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Mohamed Jamaludin Vs. State Bank of Travancore Rep. by Branch Manager / Authorized Officer and Another - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Case NumberW.P. No. 36504 of 2016 & WMP No. 31415 of 2016
Judge
AppellantMohamed Jamaludin
RespondentState Bank of Travancore Rep. by Branch Manager / Authorized Officer and Another
Excerpt:
.....in 2010 (5) lw 193 (sc) baburam prakash chandra maheshwari v. antarim zila parishad air 1969 sc 556 whirlpool corporation v. registrar of trade marks, mumbai (1998) 8 scc 1=1999-2-l.w. 200 harbanslal sahnia and another v. indian oil corporation ltd. and others (2003) 2 scc 107 saraspathy sundararaj v. authorised officer and assistant general manager, state bank of india,reported in (2010) 5 lw 560 (united bank of india v. satyawati tondon and others) iii (2010) bc 495 (sc) = 2010-5-l.w. 193 baburam prakash chandra maheshwari v. antarim zila parishad air 1969 sc 556 whirlpool corporation v. registrar of trade marks, mumbai (1998) 8 scc 1 harbanslal sahnia and another v. indian oil corporation ltd. and others (2003) 2 scc 107 simon's foot wear pvt. ltd.v. indian bank,..........of any aggrieved person. therefore, in all such cases, high court must insist that before availing remedy under article 226 of the constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 18. while expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the high court under article 226 of the constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part iii or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this court, which every high.....
Judgment:

(Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for a Writ of Mandamus, forbearing the respondents herein, their subordinates, men and agents, from forcibly evicting the petitioner from the property bearing Door No.8/88B, Chidambarnathan Street, C.Pallavaram, Chennai - 600 043, without affording sufficient time of atleast 3 months to vacate the property as requested through the representation submitted by the petitioner on 15.10.2016.)

S. Manikumar, J.

1. laiming himself to be a tenant under the 2nd respondent from 1989 and continues to be in occupation for over 27 years and contending inter alia that he is aged about 61 years, and taking care of his three daughters and parents-in-law, sought to be forcibly evicted by the State Bank of Travancore, represented by the Branch Manager, authorised officer, Besant Nagar Branch, Chennai, the 1st respondent, the petitioner has filed this writ petition for a mandamus, forbearing the respondents, their subordinates, men and agents, from forcibly evicting the petitioner from the property bearing Door No.8/88B, Chidambaranthan Street, C.Pallavaram, Chennai - 600 043, without affording sufficient time of atleast 3 months to vacate the property as requested through the representation submitted by the petitioner on 15.10.2016.

2. Supporting the prayer sought for, averments have been made and it is the specific case of the petitioner that on 06.10.2016, few persons, came to the subject property, asking the petitioner and others to vacate, that the 1st respondent Bank informed the petitioner that they have necessary orders to take possession from the petitioner, and that they can even break open the house and throw all the household articles out of the house, and lock the same. Contention of the petitioner is that the people who came to the house have informed that within 3 or 4 days, they would come again.

3. According to the petitioner, he visited the 1st respondent bank on 13.10.2016 and sought for particulars, as to the loan details availed by the 2nd respondent, but no information was given to him. In the abovesaid circumstances, he has also lodged a complaint on 14.10.2016, to the Inspector of Police, Law and Order, Pallavaram Police Station and also sent a letter dated 15.10.2016 to the Manager, State Bank of Travancore, Besant Nagar Branch, Chennai. No acknowledgment is enclosed for the complaint dated 14.10.2016, and the same is extracted hereunder.

TAMIL

4. A letter dated 15.10.2016, said to have been addressed to the Manager, State Bank of Travancore, Besant Nagar Branch, Chennai, is extracted hereunder.

