1. These are three applications far leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution against our judgment dated 10-2-1958. In our order in connection with the review petitions filed and disposed of today we have dealt with the facts of these cases elaborately. Two points which have been urged by the counsel for the applicants are that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction in reference to go into the validity of the acquisition proceedings and secondly it is contended that in view of the provision of Section 23 of Act 30 of 1952 (The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952) the acquisition even if invalid, has been validated and consequently this court could not have declared the order of acquisition invalid.
A preliminary objection has been taken by the
opposite parties to the maintainability of these applications. It is urged that the order is not a final order
within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution
and secondly it is urged that the valuation of each
of the appeals is not more than rupees twenty thou
sand, consequently appeal would not lie as a matter
of right under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. So
far as the question of the finality of the order is concerned it is necessary to examine the order. Our
order is in the following terms:
'Therefore the whole thing relating to the award particularly the rate or amount of compensation and respective title of the claimants, must be kept open and the matter must go back to the Collector for proceeding with the acquisition according to the provisions of law'.
The order of the Subordinate Judge setting aside the award on the ground that the acquisition proceedings were ultra vires has been affirmed and the order in this respect finally disposes of the controversy between the parties. What remains pending under our order is the acquisition proceedings and not the, award. Cases where the order of remand is made in a suit it has now been held in series of cases that such orders are not final orders, as even after the remand the matter remains to be finally disposed of and the suit remains pending, but what remains open by our orders is the acquisition proceeding and not the award. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that our order is not a final order.
As regards the second objection as to the valuation of the appeals, even if it be held that the value is below rupees twenty thousand, the case is otherwise fit for (a) certificate under Article 133(1)(c) as it raises substantial questions of law of general importance. The point whether the Subordinate Judge has got jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity of the acquisition proceedings in reference is certainly a matter of substantial importance.
It may be that when we were dealing with the matter the point was not elaborately placed before us and sufficient importance was not given to this point, but that does not mean that the point is not of substantial importance. Before us it was not seriously contested that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to declare the acquisition proceeding invalid as no appeal or cross objection was filed by the State.
Mainly the effect was made to justify the order on the ground that the court below was justified in upholding the amount of compensation even on the finding that the acquisition was invalid which on the face of the order could not be justified. The second point raised by the Advocate General is that in view of Section 23 of Act XXX of 1953 the acquisition order will be deemed to be valid, even if it is irregular. This point was not pressed before us but is of sufficient general importance. We accordingly certify that these cases are fit for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.
H. Deka, J.
2. I agree.