Ram Labhaya, Ag. C.J.
1. This petition of revision is directed against an order of Mr. M.N. Khanikar, Magistrate, 1st Class, Gauhati, dated 28-10-1948 directing that a bailable warrant of arrest should issue against the petitioner. The warrant was ordered to be issued on a complaint by Abdul Rahman, the Opposite Party.
2. Abdul Rahman's grievance as disclosed in the complaint was that the petitioner had reported to the police at Gauhati that on 1-9-1948 his son had been kidnapped by Abdul Rahman and some others. That on the same night at about 11 P.M., he accompanied the police to his house. The police asked him about the whereabouts of the missing son of Sankar Lal (the petitioner in this case). He pleaded ignorance but was arrested. His case is that the report made by Shankar Lal, petitioner, against him was false. He prayed for the prosecution of Sankar Lal under Section 211, I. P. C. It was on his complaint that a warrant of arrest was issued on 28-10-1948 against the petitioner.
3. It is clear that the complaint is based on a report made to the police on 1-9-1948 by Sankar Lal. In this report all that Sankar Lal, petitioner, stated was that his son Inder Chand Tewari, aged about 7 years was found missing at about 11-30 A.M. that day. He further stated that he thought that his son had been kidnapped by some one and expressed his suspicion that some Pathans, who had a grudge against him, may have done so. The grudge was due to his evicting them from his house.
4. Mr. Medhi, the learned counsel for the
petitioner, has contended that the complaint does not disclose any offence under Section 211, I. P. C., for the simple reason that the report on which it is based could not be said to have contained any false charge against any particular person. He points out that Section 211 requires that if with intent to cause injury to any_ person, someone institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, he shall be punished with imprisonment as provided in the section.
He urges that the report was not directed against any particular individual. It did not embody any accusation of an offence having been committed by any individual. At the most suspicion was expressed. He contends that expression of suspicion alone does not amount to institution of a criminal proceeding as required by Section 211, I. P. C., even if a particular individual is named. In this case no individual was named and therefore two important ingredients of Section 211, I. P. C., are lacking on the showing of the complainant himself. His complaint has to be read in the light of the report which affords the grievance or the basis for his complaint. This contention appears to us to be well founded, even if it is assumed that Abdul Rahman was one of the persons against whom. Sankar Lal's suspicion was directed when he made his report. It is supported by authority.
5. The first case was reported in--'Swaminatha Thevan v. Emperor', 13 Cri. L. J. 303 (Mad) (A). In this case it was held that the mere communication of a suspicion to the police on which an inquiry may be initiated does not amount to the institution of a criminal proceeding within the meaning of Section 211, I. P. C. This view was referred to with approval in--'Mallala Obiah of Owk, In re', AIR 1918 Mad 731 (B).
6. Against these authorities, Mr. Haque, the learned counsel for the Opposite Party, has relied on--'Kashi Ram v. Emperor', AIR 1924 All 779 (C). In this case, the meaning of the word 'charge' was explained by the learned Judges of the Division Bench. According to them, mere stating facts and suspicion did not amount to a 'charge', but alleging belief in guilt of particular person and desiring that he should be proceeded against was held to amount to a 'charge.'
7. 'Registrar, High Court v. Kodangi', AIR 1932 Mad 363 (FB) (D) has also been relied on. In this case the complaint was contained in a telegram to the District Superintendent of Police charging 4 persons with stabbing another. The Police investigated and charged only one of the four and the charge against the others was not brought before the Court. The reference to the Full Bench did not include the question now before us. The report in that case was against certain individuals named. Besides it did not express merely a suspicion. It was a definite charge against certain individuals. This case, therefore, is of no assistance to the learned counsel.
8. AIR 1924 All 779 (C) would support the view which the learned counsel for the petitioner has put forward. The point is concluded by authority and we entertain no doubt that mere statement or communication of suspicion cannot amount to the institution of a
proceeding within the meaning of Section 211, I. P. C. In this view of the matter, this complaint does not disclose an offence under Section 211 and the proceedings are liable to be quashed. The petition of revision is, therefore, allowed. The complaint and the proceedings taken on it are quashed.
9. I agree with the learned Acting Chief Justice as to the proposed order and would like to add that at the time of lodging the information before the Police, Sankar Lal does not seem to have the picture of the complainant in his mind. He definitely speaks of his suspicion with regard to some Pathans who had been evicted from his house. The complainant in his own showing is not a Pathan nor was he amongst the persons evicted from the house of Sankar Lal. It will be, therefore, stretching too far to say that any information was lodged to the police against the complainant not to speak of having a charge made against him. In my opinion the complainant has no substance and it will be sheer abuse of the process of the Court if the proceeding is allowed to continue. The case, therefore, is a fit one for being quashed.