operative Societies Act, 1932 of 1983 to amend the name and also no order was produced before this Court.

101. The substance of the argument advanced by the Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent is that the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 and Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 and only in the year 1973, an amendment was sought for in respect of approved original plan of the year 1967. In effect, the plea of the Eighth Respondent is that the Madura Mills was in exclusive possession of the Club House, Auditorium, Shuttle Cock Court, Basket Ball Court etc., from the year 1973 and from that date of purchase, the Eighth Respondent/Private Hospital continues to be in possession of the same.

102. Besides the above, it is the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Eighth Respondent that whether the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013/Co- operative Society is in existence, it is not known and the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 says that the Society was defunct and Members formed a new Association called 'Harvey Nagar Welfare Association'.

103. Per contra, the affidavit of K.T.Karuna purported to represent the Society {Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.730 of 2013} stated that the name of Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Societies Limited was amended to Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Housing Societies Limited and both the claims are not supported by documents and as such serious disputed questions of fact are involved which require oral and documentary evidence to be let in by the parties. In regard to the plea taken on behalf of the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013, it was mentioned that the byelaw of the Society was amended to and the same was attested by Co-operative Sub-Registrar (Housing) Madurai. The very same signature was found in M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 as the Special Officer of the Appellant {in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013} and in this regard, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent contends that Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Registration Act, 1981 and Rule 9 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules and very much relevant. In fact, Section 11 envisages amendment of byelaws of Registered Society and Rule 9 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules speaks of procedure in regard to the amendment of byelaws.

104. The stand of the Eighth Respondent/Devaki Diagnostics Pvt Ltd., Madurai is that as per Rule 9 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988, an amendment of 'Bye Law' should be made only or Resolution passed by the majority of the General Body and every such resolution should be forwarded to the Registrar with an application Form No.9. Soon after the receipt of application of Form No.9, the Registrar shall enter particulars in Form No.10 and grant acknowledgement in Form No.11. If the Registrar is satisfied, then he would register the amendment under Section 11 (3) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, refers to the evidence of Registration and Certificate of Registration and barring a sheet of paper that byelaw No.1 was amended, no other proof was filed. In effect, the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent is that byelaws of the Registered Co-operative Societies could not be amended without adhering to the procedure enjoined under the Tamil Nadu Co- operative Societies Act, 1983 and the Rules made thereunder.

105. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent proceeds to make a submission that the writ petition was filed by the Writ Petitioner/Harvey Nagar Residence Welfare Association after it has afford an order before the Civil Court in O.S.No.334 of 2009 on the file of the Learned Additional District Munsif, Madurai in respect of the very same subject matter and in fact, the possession of Madura Coats was protected by the order dated 29/9/2010 made in I.A.No.273 of 2009. The issue relating to whether 'Co-operative Society is defunct and a Special Officer is appointed or whether the name of the Society is amended are all disputed questions of fact.

106. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent proceeds to contend that the original approved layout plan of the year 1967 was revised during the year 1973 permitting Madura Mills to construct Club Building, Playground, etc., and in fact, Club Building, Auditorium, Shuttle Cock Court, etc., were constructed during the year 1973 and the Mill was in exclusive possession of the same. Therefore, it is not open to the Writ Petitioner/Harvey Nagar Welfare Association to challenge the same and that too after 40 years period.

107. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Standard/Private Hospital goes on to contend that the Writ Petitioner (Harvey Nagar Resident's Welfare Association) in W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 had not challenged the transfer in favour of the names during the year 1973 and later, when transfer was effected by the Company in favour of the Eighth Respondent in accordance with law. As such, the Writ Petition filed by the Writ Petitioner is not maintainable.

108. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent contends that the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 (Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010) to circumvent the orders of the Civil Court in I.A.No.273 of 2009 in O.S.No.334 of 2009, filed W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010, seeking the relief of Writ of Mandamus, the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 has no legal right.

109. In regard to the Writ Appeal (MD) Nos.744 of 2013 and 892 of 2013 filed against the order allowing W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 filed by Devaki Diagnostic Private Limited/Writ Petitioner, it is to be pointed out that the said Writ Petition was filed by the Private Hospital challenging the order of Revenue Divisional Officer, cancelling the patta in its favour.

110. The Learned Senior Counsel for the First Respondent (in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013, Eighth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013), contends that patta originally stood in the name of Madura Mills Employees Building Co- operative Society during the year 1967 and when the layout approval was revised during the year 1973, it should have been brought to the notice of Revenue Authorities that it should be in the name of Madura Coats (Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013) and therefore, the entry stood in the name of Madura Mills Employees Building Co-operative Society was an erroneous one.

111. Expatiating his submissions, the Learned Senior Counsel for the First Respondent/Private Hospital in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 contends that patta is only a 'Bill for Rent' for the purpose of collection of revenue to the Government and an individual, who is in occupation of the property is to pay revenue to the Government.

112. It is the plea of the Learned Senior Counsel for the First Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 and Eighth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 that from the year 1973, The Madura Coats Private Limited (Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013) was in possession of the property and after the sale of the property, the wrong entry was corrected by the Tahsildar and the order as on date stands in so far as it relates to the Society.

113. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent/Devaki Diagnostic Private Limited submits that the Appellant in W.A.(MD) Nos.891 and 892 of 2013 has not preferred any regular Appeal and the said Association gave a simple representation dated 10/7/2011 to the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013. Thereafter, the District Collector, Madurai made an endorsement to the effect that ".R.D.O/MRD Ple examine the issue, peruse documents and take steps to cancel the patta on merits within 15 days time punctually most urgent". and based on the said endorsement, the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013, cancelled the patta, finding that the Society was not able to establish their title to the property in question but still set aside the order of the Tahsildar.

114. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent draws the attention of this Court in paragraph 5 of the affidavit in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012, the following averments were made:- ".The petitioner has now come to know that the Father-in-Law of the authority who is the superior to the District Revenue Officer, Madurai is a resident of Harvey Nagar and associated with the respondent association.". and the Third Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013 in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 viz., Tahsildar, Madurai South, in his counter had not specifically denied the same.

115. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent refers to the relevant portion of the affidavit of the Third Respondent/Tahsildar, Madurai in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 which reads as under:- ".Without answering this vital question, the petitioner is attempting to side tract the whole question on the ground of some bias and the membership of the father-in-law of the Collector as the reason for assailing the impugned order.".

116. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent submits that the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai, in its order dated 2/2/2012 in paragraph 7 of his order, extracted the heading of layout plan 13 of 1973 and in paragraph 9 of the order, gave a finding that Madura Mill was in possession and further observed that there is no material to show either the Appellant/Harvey Nagar Welfare Association in W.A.(MD) Nos.891 and 892 of 2013 and the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 viz., Coats Viyella Employees Co- operative Housing Society were in possession of the property in question and that they had not denied the possession of Madura Coats also. Resultantly, the Second Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, gave a finding that the property in question is with Madura Coats and also referred to the permission given by Madura Coats to use the premises.

117. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent submits that the Second Respondent/District Collector, Madurai could not give such a direction to cancel the patta when the Society had not sought for cancellation of patta and also that it cannot file any representation to the Collector and in short, none of the provisions of the Patta Pass Book Act, 1983 was followed. In effect, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Hospital contends that the Appellant/Harvey Nagar Residents' Welfare Association when it disputed the title should have proved its title through a competent Civil Court and should have sought a relief of recovery of possession and added further, could not claim the relief for cancellation of patta, moreso, when suit in O.S.No.334 of 2009 is pending before the Civil Court.

118. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent takes a plea that the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 has not challenged the order of the Tahsildar dated 14/12/2010 before the competent forum and in the absence of the same, it cannot be agitated/canvassed in the form of filing of the present Writ Appeal in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013. Therefore, the wrong entry made in the patta, in the name of Madura Mills Co-operative Building Society Limited ought to have been changed during the year 1973 itself and now, this erroneous entry is corrected based on possession. Also that the Appellant/Madura Coats in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 has not produced any document to prove title or possession of the property in question. Further, they have not shown any documents to establish its claim as to how it steps into the shoes of Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society.

119. Further, it is submitted on behalf of the Eighth Respondent/Devaki Diagnostics Pvt., Ltd that it is in actual possession of the property and its vendor filed the suit in O.S.No.334 of 2009 seeking the relief of injunction and it would suffice for it to obtain an 'Injunction Decree' and if some person wants to obtain a 'Decree for Declaration' and 'Recovery of Possession', he has to file a necessary Civil Suit by producing relevant records, after proving his Locus standi.

120. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Eighth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013) and Eighth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 relies on the following decisions and also relied on by the Learned Special Government Pleader for the Respondents 2 to 4 in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013, in the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2000 (3) MLJ at page 317, at page 326, in paragraph 17, it is observed as follows:- ".Next comes the question of laches. The admitted position is that the conversion was ordered somewhere in the year 1973. It did not lie in the mouth of the petitioner that he did not know about the conversion Mr.V.T.Gopalan pointed out that in fact it was the stand of L.V.Varadarajan in the suit that the respondents 9 to 11 were the full owners of the plot. Thus, L.V.Varadarajan was aware that the park and was converted into house sites out of which Plot No.286 was one of the 20 house sites. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner did not know about the conversion. In order to get out of the objection of laches, as we have already pointed out, the petitioner tried to point out that this fact of conversion became known to all of them only when the Corporation erected a board on the site suggesting that the property is a Corporation Property. We fail to understand as tow hat the petitioner was doing even from the date of 1997. The petitioner now wants us, by this petition, to upset all the transactions from 1973. It has come on record by way of counter that the concerned purchasers of the plots obtained sale deeds somewhere early in the year 1980 and obtained building permission from 1982 upto 1996 and that the construction activity was constantly on during this period. It is rather surprising that the petitioner should not have realised that the precious land was being wasted in all these years. Considering the graphic details of the orders given in the petition, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner was not aware of the conversion order. There is absolutely no explanation in the petition. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the petitioner is guilty of laches. In Mayank Rastogi Vs. V.K.Bansal Mayank Rastogi V. V.K.Bansal Mayank Rastogi V. V.K.Bansal (1998) 2 SCC343 the Supreme Court, under similar circumstances, had expressed itself in the following words: The appellant had purchased this plot of land in April, 1991 and had admittedly started construction in January, 1995. The writ petition was filed nearly four years after the approval of the development plan vide Notification dated 15.2.1991 and apart from the question of laches, even on merits, there was no reason for the High Court to have interfered when the residential plot shown in the duly approved development plan had been allotted as a residential plot to the appellant and was used for constructing a residential unit therein.".