5. Contents of both the letters and other documents such as Voter ID dated 12.06.2009, Ration Card (June 2005), Telephone Bill dated 02.03.2006, Bank pass Book from 13.01.2007, Passport issued on 30.07.2009 and Driving Licence dated 26.02.2010, indicates that the writ petitioner has been in possession of the subject property.

6. By drawing the attention of this Court to paragraph Nos.29 and 30 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vishal N.Kalsaria Vs. Bank of India and Others,reported in (2016) 3 SCC 762, Mr.G.Arul Murugan, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that statutory tenants are entitled to protection under the Rent Control Act and in such circumstances, 1st respondent Bank or anyone acting on their instructions cannot forcibly evict the petitioner by resorting to any unlawful means. Paragraph Nos. 29 and 30 are extracted.

"29. When we understand the factual matrix in the backdrop of the objectives of the above two legislations, the controversy in the instant case assumes immense significance. There is an interest of the bank in recovering the Non Performing Asset on the one hand, and protecting the right of the blameless tenant on the other. The Rent Control Act being a social welfare legislation, must be construed as such. A landlord cannot be permitted to do indirectly what he has been barred from doing under the Rent Control Act, more so when the two legislations, that is the SARFAESI Act and the Rent Control Act operate in completely different fields. While SARFAESI Act is concerned with Non Performing Assets of the Banks, the Rent Control Act governs the relationship between a tenant and the landlord and specifies the rights and liabilities of each as well as the rules of ejectment with respect to such tenants. The provisions of the SARFAESI Act cannot be used to override the provisions of the Rent Control Act. If the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent Banks are to be accepted, it would render the entire scheme of all Rent Control Acts operating in the country as useless and nugatory. Tenants would be left wholly to the mercy of their landlords and in the fear that the landlord may use the tenanted premises as a security interest while taking a loan from a bank and subsequently default on it. Conversely, a landlord would simply have to give up the tenanted premises as a security interest to the creditor banks while he is still getting rent for the same. In case of default of the loan, the maximum brunt will be borne by the unsuspecting tenant, who would be evicted from the possession of the tenanted property by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Under no circumstances can this be permitted, more so in view of the statutory protections to the tenants under the Rent Control Act and also in respect of contractual tenants along with the possession of their properties which shall be obtained with due process of law.

30. The issue of determination of tenancy is also one which is well settled. While Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 does provide for registration of leases which are created on a year to year basis, what needs to be remembered is the effect of non-registration, or the creation of tenancy by way of an oral agreement. According to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a monthly tenancy shall be deemed to be a tenancy from month to month and must be registered if it is reduced into writing. The Transfer of Property Act, however, remains silent on the position of law in cases where the agreement is not reduced into writing. If the two parties are executing their rights and liabilities in the nature of a landlord-tenant relationship and if regular rent is being paid and accepted, then the mere factum of nonregistration of deed will not make the lease itself nugatory. If no written lease deed exists, then such tenants are required to prove that they have been in occupation of the premises as tenants by producing such evidence in the proceedings under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act before the learned Magistrate. Further, in terms of Section 55(2) of the special law in the instant case, which is the Rent Control Act, the onus to get such a deed registered is on the landlord. In light of the same, neither the landlord nor the banks can be permitted to exploit the fact of non registration of the tenancy deed against the tenant."

7. The above principles of law is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vishal N. Kalsaria's case on 20.01.2016. We are informed of the latest amendment to SARFAESI Act, 2002 by Act 44 of 2016 dated 12.08.2016, wherein, the legislature has enacted the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debt Law and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 2016.

8. As per Section 1 (2) of the above said amended Act, it shall come into force, on such date, as the Central Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.

9. Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 has been amended on 12/6/2006, by insertion of Section 4 -A of 2016, with effect from 1/9/2016. As per Section 17 (4)-A of the SARFAESI Act, as amended, vide Act 44 of 2016, where

(i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purpose of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy, -

(a) has expired or stood determined; or

(b) is contrary to Section 65 A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); or

(c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or

(d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act; and

(ii). the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

10. Notification issued by the Department of Financial services, Ministry of Finance, dated 1/9/2016, is extracted hereunder:-

S.O.2831 (E) In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 2016 (44 of 2016), the Central Government hereby appoints the 1st day of September, 2016, as the date on which the following provisions of the said Act shall come into force, namely:-

S.No.Sections
1.Sections 2 and 3 (both inclusive)
2.Sections 4 [except clause (xiii)]
3.Sections 5 and 6 (both inclusive)
4.Sections 8 to 16 (both inclusive)
5.Sections 22 to 31 (both inclusive)
6.Sections 33 to 44 (both inclusive)
11. In the light of the recent amendment, by way of Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 2016 (44 of 2016), there is an effective and alternative remedy, provided to any person, who claims to be a tenant or has lease hold rights, upon the secured asset and that if any application is filed, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties, in relation to such claim shall, for the purpose of enforcement of security interest, has jurisdiction to examine whether the lease or tenancy and other parameters, mentioned in Section 4 A of the Amended Act and to pass such orders, as deems fit, in accordance with the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstructions of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, taking note of the amendment.

12. Repeatedly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when there is an efficacious and alternate remedy under the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act or Securitisation And Reconstructions of Financial Assets Act, 2002, as the case may be, a writ petition is not maintainable. We deem it fit to consider the following decisions.

(i) In Precision Fastenings v. State Bank of Mysore, reported in 2010(2) LW 86, this Court held as follows:

"This Court has repeatedly held in a number of decisions right from the decision in Division Electronics Ltd. v. Indian Bank (DB) Markandey Katju, C.J., (2005 (3) C.T.C., 513), that the remedy of the aggrieved party as against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act is to approach the appropriate Tribunal and the writ petition is not maintainable. The same position has been succinctly stated by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Transcore v. Union Of India (2006 (5) C.T.C. 753) in paragraph No. 26 wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:

The Tribunal under the DRT Act is also the Tribunal under the NPA Act. Under Section 19 of the DRT Act read with Rule 7 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (1993 Rules), the applicant bank or FI has to pay fees for filing such application to DRT under the DRT Act and, similarly, a borrower, aggrieved by an action under Section 13(4) of NPA Act was entitled to prefer an Application to the DRT under Section 17 of NPA. (Emphasis added) "

(ii) In Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, reported in 2010 (5) LW 193 (SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:

"16. The facts of the present case show that even after receipt of notices under Section 13(2) and (4) and order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not bother to pay the outstanding dues. Only a paltry amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid by respondent No. 1 on 29.10.2007. She did give an undertaking to pay the balance amount in installments but did not honour her commitment. Therefore, the action taken by the appellant for recovery of its dues by issuing notices under Section 13(2) and 13(4) and by filing an application under Section 14 cannot be faulted on any legally permissible ground and, in our view, the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by entertaining the writ petition of respondent No. 1.

17. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression any person used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

18. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for re-dressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1=1999-2-L.W. 200 and Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order.

27. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.

28. Insofar as this case is concerned, we are convinced that the High Court was not at all justified in injuncting the appellant from taking action in furtherance of notice issued under Section 13(4) of the Act.

29. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Since the respondent has not appeared to contest the appeal, the costs are made easy."

(iii) In Saraspathy Sundararaj v. Authorised Officer and Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, reported in (2010) 5 LW 560, the Court held as follows:

"The petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the possession notice dated 16.09.2004 issued by the respondent under the SARFAESI Act and consequently direct the respondent to effect the settlement in accordance with the SBI OTS-SME 2010 Scheme as contained in its letter dated 18.03.2010 and unconditionally restore physical possession of the six rooms taken physical possession by it at No. 29, Sarojini Street, T. Nagar, Chennai - 17 with such damages.

