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Rainbow Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtCustoms Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal CESTAT Delhi
Decided On
Reported in(1985)(5)LC1545Tri(Delhi)
AppellantRainbow Industries (P) Ltd.
RespondentCollector of Central Excise
Excerpt:
1. this is a revision application (hereinafter called "appeal") filed before the central government which under section 35p of the central excises and salt act, 1944, stands transferred to this tribunal to be disposed of as if it were an appeal presented before the tribunal.important events in this case, as seen from the27-11-75 the appellants filed a price-list in part iv proforma as applicable for sales to related persons, of the dyestuffs manufactured by them. the price-list showed various includible and excludible expenses as well as the assessable value as claimed by the appellants.6-12-75 the price-list was approved, accepting the assessable values as declared by the appellants. the approval was to be effective from 1-10-75.9-8-76 the assistant collector addressed a letter to the.....
Judgment:
1. This is a revision application (hereinafter called "appeal") filed before the Central Government which under Section 35P of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, stands transferred to this Tribunal to be disposed of as if it were an appeal presented before the Tribunal.

important events in this case, as seen from the27-11-75 The appellants filed a price-list in Part IV proforma as applicable for sales to related persons, of the dyestuffs manufactured by them. The price-list showed various includible and excludible expenses as well as the assessable value as claimed by the appellants.6-12-75 The price-list was approved, accepting the assessable values as declared by the appellants. The approval was to be effective from 1-10-75.9-8-76 The Assistant Collector addressed a letter to the appellants stating that the method adopted in arriving at the assessable value was not correct.

It set out what according to the Assistant Collector was the correct method. It also showed the net according to the revised method, the value in each case being higher than what had been declared and accepted earlier. The letter added, & You are further requested to pay the differential amount as per26-8-76 The appellants replied to the Assistant Collector's letter requesting to know the basis on which the16-10-76 A show cause notice was issued by the Assistant Collector. It was stated therein that the appellants had removed dyes by declaring less assessable in the Annexure should not be revised and differential duty recovered under Rule 10 of the Central13-11-76 The appellants replied to the show cause notice, asserting that the method adopted by them was correct, that there was no short-levy of duty and the question of recovery of duty could not be sustained.1-4-77 The Assistant Collector rejected the contentions of the appellants. He confirmed the modification of the price- list effective from 1-10-75 as the previous approval, according to him, was incorrect. He also ordered that the appellants should pay differential duty under Rule 10 read with Rule 173J of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.20-5-77 An appeal was made to the Appellate Collector. 29-3-78 The appeal was rejected, upholding the findings of the Assistant Collector.

3. As required under the Rules, the appellants filed a RT-12 Return for clearances in each month from October 1975 to November 1976. These RT-12 Returns were assessed on various dates between 28-1-76 and 8-12-76. Further, demand notices for duty alleged to have been short levied were issued on 23-8-76 and 18-9-76 in respect of RT-12 Returns assessed prior to those dates. The RT-12 Returns for the months of July to November 1976 were returned along with demands for the differential duty, on 30-9-76, 1-11-76 and 11-12-76. The total of the demands for differential duty came to Rs. 87,755.83.

4. We are not going into the details of the methods adopted by the appellants and by the Assistant Collector for arriving at the correct assessable value of the goods, since Shri Narasimhan, the learned Advocate for the appellants, conceded that the revised method adopted by the Assistant Collector was correct. Shri Narasimhan however contended that the demands were not enforceable because the proceedings before the Assistant Collector were vitiated by lack of jurisdiction and competence, and also on the grounds of limitation.

5. Shri Narasimhan's argument in brief was that the first price-list had been duly approved under Rule 173C by the Assistant Collector. The subsequent modification of that approval, according to Shri Narasimhan, amounted to a review of the Assistant Collector's order of 6-12-75.

According to Shri Narasimhan, this could not be done by the same or the successor Assistant Collector. The power vested only with the Central Board of Excise and Customs under Section 35A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, or if the provisions of Rule 10 were duly complied with.