121. In the Division Bench decision of this Court in J.K.TOWERS FLAT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, rep. BY ITS SECRETARY77 7TH AVENUE, ASHOK NAGAR, MADRAS83{2001 (3) CTC at 757}, wherein at special page Nos.761 and 762, in paragraph 4, it is observed and held as follows:- ".The further submission of the learned counsel is that when the suit was filed, the impugned order of exemption was not granted and therefore, the validity of the impugned order of exemption was not a subject matter of the suit and therefore, it can be decided only in the writ petition. I am unable to accept the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner for the simple reason that for the same issue, there cannot be two parallel adjudication. Even though the impugned order in the writ petition is not the subject matter of the suit filed by the petitioner in O.S.No.7976 of 1991, the relief sought for in the suit is as to whether the 2and and 3rd respondents that under clause 15 of the agreement, the petitioner association has accepted the right of the 2nd and 3rd respondents to put up any additional construction provided the 2nd respondent obtains any order of exemption or revised sanction plan. Therefore, whether the petitioner can question the flats put up by the 2nd and 3rd respondents on the top floor could be decided only by lettering in evidence before the competent civil Court as the scope of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited as this Court cannot go into the disputed questions and also decide the rights of the parties governed as per the agreement. I am also unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the impugned order of the Government granting exemption is not the subject matter of the suit and the issue cannot be settled in the Civil Court for the reason that when the prayer of the petitioner in the civil suit is for a declaration that the construction put up in the top floor as violative of the building plan and consequently for a declaration, the subsequent exemption can also be considered by the civil Court as the same is incidental to the main relief. When once the petitioner has approached the civil Court seeking for a declaration that the construction put up in the top floor as unauthorized, the petitioner can very well establish that the exemption granted by the 1st respondent cannot be taken as the basis for 2nd and 3rd respondents to put up two flats in the fourth floor before the civil Court as an incidental question. In that view of the matter, I do not propose to venture to decide as to the power of Government to grant exemption under Section 113 of the Act in this writ petition. The issue is left open to both the parties to be agitated before the Civil Court as admittedly, both the parties have already approached the civil Court and have also visited with the judgment and decree. The rights of the parties to challenge the said judgment and decree are very much available to them and both the petitioner and the 2nd and 3rd respondents can get redressal of their grievance in the civil Court which I consider would be appropriate. In that view of the matter, without going into the merits of the impugned order of exemption granted, the writ petition is dismissed giving liberty to the parties to agitate their claims before the civil Court. It is also made clear that both the petitioner and the 2nd and 3rd respondents are at liberty to raise all the points that are available to them in the civil Court in the event if they are advised to file appeals. With the above observations, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.".

122. In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in BANDA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, BANDA Vs. MOTILAL AGARWAL AND OTHERS {(2011) 5 SUPREME COURT CASES394, at special page No.403, in paragraph Nos.15 to 20, it is observed and held as follows:- ".15. The above extracted portions of the plaint unmistakably show that Respondent 1 had no complaint against the acquisition of land or taking of possession by the State Government and delivery thereof to BDA and the only prayer made by him was that the defendants be directed to undertake fresh acquisition proceedings after sub-dividing Plot No.795 so that he may get his share of compensation. He filed writ petition questioning the acquisition proceedings after almost 9 years of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6 (1) and about six years of the pronouncement of award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. During this interregnum, BDA took possession of the acquired land after depositing 80% of the compensation in terms of Section 17 (3-A), prepared the layout, developed the acquired land, carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections of the society, invited applications and allotted plots and flats to the eligible persons belonging to economically weaker sections as also LIG, MIG and HIG categories. Unfortunately, the High Court ignored all this and allowed the writ petition on the specious ground that the acquired land did not vest in the State Government because physical possession of the land belonging to Respondent 1 was not taken till 31-7-2002 and the award was not passed within two years as per the mandate of Section 11 A.

16. In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf of BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty-bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of nine years between the issue of declaration under Section 6 (1) and filing of the writ petition, and declined relief to Respondent 1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utlised for implementing the residential scheme and third-party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about six years between the passing of award and filing of the writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition.

17. It is true that no limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but one of the several rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts is that the High Court will not entertain petitions filed after long lapse of time because that may adversely affect the settled/crystalised rights of the parties. If the writ petition is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit for similar cause, the High Court will treat the delay unreasonable and decline to entertain the grievance of the petitioner on merits.

18. In State of M.P V. Bhailal Bhai (AIR1964SC1006 the Constitution Bench considered the effect of delay in filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and held: (AIR pp.1011-12, paras 17 & 21) ".17. ... It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it.... It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus. * * * 21. .... The learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable".

19. In matters involving challenge to the acquisition of land for public purpose, this Court has consistently held that delay in filing the writ petition should be viewed seriously and relief denied to the petitioner if he fails to offer plausible explanation for the delay. The Court has also held that the delay of even few years would be fatal to the cause of the petitioner, if the acquired land has been partly or wholly utilised for the public purpose.

20. In Ajodhya Bhagat V. State of Bihar {(1974) 2 SCC501, this Court approved dismissal by the High Court of the writ petition filed by the appellant for quashing the acquisition of his land and observed (SCC p.506, para 23) ".23. The High Court held that the appellants were guilty of delay and laches. The High Court relied on two important facts. First, that there was delivery of possession. The appellants alleged that it was a paper transaction. The High Court rightly rejected that contention. Secondly, the High Court said that the Trust invested several lakhs of rupees for the construction of roads and material for development purposes. The appellants were in full knowledge of the same. The appellants did not take any steps. The High Court rightly said that to allow this type of challenge to an acquisition of large block of land piecemeal by the owners of some of the plots in succession would not be proper. If this type of challenge is encouraged the various owners of small plots will come up with writ petitions and hold up the acquisition proceedings for more than a generation. The High Court rightly exercised discretion against the appellants. We do not see any reason to take a contrary view to the discretion exercised by the High Court.".

123. In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in TAMIL NADU ELECTRICITY BOARD Vs. SUMATHI AND OTHERS {(2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases 543}, at special page No.545, it is held as follows:- ".The language of Article 226 of the Constitution does not admit of any limitation on the powers of the High Court for the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder though by various decisions of this Court with varying and divergent views, it has been held that jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised its power in the discharge of public duty and that writ is a public law remedy. Since disputed questions of facts arose in the present appeals the High Court should not have entertained writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and then referred the matter to arbitration in violation of the provisions of the new Act. There was no arbitration agreement within the meaning of Section 7 of the new Act. Under the new Act award can be enforced as if it is a decree of a court and yet the High Court passed a decree in terms of the award which is not warranted by the provisions of the new Act. Exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in entertaining the petitions was not proper and the High Court in any case could not have proceeded to have the matter adjudicated by an arbitrator in violation of the provisions of the new Act.".

