1. We have before us an order passed by the learned District Judge, U. A. D., dated 4th April 1951, by which he dissolved the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent subject to confirmation by this Court. When this matter came before us at a previous hearing, we remanded the case for a finding on the following issues : (1) Whether the parties were domiciled in the Indian Union at the time of presentation of the petition (2) Whether there has been collusion between the parties (3) Whether there has been any connivance? A report on these issues has now been received, but we find that no specific allegation of adultery was made in the plaint. All that is stated in para. 4 of the plaint is this :
'That since about October, 1946, your petitioner understands that his said wife has been living with one Vivian Leo, who has been made the co-respondent in this case. Your petitioner further learns that his wife has committed adultery with the said Vivian Lee during the period she has been living with him.'
We do not think that what is stated in para. 4 constitutes a definite allegation of adultery of the respondent with the co-respondent. The correspondence between the husband and the wife shows that the wife left the protection of the husband on account of certain suspicions of the wife against her husband. It may be that the petitioner has grounds for suspicion that the respondent is living in adultery with the co-respondent. But before we can confirm a decree for the dissolution of a marriage, we have to be satisfied that the wife or husband has been guilty of adultery. In this case, the husband petitioner has not made any definite allegation as to adultery against his wife. For instance, he has not stated that the adultery took place in the bungalow where the co-respondent is said to be living, nor has he said that the adultery took place between a stated period. All that he says is that he has been informed that his wife has committed adultery. A petition for dissolution of marriage cannot be sustained upon an allegation so vague as an information obtained by the petitioner from an undisclosed source that his wife has committed adultery. We do not, therefore, think that we will be justified in confirming the decree for the dissolution of marriage in this case. We think that the proper course is to remand the case for an inquiry to be made as to this particular allegation of the petitioner. It is true that the petitioner has stated in his evidence that the respondent has committed adultery, but the evidence is too vague. It does not amount to anything better than his statement in the petition that he has learnt that the respondent has committed adultery.
2. Accordingly, we set aside the decree dissolving the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent, and order a re-trial of the petition. The trial Court should call upon the petitioner to give further and better particulars as to his allegation of adultery contained in para 4 of the petition. At the conclusion of the re-trial, the trial Judge is directed to give findings on all the relevant issues, including the 3 issues upon which we had remanded the case to the trial Court in the first instance.
Ram Labhaya, J.
3. I agree.