According to him, these conditions were not satisfied as there was no review by the Board. Nor were the conditions of Rule 10 satisfied, because no show cause notice was issued prior to the Assistant Collector's letter dated 9-8-76 purporting to revise the approval already accorded.

6. Shri Narasimhan relied on a decision of a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Union Carbide (India) Ltd. v.Assistant Collector of Central Excise, reported in 1984 ECR 1351. In that case the price-lists submitted by the petitioners were approved, accepting the exclusion of transportation charges (an objection was raised in regard to packing charges, but that would not affect the issue here). Subsequently, the Assistant Collector issued a notice requiring the petitioners to show cause why fresh price-lists without deduction of transport charges should not be required to be submitted and differential duty recovered. With reference to this position, the High Court held that approval to the deduction of transportation charges having already been given, the Department was not empowered to re-open the said determination on the ground that such charges amounted to equalised freight. The High Court went on to observe that Rule 173C of the Central Excise Rules, upon a proper construction, was intended to give finality to an approved price-list. Referring to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Triveni Sheet Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1983 E.L.T. 711, the Court observed that that decision was distinguishable on facts and had no relevance for determination of the questions raised in the proceedings before it.

7. Shri Narasimhan also referred to the above decision of the Allahabad High Court, which was delivered by a Division Bench. That case however was determined only partly in favour of the assessee. In that case the High Court was concerned with revisional proceedings initiated by the Government of India under Section 36(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act. The assessees had sought to invoke the limitation set out in the.

third proviso to that subsection. According to them, the period of limitation would run from the date of approval of the price-list. In rejecting this contention, the High Court held that "a simpliciter order passed under Rule 173C even though it provides a basis for eventually calculating and determining the amount of duty payable by a manufacturer during a particular month neither results in assessment of duty nor to its being levied. Such an order by itself, therefore, cannot entail any question of short-levy or erroneous refund of duty".

8. Replying for the Department, Shri Mahesh Kumar submitted that recourse to Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules was fully justified, as prima facie there was a short-levy. A show cause notice was duly issued on 16-10-76. Full details regarding the basis for seeking to revise the earlier approval, and the actual method of working out the differential duty, had been given in the show cause notice and in the earlier letter dated 9-8-76.

9. Shri Mahesh Kumar contended that the assessments were made on the RT-12s, on different dates from 1-10-75. The approval to the price-list was given only on 6-12-75 and therefore the assessments prior to 6-12-75 should be taken to be provisional. The assessments made on or after 6-12-75 were within one year of the date of issue of the show cause notice on 16-10-76, and therefore the show cause notice was in time.

10. Shri Mahesh Kumar relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bawa Potteries v. Union of India and Anr., reported in 1981 E.L.T. 114, to contend that the Assistant Collector was in the circumstances of this case fully competent to revise the approval earlier accorded to the price-list. In that case also a price-list was approved by the Assistant Collector and subsequently sought to be revised by the Assistant Collector, on the ground that an erroneous view had been taken in the earlier order of approval. The second Assistant Collector's order was upset by the Appellate Collector in appeal but restored by the Central Government acting under Section 36(2). Against the Central Government's order the petitioners had gone to the Delhi High Court, which upheld the competence of the Assistant Collector to modify the earlier order of approval, and rejected the writ petition. Shri Mahesh Kumar contended that this decision was squarely applicable to the present case, and that, since the Assistant Collector's order was not contested on merits, the appeal should be rejected.

11. In reply, Shri Narasimhan referred to the order of the Tribunal in the case of Messrs Nuchem Plastics Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Delhi, reported in 1984 ECR 658. In para 23 of that order, the Tribunal had discussed the effect of the decisions of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bawa Potteries as well as in another case of J.K.Synthetics Ltd., reported in 1981 E.L.T. 328, and had set out the guidelines emerging from these cases as to when an Assistant Collector would be entitled to re-open a question of classification which had been decided by his predecessor. According to Shri Narasimhan, none of the circumstances set out in the Tribunal's order operated in this case and therefore the modification ordered by the Assistant Collector was without competence.