124. In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in CHAIRMAN, GRID CORPORATION OR ORISSA LTD (GRIDCO) AND OTHERS Vs. SUKAMANI DAS (SMT) AND ANOTHER {(1999) 7 SUPREME COURT CASES298, wherein at special page No.299, it is held as follows:- ".The High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellant Grid Corporation. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to the Grid corporation had snapped and the deceased had come in contract with the same and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the Grid Corporation and under which circumstances the deceased has come in contract with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the Grid Corporation in each of these cases it deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond its control or unauthorized intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy.".

125. In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS Vs PRASANA KUMAR SAHOO {(2007) 15 SUPREME COURT CASES - 129}, at special page No.130, it is held as follows:- ".It may be that some other persons similarly situated have been appointed. But Article 14 contains a positive concept. A writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court only when there exists a legal right in the writ petitioner and corresponding legal obligation in the State. Only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated by a Court of Law. There cannot be equality in illegality.".

126. In the Division Bench decision of this Court in VISHWAS FOOTWEAR COMPANY LTD., A-2 THIRD PHASE, GUINDY INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, CHENNAI600032, rep. BY DIRECTOR V.RAVI Vs.

1. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, KANCHEEPURAM AND4OTHERS {2011 (5) CTC94, it has inter alia observed that ".When both parties claiming title and possession over property, the Revenue Divisional Officer cannot decide the title dispute between parties and the authorities exercising power under Section 12 of the Patta Pass Book Act, 1983 can consider only prima facie case as to entitlement of person for issuance of patta and when there is dispute as to the title, parties should be directed to approach competent Civil Court of Law for adjudication of title dispute and resultantly held that the impugned order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer cancelling patta by deciding title disputes between the parties is without jurisdiction.".

127. In the decision in CHOCKKAPPAN AND2OTHERS Vs. THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU, rep. BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER AND COMMISSIONER LAND ADMINISTRATION, CHEPAUK, CHENNAI5AND2OTHERS {2004 (1) CTC136, wherein at special page 138, it is observed and held as follows:- ".Coming to the facts of the case, it is not in dispute that the petitioners are the co-owners of the lands and they were granted joint patta as early as on 16.7.1984. The name of the 3rd respondent was included by the Zonal Tahsildar, Aruppukottai after a period of 11 yers i.e., on 27.10.1995 after deciding the title in favour of the 3rd respondent which ought to have been agitated only in the Civil Court. Though the Revenue Officials are empowered to consider the prima facie consideration of the right of the parties for the grant of patta, when the patta stands in the name of a particular person, inclusion of others in the patta is impermissible, that too, on consideration of title by the Revenue Officials. In all fairness, the Zonal Tahsildar, Aruppukottai ought to have directed the 3rd respondent to first establish her title before the Civil Court before any inclusion is made in the patta, as it is not the case of fresh patta but inclusion of 3rd respondent in the patta which already stand in the name of the petitioners. In this context, the impugned order cannot be sustained as the 3rd respondent's name has been included only after the decision rendered by the Revenue Officials regarding the title of the 3rd respondent. Hence the impugned order is set aside. However, liberty is given to the 3rd respondent to work out her remedy in Civil Court as to her title over the land in question and in the event, the 3rd respondent has obtained a decree in her favour she can make her application for inclusion of her name in the patta. The Writ Petition is allowed with the above observation. No costs.".

128. In the decision KUPPUSWAMI NAINAR VERSUS THE DISTRICT REVENUE OFFICER, THIRUVANNAMALAI AND OTHERS {(1995) 1 MLJ426, it is observed and held as follows:- ".In a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, the question of title regarding immovable property cannot be gone into because a mass of evidence may be required for adjudicating the question of title. Even if the Court is to interfere with the order under appeal, it is the other party who has to go to a civil Court and establish title. As far as the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is concerned, it does not matter to it whether 'A' party goes to civil Court of 'B' party. Therefore, the Court is of the view that the question of title has to be decided by the civil Court without reference to the order under question. Hence the Court declines to interfere with the order challenged in the writ petition.".

129. In the decision RAJA BASKARA KUMARA SHANMUGAM @ N.KUMARAN SETHUPATHY, rep. BY POWER AGENT, RAMANATHAPURAM DISTRICT Versus DIRECTOR OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING AND ANOTHER {(2008) 2 MLJ824, it is held as follows:- ".After 1974 the predecessor-in-title of the petitioner has not taken steps for the purpose of proceeding with the plan or the second respondent has also not insisted the predecessor-in-title or the petitioner to gift away the portions earmarked for public purpose. By applying Section 50 it is only natural that the fate of the plan given by the Director comes to an end in the year 1977 itself. Whileso, there is no presumption about the existence of the sanctioned plan itself. In such circumstances, the question of allocation of portion for the public purpose does not arise. Therefore, looking at any angle, either under the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act or under the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, there is no difficulty to come to the conclusion that the date of passing of the impugned order there was no sanctioned plan in existence at all. Even if it is presumed that such sanctioned plan has been obtained by the original owner in the year 1974, by applying Section 177 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, certainly the petitioner being the successor in title in respect of the property in S.No.313/1 is entitled for a notice to be issued. In such circumstances, the impugned order of the 2nd respondent municipality without even giving a notice for coming to the conclusion as if the petitioner is an encroacher is not acceptable.".

