1. The captioned appeal was initially filed as a Revision Application before the Central Government which, under Section 13 IB of the Customs Act, 1962, has come as transferred proceedings to this Tribunal for disposal as if it were an appeal filed before it.
2 The short point arising for consideration is whether plain polyester films imported by the appellants were entitled to the concessional rate of duty in terms of Customs Notification No. 229/76, dated 28 1976 In accordance with this notification metallised or plain plastic films when imported for the manufacture of electronic capacitors is exempted from the basic duty of customs in excess of 60 per cent ad valorem and from the whole of the additional duty of customs. The exemption is subject to the condition that the importer executes a bond to pay the differential duty in 0respect of the quantity of the metallised or plain plastic films which is not roved to have been used in the manufacture of electronic capacitors.
3 In the present case, the appellants got the goods assessed at the concessional rate of duty in terms of the aforesaid notification. In due course, the Assistent Collector enforced the bond holding that the appellants had failed to furnish the requisite proof of end-use. The appeal against this order did not meet with success. It is the Appellate Collector's order which is now under challenge before us.
4 Shri Sogani submitted before us that the required end-use certificate from the Commissioner of Industries had been produced before the lower authorities (page 26 of the paper book). The Appellate Collector, however, rejected the claim on the ground that the said certificate did not say that the goods were used in the manufacture of electronic capacitors. In this connection, Shri Sogani referred to a photostat copy of the manufacturer's catalogue showing the application of the goods, namely for capacitors and manufacture of magnetic tapes. Since the film was metallised, it could not be used for manufacture of magnetic tapes and the only use would be for capacitors.
5. Shri Sunder Rajan on behalf of the respondent submitted that the concession would be available only when it is shown that the plain film or metallised film was used in the manufacture of electronic capacitors and not otherwise. The end-use certificate did not show this. He cited the decision of the Delhi High Court in Modi Rubber Limited v. Union of India and Ors. -1983 ELT 24 (Del.) in which the Court held that the scope, effect and operation of a notification had to be judged by the words employed in the notification. He also cited this Tribunal's decision in Canara Workshop Limited Mangalore v. Collector of Customs, Madras-1983 E.L.T. 1099 (CEGAT). According to which the terms or words used in a statute had to strictly construed.
6. We have considered the submissions of both sides. The certificate issued by the Commissioner of Industries only testifies to the fact that the polyester films had been used in the manufacture of metallised polyester films "for the purpose of using in the manufacture of electronic capacitors". What the notification requires is that the imported plain films or metallised films should be used in the manufacture of electronic capacitors and evidence of such use shouid be produced. The Certificate produced by the appellants cannot be regarded as adequate discharge of their obligation in terms of the notification and in terms of the bond executed by them to satisfy the proper authority that the films imported by them had in fact been used in the manufacture of electronic capacitor. It is futile to argue that metallised films had only one use. If this is so, there is no purpose in the notification requiring evidence of such end-use even in respect of such metallised film. Further, we notice from the impugned order that the appellants were not the manufacturers of electronic capacitors. This only shows that the onus on them was even more onerous to establish compliance with the prescribed manner of end-use. In this view of the matter we do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned order which we, therefore, up-hold. We reject the appeal.