12. We have carefully considered the arguments advanced on both sides.

As regards the question whether an Assistant Collector has competence or jurisdiction to revise an order of his predecessor on a classification list or a price-list, the Tribunal had made a detailed examination in its order in the case of Nuchem Plastics, which has been relied upon by Shri Narasimhan. In that order the Tribunal had taken into account two judgments of Division Benches of the Delhi High Court which were very relevant, namely that in the case of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. (1981 E.L.T'. 328) and that in the case of Bawa Potteries (1981 E.L.T. 114), In para 23 of the order, the Tribunal had referred to the guidelines emerging from these two judgments. The following observations of the Tribunal are particularly relevant :- "We shall now examine, with particular reference to the two pronouncements of the Delhi High Court, the contention of Shri Narasimhan that the successor Assistant Collector was not entitled to re-open the question of classification which had been decided by his predecessor. The judgment in the case of J.K. Synthetics sets out certain guidelines in this regard. If the process of manufacture of the goods has changed, or if the relevant entries in the Tariff have undergone a modification, or if there has been a subsequent pronouncement of a High Court or the Supreme Court which necessitates reconsideration of the issue, there is obvious justification for such action to be taken. None of these factors operated in the present case. However, the judgment gives the authorities some further latitude by indicating that such a decision could be reopened if fresh facts are brought on record, or there is at least a suggestion that while arriving at the earlier conclusion certain material facts or provisions had not been considered, and that if they had been considered a different view might have been taken." Shri Narasimhan argued that the present case would not be covered by these guidelines. We find it difficult to agree with this contention.

In this case it could be said that while arriving at the earlier conclusion certain material facts or provisions had not been considered, and that if they had been considered a different view might have been taken.

13. The judgment in the case of Bawa Potteries is also very relevant to this case because the facts of the two cases are quite similar. In that case also a price-list was approved by an Assistant Collector.

Subsequently, it was found that the approval was given on the basis of a wrong assumption that the expenses of which deduction had been allowed were not charges for insurance but a breakage allowance. On this ground, the successor Assistant Collector sought to revise the approval granted to the price-list by his predecessor, and also demanded payment in terms of Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules refund granted under his predecessor's order. The Assistant Collector's order (which was reversed by the Appellate Collector and subsequently restored by the Central Government) was ultimately upheld by the Delhi High Court as being competent. Further, the invocation of Rule 10 to the case was also upheld, with the following observations :- "It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention that the rule is not attracted merely because the earlier order has been passed after a detailed consideration. The rule permits a review when the appropriate authority comes to a conclusion that the earlier decision was erroneous and that more duty should have been levied or that no refund ought to have been granted, such error having crept in inter alia due to "inadvertence, error, collusion, or misconstruction on the part of an officer". These words are very wide and clearly cover the circumstances of the present case, as according to the respondents, the refund was erroneously granted due to a misconstruction of law and the earlier order of Rangarajan, J. If the order of review is incorrect, it is, of course, subject to correction by appeal, further revision and, in appropriate cases, by judicial review in a writ petition but it is not open to objection on the ground that the authority has no jurisdiction to review a considered order.

14. It will be seen that the facts of the Bawa Potteries case are similar in material respects to the facts in the case before us. The arguments placed before us in this case are substantially those which were placed before the Delhi High Court in the Bawa Potteries case but were not accepted. We, therefore, find force in Shri Mahesh Kumar's contention that in terms of the decision in the Bawa Potteries case the proceedings were competent and that the application of Rule 10 was justified.

15. It is true that in the case of Union Carbide relied upon by Shri Narasimhan the Calcutta High Court had held that Rule 173C of the Central Excise Rules, upon a proper construction, was intended to give finality to an approved price-list. With great respect to the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court, we think that the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the Bawa Potteries case should be followed in preference to the decision of the Single Judge in the Union Carbide case, particularly as the facts of the Bawa Potteries case are very similar to the facts of the present case.