130. The contentions of the Seventh Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013:- The Learned Senior Counsel for the Seventh Respondent/Devaki Diagnostics Private Limited, Madurai submits that the Writ Petitioner/Harvey Nagar Residents' Welfare Association earlier has filed W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 praying for the same relief and the said Writ Petition was dismissed by this Court on 13/3/2013 and also that the Writ Petitioner has preferred W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013. As a matter of fact, the Writ Petitioner/Appellant (in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013) has filed W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 as Public Interest Litigation seeking the very same prayer for the issuance of a 'Writ of Mandamus' in directing the Respondents 1 to 5 forbearing the Respondents 6 and 7 from converting the playground T.S.Nos.1300, 1308/2, 1309/2, 1310, 1311, New T.S.No.48, 49, 52, 21, Town Survey Ward No.5 Building bearing No.2 Harvey Nagar, Technical School West 13th Street, Madurai 16 into any concrete structure or alter the usage of land for any other purpose and consequently direct the Respondents to restore the playground to its original position and this conduct of the Writ Petitioner/Appellant shows that the Association is abusing the process of law and in fact, the Writ Petition (MD) No.13589 of 2013 is not maintainable before this Court.

131. Besides the above, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Seventh Respondent projects a legal plea that the Writ Petitioner/Appellant having lost before the Civil Court after raising the very same defence that the property in question was set apart for public purpose cannot file the present Writ Petition (MD) No.13589 of 2013 before this Court when their earlier prayer in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 seeking the relief of mandamus that property in question was set apart for public purpose raising the very same contention. To put it succinctly, it is the stand of the Seventh Respondent that the Writ Petitioner/Appellant cannot relitigate on the very same subject matter and W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 filed by the Resident's Welfare Association is a clear case of abuse of process of law and as such the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs.

132. Analysis:- At the outset, it is to be pointed out that in the copy of approved layout 18/1967, dated 16/8/1971 of Madura Mills Employees Co- operative Building Society (layout of house sites in T.S.Nos.922, 923/2, 1300, 1309/1311, 1312 etc., of Harvey Nagar (West Ponnagaram TP Scheme No.3) area for children play space is shown. The number of house sites provided is mentioned as 88. However, in the copy of revised plan - revised layout 3/73 dated 3/3/73, a reference is made among other things to the place to be converted as part of playground leaving 15' for the playground and Club house site proposed club site building and playground. It is seen from the final warning notice dated 5/11/2005 issued by Madurai Corporation addressed to the Madura Coats arrears relating to property tax etc., from the year 1999 to 2000 till 2005 - 2006, a demand was made in respect of a total sum of Rs.14,320/-. As seen from the letter dated 24/1/2009 of the Madura Coats Private Limited addressed to the Assistant Commissioner West Zone, Madurai Corporation in respect of Harvey Nagar Door No.2 Technical School 13th West Street Property Tax No.45225, a request was made for determining the tax of Rs.5948 cents, the property is a residential one for the year 2008 - 2009 second half and to pass orders for collecting the said amount.

133. The Madura Coats Private Limited on 13/3/2009, through its Assistant Manager Legal addressed a communication to the Assistant Commissioner West Zone, Office of Madurai Corporation stating that a SBI cheque for Rs.5948 dated 9/3/2009 bearing No.272380 was issued being the property tax amount for second half period 2008 - 2009 drawn in favour of the Commissioner, Madurai Corporation. It is not in dispute that Madura Coats Private Limited as Plaintiff filed O.S.No.334 of 2009 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Madurai in which I.A.No.273 of 2009 was filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 and Section 151 of CPC, seeking the relief of temporary injunction against the Respondent/Association (Harvey Nagar Resident's Welfare Association, Madurai), their Members, their men, etc., from in any way interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property mentioned in the schedule of the petition) till the disposal of the suit and in the mean time, sought the relief of ex parte the ad-interim injunction to that effect, pending disposal of the application.

134. In the said I.A.No.273 of 2009 in O.S.No.334 of 2009, the trial Court, after contest, allowed the application as prayed for on 29/9/2009. As against the said order dated 29/9/2009 made in I.A.No.273 of 2009 in O.S.No.334 of 2009 on the file of the Learned District Munsif, Madurai Town. The Respondent/Defendant (Harvey Nagar Resident's Welfare Association/Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013) filed C.M.A.No.10 of 2010 on the file of Principal Sub- Court, Madurai and the same is reportedly pending. It is brought to the notice of this Court on behalf of the Seventh Respondent (in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 and Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012) that a criminal compliant was lodged against the Secretary of Harvey Nagar Resident's Welfare Association (Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 which was registered in CSR No.It transpires that the Mill sold the property through a registered sale deed dated 12/11/2010 in favour of the Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 and W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013. Subsequently, W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 was filed before this Court by the Appellant/Harvey Nagar Residents' Welfare Association in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 in M.P.(MD) No.2 of 2010. On 27/1/2011 the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 obtained an order of injunction.

135. In the Revised Approved Layout dated 3/3/1973 bearing No.3/73, the subject property was not mentioned/earmarked for any public purpose and in the revised plan, there is no indication in respect of the extent of lands and number of plots. At this stage, the stand of the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 and Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 in the revised plan (i.e.) revised layout 3/73, the club building and playground of Madura Mills and extension to 40 feet east west road with adjustment to the private party was made.

136. It is to be pointed out that the averment of the Fourth Respondent/Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning, Madurai that the total extent of land is 14.82 acres as mentioned in its counter is not a factually correct one, according to the Seventh Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013/Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012. In regard to the filing of W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 by the Writ Petitioner/ Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013, it has to be pointed out that a writ of Mandamus may be refused on the ground of existence of an adequate alternative remedy particularly a statutory one, as per the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in S.A.KHAN Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS {1993 (2) SCC at page 327}. This Court aptly points out that the Mandamus is not a particular appropriate proceeding to decide the questions of title, as per the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in SHRI SOHAN LAL Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (AIR1957SC - 529).