... When a specific forum has been created which enables the borrower to challenge the action of the financial institution by filing necessary petition under Section 17, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. What could not be achieved by the petitioner by filing a petition before the appropriate Forum, which is at present barred by period of limitation, could not be permitted to be achieved by extending the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of The Constitution of India. Above all, since the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the loan by transferring the property in favour of her son, this Court is not inclined to entertain the petition.

7. In this connection, we are fortified by the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others) III (2010) BC 495 (SC) = 2010-5-L.W. 193, wherein in para Nos. 17 and 18, it was held thus:

17. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

18. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order, (underlining added).

9. In the light of the above decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, the writ petition filed by the petitioner seeking to set aside the possession notice issued to her long back is legally not sustainable. We are of the considered view that this petition has been filed only to drag on the proceedings and to evade repayment of the loan. That be so, the petitioner has no legal right to compel the bank to accept the one time settlement offer made by her.

13. The present case is identical in nature and it is covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court mentioned supra. In this case, the petitioner has violated the condition of mortgage by transferring the secured asset in favour of her son and therefore, as per clause 1.7 of the OTS Scheme offered by the bank, the petitioner has to be excluded from extending the benefits of the scheme which was rightly done by the bank. In any event, without exhausting the alternative remedy, the relief sought for by the petitioner by invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of The Constitution of India cannot be granted."

iv) In Simon's Foot Wear Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Bank, reported in (2015) 2 MLJ 166, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this court held as follows:

9.As against the confirmation of sale and issuance of the sale certificate, the writ petitioners did have their remedy of filing an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The appeal remedy is an effective and efficacious remedy. When such an effective and efficacious remedy is available, this court will decline exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ....

10. So far as the challenge made to the order dated 24.06.2013 is concerned, since an appeal remedy is available the writ petitioners ought to have exhausted the appeal remedy before approaching this Court with this writ petition. .......

13. Though, Mr.G.Arul Murugan, learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that inasmuch as no notice or written instruction is given by State Bank of Travancore, Besant Nagar Branch, Chennai, the 1st respondent herein, on the petitioner, to vacate and thus, a cause of action has arisen, so as to enable the petitioner, to approach the tribunal under Section 17 of the Act, and therefore, the instant writ petition is maintainable for issuance of mandamus, the said submission cannot be countenanced, in the light of the language employed in Section 13(4) of the Act and the amended provisions 17(4)(a) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

14. That apart, as against the attempt to forcibly evict, when the petitioner, is stated to have lodged a complaint dated 14.10.2016 with the Inspector of Police, Law and order, Pallavaram, it is also open to him to approach the remedy under section 200 or 482 Cr.P.C., as the case may be, against those who forcibly attempted to evict the petitioner without any orders of the competent authority under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates action under those who violate law and provision under Sections 13(4) r/w 17(4)(a) of the amended Act, enables the tenant to approach the tribunal. Both the above have not been done and remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is sought for. Exercise of jurisdiction is extraordinary, only in the absence of alternate and efficacious remedy. If there is any attempt to forcibly evict the petitioner, the petitioner can resort either to procedural remedy, viz., the Code of Civil Procedure or the statutory remedy, as per the amended provisions.

15. Writ of mandamus cannot be issued as a transitory order, in the process of the petitioner seeking appropriate remedial action, under either the Code of Criminal Procedure or the amended provisions, under Section 13(4) r/w 17(4)(a) of SARFAESI Act, 2002. Therefore, we are not inclined to entertain the instant writ petition for issuance of mandamus. At the same time, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we only observe that State Bank of Travancore, Besant Nagar Branch, Chennai, the 1st respondent should act only according to the statutory provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002, for taking possession.

16. In the light of the above decisions and observations, writ petition is dismissed, reserving the right of the petitioner to take recourse to the statutory remedy, provided for, under SARFAESI Act, 2002, and the amended Act 44/2016, by raising all grounds available to the petitioner. No Costs. Consequently, connected, Writ Miscellaneous Petition is closed.


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