16. The judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Triveni Sheet Glass Works does not help the appellants, and in fact the Calcutta High Court found it necessary to distinguish the case before them from that which was before the Allahabad High Court.

17. We would observe in passing that Rule 173C lays down a detailed procedure to be followed when there is a dispute as to the admissibility of prices declared in a price-list. The provisions however relate mainly to a dispute arising at the time of initial filing of a price-list. Sub-rule (10) makes a reference to an alteration in the price-list, but the context as well as the wording of this Sub-rule, which requires the assessee to file a fresh list or an amendment of the list, strongly suggest that it should be an amendment made at the instance of the assessee because of some change in the position, and not an amendment sought to be made at the instance of the Central Excise authorities. Rule 173C does not appear to make any specific provision either permitting or disallowing such an amendment.

The question whether an amendment of that nature could be made would therefore have to be seen with reference to other provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act and Rules. When examined in the light of the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bawa Potteries, the conclusion is clear that such an amendment is permissible, subject to the parameters laid down by the Delhi High Court.

18. The next question to be considered is whether the demand under Rule 10 could be said to be time-barred. The decisions in the Bawa Potteries case as well as in the Triveni Sheet Glass Works case make it clear that the time-limit under Rule 10 would run from the date of assessment by the Central Excise authorities on the RT-12 Return. We are unable to accept Shri Mahesh Kumar's argument that the assessments between 1-10-75 and 6-12-75 should be deemed to be provisional, because the price-list was approved only on 6-12-75. According to the Departmental authorities themselves, that approval was deemed to be effective from 1-10-75, and there is also no indication that the earlier assessments were specified to be provisional. The show cause notice issued on 16-10-76 would be in time in respect of assessments made for a period of one year prior to the issue of that show cause notice. From the statement furnished by Shri Narasimhan, it is seen that all the assessments were between 28-1-76 and 8-12-76 and therefore the show cause notice must be deemed to be in time with reference to all the assessments for clearances during the months October 1975 to November 1976.

19. In the result, we find that the order of the Assistant Collector was not lacking in competence or jurisdiction, nor was it time-barred.

The order has not been contested on its merits, as the appellants have fairly conceded that the revised method adopted by the Central Excise authorities for arriving at the assessable value was the correct one.

In the circumstances, we confirm the order of the Appellate Collector and, |reject the appeal.(Entremonde Polycoaters Private Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Poona), I had occasion to hold, on a construction of Rule 173 B of the Rules and after a reference to the case law on the issue and distinguishing the rulings in 1981 E.L.T. 114 (Baw Potteries v. Union of India) and 1981 E.L.T. 328 (J.K. Synthetics v. Union of India), that:- (a) it is axiomatic in law that a power of review has to be granted expressly or by necessary implication ; and (b) approval of a classification list being quasi-judicial, there can be no question of its review-such power not having been either expressly or by necessary implication conferred under the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or the Rules.

21. (a) In 1984 ECR 658 (Nuchem Plastic v. Collector of Central Excise), the Special Bench 'D' of this Tribunal had come to a slightly different conclusion following the aforesaid decisions in 1981 E.L.T.114. The conditions requisite for a review in terms of the said decision are : (iii) there has been subsequent pronouncements of the High Court or the Supreme Court which necessitate reconsideration of the issue; and (iv) fresh facts are brought on record or there is, atleast, a suggestion that while arriving at conclusions earlier certain material facts and provisions have not been considered.

(b) Out of the aforesaid requisites, that at (ii) is already implicit in Rule 173B (iii) and (i) and (iii) do not, strictly speaking, call for the exercise of a power of review.

(c) The only difference between the two decisions was while I had held that there was no power of review at all, not having been expressly confirmed, it was held by the latter Bench that there was a restricted power of review in the specified cases.