137. Also that a Writ of Mandamus may be refused on the ground of laches and unexplained delay, as per the decision WAZIR CHAND MAHAJAN AND ANOTHER Vs. THE UNION OF INDIA (AIR1967SC - 990).

138. Moreover, in the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in VICE CHANCELLOR, UTKAL UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS Vs. S.K.GHOSH AND OTHERS (AIR1954SC at page 217), wherein it has observed and held that ".object of mandamus being simply, to compel performance of a legal duty on the part of same person or body who is entrusted with that duty, the Court in a proceeding for mandamus will never sit as a Court of Appeal, so as to examine the facts or to substitute its own wisdom for the discretion vested by law in the person or body against whom the writ is sought for.". Added further, a Writ Petition is not maintainable when factual matters are in dispute, as per decision SAI TEJA MARIN EXPORTS PRIVATE LIMITED, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT Vs. STATE BANK OF INDIA, BHIMAVARAM {2010 (2) ALD146.

139. Besides the above, it is to be noted that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines 'sale'. In an ordinary parlance, a sale transaction is an exchange of a commodity or service for cash or kind. In sale, the vendor or the seller barters away his property movable or immovable for valuable consideration in cash or kind paid or payable by the buyer, as per decision AIR2003BOMBAY360VOLITION INVESTMENT PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. Mrs.MADHURI JITENDRA MASHROO AND ETC.

140. Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, defines 'sale' and it provides the transfer of ownership, in the case of a tangible immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards and can be made by a registered document, as per decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH Vs. SHIVALLIK AGRO POLY PRODUCTS AND OTHERS (AIR2004SC4393.

141. In terms of Section 54 r/w. Section 8 of Transfer of Property Act, ordinarily, the title of vendor passes to the vendee on Registration of Sale Deed irrespective of the fact as to whether the consideration made either in whole or part has been paid by the vendee to the vendor are not, subject of course a contrary intention of parties to the said transaction, as per decision HARBANS SINGH V. SMT.TEKAMANI DEVI AND OTHERS (AIR1990PATNA26.

142. A combined reading of Section 8 and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, clearly spells out that though on execution and Registration of a sale deed, the ownership of all interests in property pass to the transferee yet that would be subject to terms and conditions mentioned in the deed, indicating the mind set/intention of parties, as per decision BISHUNDEO NARAIN RAI (DEAD) BY LRs AND OTHERS Vs. ANMOL DEVI AND OTHERS (AIR1998SC - 3006).

143. Further, the date of execution of sale deed is the sole criterion for determining the physical possession of land as per decision KANTABEN CHANDULAL SHAH Vs. GAJIBEN AND OTHERS (AIR2005GUJARAT49. Furthermore, when a registered sale deed exists, onus is on the other side to prove that it was not intended to be sale, as per decision SUKALOO AND ANOTHER Vs.PUNAU (AIR1961MP176.

144. At this stage, it is to be remembered that a sale for valid consideration is not hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as per decision TRIBENI Pd. RASTOGI Vs. BASUDEO Pd.RASTOGI (AIR1980PATNA220. As a matter of fact, the title of vendor passes to the vendee only on registration of sale deed irrespective of the fact that the sale deed was actually executed on an anterior day as per decision CHERICHI Vs ITTIANAM AND OTHERS (AIR2001KERALA184.

145. At this point of time, this Court worth recalls and recollects the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court MOHAN PANDEY AND ANOTHER Vs. USHA RANI RAJGARIA (SMT) AND OTHERS {1992 (4) SCC61, wherein it is held as follows:- ".A regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights between private persons. The remedy under Article 226 shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of a statutory authority is alleged and in such a case, the Court will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned. If the real grievance of the respondent is against the initiation of criminal proceedings, and the orders passed and steps taken thereon, he must avail of the remedy under the general law including the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly. Therefore, the High Court was in error in issuing the impugned direction against the appellants.".

146. Admittedly, the Appellant/Resident's Welfare Association in W.A.(MD)No.892 of 2013 and Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 is utilising the Auditorium etc., only with the tacit permission of the Sixth Respondent/Madura Coats in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010.

147. In short, in view of the disputed questions/issues of fact that exist between the respective parties pertaining to the subject matter of the property in question and also when the Appellant/Association (in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 and Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010) has nothing to do with the property in question and moreover, in view of the fact that already a Civil Suit in O.S.No.334 of 2009 is pending on the file of the trial Court between the Sixth Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 and the Appellant/Association (Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010) and also after I.A.No.273 of 2009 in O.S.No.334 of 2009 being allowed by the trial Court on 29/4/2009 against which the Appellant/Association (Writ Petitioner) has preferred CMA No.10 of 2010 on the file of the Learned Principal Sub-Judge, Madurai which is admittedly pending, this Court is of the considered view that W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 filed by the Appellant praying for the relief of Writ of Mandamus therein forbearing the Respondents 1 to 5 from granting any permission or to demolish the construction in T.S.No.1300, 1308/2, 1309/2, 1310, 1311 New T.S.No.48, 49, 52, 21 Town Survey Ward Nos.5 building bearing No.2 Harvey Nagar, 1st Street, Technical School, West 13th Street, Madurai 16, is not maintainable in law. In fact, the Seventh Respondent/Devaki Diagnostic Pvt Ltd in W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013/First Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013/Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 has purchased the property through a registered sale deed dated 12/11/2010 from the Mill.

148. Also, Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules refers to the procedure as regards the amendment of byelaws. It cannot be gain said that in terms of Rule 9 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules of Amendment of byelaw can be brought about only by means of Resolution passed by majority members of the Society in the General Body Meeting and a Resolution in this regard is required to be forwarded to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies together with an application Form No.9. It cannot be over emphasised that a mandamus of byelaws of any Co-operative Society is to be brought about in the manner envisaged under particular act and Rules framed thereunder.

149. Apart from the above, it is to be relevantly stated that the affidavit in M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 has been sworn to by the Secretary of Coats Viyella Employees Society. However, it was signed with 'sale' by Special Officer in the purported amendment of byelaw in the Society, the very same signature is seen. However, these aspects which are in dispute cannot be gone into in detail by this Court in the Writ of Mandamus in W.P.(MD) No.14451 and in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 filed by the Appellant/Harvey Nagar Resident's Welfare Association. The property tax and also assessment do stand in the name of Madura Coats Pvt. Ltd.

150. As per Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955, a Civil Suit for setting aside the sale deed/document can be filed by a litigant/party. The Court fee payable for cancellation of sale deed under Section 40 (1) of the Act and to be computed on the value of the document for which the said document was executed. To put it in a nutshell, several factual matters concerning the respective parties like whether property in question was earmarked as a place for the public purpose, the children play area originally shown in the plan later on converted into club building and playgrounds of Madura Mills under the revised plan 3/73 dated 3/3/73 are not to be gone into in detail/elaborate fashion in writ proceedings (under Article 226 of the Constitution of India) because of the simple reason that the writ proceedings are summary in nature. Even way back in the year 1973 itself, Madura Mills constructed an Auditorium measuring an extent of 1800 Sq.feet and constructed Volley Ball Court etc., and the Members of the Society were only permitted/allowed to use the facilities when the Mill had put up the construction in the year 1973 itself, the writ petitioner Harvey Nagar Welfare Association in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 not being the owner of the property cannot seek the relief of Writ of Mandamus.

151. A perusal of the affidavit in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 filed by the Writ Petitioner/Association indicates that at one point of time, the Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society Limited became defunct and the Members formed new Association in the name of Harvey Nagar Welfare Association/writ petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010. Also through an amendment dated 18/2/1997, the name of 'Madura Mills Employees Co-operative Building Society Limited A249' was changed as 'Coats Viyella Societies Limited' without changing the 'Bye-Laws' and with the same members. However, these aspects/matters are not admitted by the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 {Seventh Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010) and Eighth Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013}. To say the least, at the risk of repetition, this Court points out that there are divergent/conflicting views/numerous factual disputes that exist between the parties and also when the issue relating to the sale deed dated 12/11/2010 is involved, then the writ of mandamus filed by the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 is not maintainable.

152. In any event, the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 has no enforceable legal right to seek the Writ of Mandamus. Even on the ground of laches, and unexplained delay, the said writ petition filed by the Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 is not maintainable in law. Likewise, W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 and W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 filed by the Appellants are not maintainable and consequently, they fail.

153. Coming to the aspect of Writ Appeal (MD) No.892 of 2013 (filed by the Appellant/Harvey Nagar Resident's Welfare Association) and W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013 filed by the Appellant/A-2459 Madurai Viyella Paniyalarkal Mattrum Pothu Sevai Cootruravu Veettu Vasathi Variyam, Madurai, the said two Appeals centre around the assailing of correctness of the Revenue Divisional Officer in canceling the patta in their favour and against the order dated 13/3/2013 passed in allowing the Writ Petition filed by the Writ Petitioner/Devaki Diagnostic Private Limited in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012/First Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 passed by the learned Single Judge.

154. The Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012/first respondent in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 has inter alia made a categorical averment in paragraph 5 of the affidavit that 'Father-in-Law of the Authority' who is superior to the District Revenue Officer, Madurai is a resident of Harvey Nagar and associated with the Respondent Association. This has not been denied expressly or pin- pointedly by the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 Resident's Welfare Association, in their counter filed in W.p.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 (as Third Respondent). The Appellant/Coats Viyella in its representation to the Collector of Madurai prayed for cancellation of patta, the main grievance of the writ petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473/First Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013) is that the Collector cannot give a direction to cancel the patta and it is true that Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act speaks of issuance of Patta Pass Book. Every owner in respect of land owned by him on an application made by him in this regard as per Section 3 of Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act, 1983. Also that Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act speaks of presumption of correctness of in terms in the Patta Pass Book Act. Section 5 refers to making in terms of Registration of alienation or transfer in the patta book. Section 6 deals with in terms in the Patta Pass Book to the prima facie evidence of title. Section 10 deals with modification in terms in the Patta Pass Book. As a matter of fact, Section 12 of the Act deals with filing of an appeal by any person aggrieved by an order made by the Tahsildar under the Act. As per Section 13 of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act, a revision can be filed before the rank of District Revenue Officer, authorised by the Government etc. Section 14 of the Act refers to bar of suits.

155. In fact, the said Section points out that if any person is aggrieved as to any right of which he is in possession by an entry made in the Patta Pass Book in this Act, he may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title to such right, for a declaration of his rights under Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act 47 of 1963. The entry in the Patta Pass Book shall be amended in accordance with any such declaration. The First Respondent (in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013)/Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 has disputed the title of the subject property and it has also pleaded that the sale deed dated 12/11/2010 is null and void etc. Conclusion arrived at by the Revenue Divisional Officer/First Respondent in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 in the order dated 2/12/2012 is to the effect that Madura Mill was in possession. Finally, the finding of the First Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai is that the property in question was with Madura Coats. In fact, Madura Coats had given permission to use the premises which was referred to in the impugned order of the First Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai dated 2/12/2012.

156. Ordinarily, a Writ Petition relating to the issue of patta, transfer of patta is not maintainable. In the instant case in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012, a specific averment has been made that after purchasing the property, the records were set right and also a significant mention has been made that there is no material to show the subject property was ever dedicated for public purpose. Also that the Writ Petitioner (in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012)/Devaki Diagnostic/Private Hospital has purchased the property from the Company by way of a registered sale deed for valuable consideration and after purchasing the property, the Revenue records were immediately corrected and changed in its name. As such, it started taking steps to demolish the building and expand the Cancer Institute. In fact, according to the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013 in the representation dated 10/7/2011 addressed to the Collector, by the Appellant/Harvey Nagar Resident's Association in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013, the Collector made the following endorsement ".R.D.O/MRD Ple examine the issue, peruse documents and take steps to cancel the patta on merits within 15 days time punctually most urgent".. However, based on the endorsement, the First Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, cancelled the patta and they found that the Society was not able to establish their title to the property in question but however, set aside the order of the Tahsildar. The Second Respondent/District Collector, Madurai (in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 cannot make such an endorsement in the representation of the Harvey Nagar Resident's Welfare Association as stated supra and under such circumstances, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai had cancelled the patta.

157. In view of the specific averment in paragraph 5 of the affidavit in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 to the effect that 'the petitioner has now come to know that the father-in-law of the authority who is superior to District Revenue Officer, Madurai is a resident and associated with the Respondent/Association (Third Respondent) and only the Writ Petitioner is perfectly justified in invoking the Extraordinary Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in filing W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 because of the simple reason that the First Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, under the impugned order dated 2/12/2012 cancelled the mutation of patta made in favour of the petitioner, as a result of which he is put to hardship/inconvenience and Loss. The Appellant/Harvey Nagar Resident's Welfare Association (Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.892 of 2013 and the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 have not produced any records to show that they have valid title to the subject property. Furthermore, even a perusal of the impugned order dated 2/12/2012 passed by the First Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai indicates latently and patently that there are numerous issues which are in dispute concerning the subject matter of the property in question which require an in depth/elaborate examination, in the considered opinion of this Court. The patta was not in the name of the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 Coats Viyella Employees Co- operative Housing Society Limited. Also the order of the Tahsildar has not been questioned by the Appellant in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 (Coats Viyella Employees Co-operative Housing Societies Ltd., Madurai). If the parties/litigant lay a claim in regard to an immovable property, they are to cement their claim based on documents like Title Deed, etc., to show their claim of ownership or possession of the property in question. In this regard, the Appellants in W.A.(MD) No.738 of 2013 and 744 of 2013 have not produced necessary documents to the subjective satisfaction of this Court.

158. It cannot be forgotten that the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012, the First Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013) after purchasing the property through a sale deed dated 12/11/2010 is in possession and enjoyment of the property and its vendor filed civil suit No.334 of 2009 on the file of the trial Court seeking the relief of injunction. Looking at from any point of view, the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner/Devaki Diagnostic Pvt Ltd., in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 is perfectly maintainable in law.

159. Further, when the subject matter in issue/property concerns with several factual aspects of the matter and also touching upon the title of the property especially when the writ petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2010 First Respondent in W.A.(MD) No.744 of 2013 has purchased the property through sale deed dated 12/11/2010 for valuable consideration, then the First Respondent/Revenue Divisional Officer should have directed the parties to file a suit before the competent forum either for 'Declaration of their Rights' under Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and instead of resorting to that kind of procedure, he erroneously cancelled the patta through the impugned order dated 2/12/2012 which is clearly an illegal one in the eye of law. Consequently, the order passed by the Learned Single Judge in allowing the W.P.(MD) No.1473 of 2012 does not suffer from any impropriety or illegality in the eye of law. Resultantly, the Writ Appeal (MD) Nos.892 of 2013 and 744 of 2013 fail.

160. Dealing with the aspect of W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 filed by the Writ Petitioner/Harvey Nagar Welfare Resident's Welfare Association as Public Interest Litigation before this Court, it is to be pointed out that the Petitioner filed earlier W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 in respect of the same relief and filed W.A.(MD) No.891 of 2013 as an aggrieved person as against the order of the Learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition.

161. It cannot be gain said that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not certainly applicable to the Writ Proceedings. But the basic principle like 'Res judicata' do apply, in the considered opinion of this Court. The order of 'Res Judicata' applies to Writ, as per the decision in KOPARGAON S.S.K.LIMITED Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS {(2009) 3 SUPREME COURT CASES273 at special page 280. Also, that the second Writ Petition on the same cause of action would be barred by 'Res Judicata' as per decision BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA AND TAPAN KUMAR DUTT (AIR2009CALCUTTA200 (DB). Indeed, the successive Writ Petition for the same relief would be barred by constructive 'Res Judicata' and Order 2 Rule 2 of C.P.C.

162. The well settled principle of law is that when the Writ Petitioner has filed earlier W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 before this Court, the instant Writ Petition in W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 filed for the same relief is not maintainable in limini, in the considered opinion of this Court. Having filed earlier W.P.(MD) No.14451 of 2010 dated 13/3/2013 and suffered an adverse order, for a similar relief, projecting the very same pleas in W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 viz., that the property in issue is set apart for public purpose etc., is nothing but a clear case of second innings of litigation which is impermissible in law, since the said writ petition is not legally maintainable per se before this Court. Viewed in that perspective, we unhesitatingly hold that W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 filed by the Petitioner/Harvey Nagar Residents' Welfare Association is not maintainable and consequently, it fails.

163. Disposition: In the result, (i). W.A.(MD) Nos.738, 744, 891, 892 of 2013 and W.P.(MD) No.13589 of 2013 are dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. (ii). It is open to the parties to pursue their remedies in O.S.No.334 of 2009 in C.M.A.No.10 of 2010 before the Principal District Munsif, Madurai in the manner known to law and in accordance with law or to file appropriate civil suit before the competent forum for declaration of their rights or for necessary reliefs, if so advised. In such an event, liberty is granted to the respective parties to raise all factual legal pleas in the manner known to law and in accordance with law. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed. [M.J.J]. & [M.V.J.,]. 


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