22. (a) We have here a question relating to review of a price list and not a classification list. Accordingly, we have to consider Rule 173C, as it existed at the material time, rather than Rule 173B. (b) While Rule 173B (4) and (5) spell out the reasons that may justify an alteration in an approved classification list, Rule 173 C (3) speaks of an alteration becoming necessary for "any reason" whatsoever.

(c) It this a distinction without a difference Again, does the action to be taken in terms of Rule 173C (3), when any alteration in an approved price list becomes necessary, amount to the exercise of a power of review (d) Even if we were to take it that the reasons for the alteration that becomes necessary in terms of Rule 173C (3) are not restricted, as is the case in Rule 173B (4) and (5), only to those specified, still, all that the proper officer can do in such circumstances is, not to carry out any alteration in the approved list, [as is the case in Rule 173B (5)] but to require the manufacturer to file a fresh list or an amendment of the list already filed for his approval. In other words, it is revocation of his earlier approval that is contemplated rather than a review thereof.

(e) This being so, it does not appear that there is any power of review, in terms of Rule 173C (3), of an approved price list.

(f) Once it is revocation and not review, it cannot relate back to nullify the previous approval given. The revocation is wholly prospective, unlike a review which relates back to the date of the decision reviewed.

23. (A) Once this were so, it becomes necessary to examine if a power of review of a price list or for the matter of that, a classification list as well, approved earlier, had been conferred, either expressly or by necessary implication in terms of any other provision applicable for the period in question.

(B) (i) Reliance is placed on the cases reported in (supra) and (supra) to deduce a power of review of an approval given earlier to a price list, in Rule 10 as it read at the material time.

(ii) In 1981 E.L.T. 114, a price list in which certain deductions from the price were claimed for a determination of the assessable value, was not approved in 1962, even though earlier, price lists claiming the same deductions were approved. On a remand from the High Court, the Assistant Collector, redetermined the assessable value, permitted some of the deductions claimed and allowed a refund of duty in a sum of Rs. 3,41,000 for the period between 1961 to 1966 paid earlier. Amongst such deduction allowed was the one relating to a uniform deduction at the rate of 10% for breakages. This was in October 1973. After the refund, however, in November 1974, his successor in office issued a notice in terms of Rule 10 calling for repayment of Rs. 1,25,000 erroneously refunded on account of the deduction at 10% from the price uniformly for breakages and proposing to revise the earlier order.

(iii) It was in the context of the aforesaid facts that it was contended for the assessee inter alia, that the refund granted originally by the Assistant Collector could not have been reviewed by his successor just because he thought it was wrong.

(iv) Rule 10, at the material time, spoke of recovery of any duties short-levied through inadvertance, error, collusion, or misconstruction on the part of an officer or through mis-statement as to the quantum, description or value of such goods on the part of the owner, or an erroneous refund and specified for the issue of a notice to show cause against such recovery in a period of three months from the date when the duty was paid or adjusted or from the date of making the refund.

(v) It would be observed, straightaway, that in so far as the case before the High Court was concerned, it was a case of an erroneous refund that called for reconsideration and the question of the applicability of Rule 10 presented no difficulty whatsoever. Relying upon the observation of the Supreme Court in 1973 (1) S.C.R. 822 : AIR 1972 S.C. 2563 (J 416) [The Assistant Collector of Central Excise v.National Tobacco Company (India) Ltd.] and AIR 1971 S.C. 2039 (J 399) (N.B. Sanjana v. Elphinstone Spinning & Wearing Co. Ltd.), their lordships of the Delhi High Court held that there could have been no short-levy except only after an assessment ; likewise, a refund could have been directed only after making a like determination of a quasi-judicial nature. The rule admits of a review when the appropriate authority comes to a conclusion that the earlier decision was erroneous and that no refund ought to have been granted.

(vi) Similarly,; in (supra), the assessee applied for rectification of previous assessments and grant of consequential refund. The case for such rectification in completed assessments was ultimately allowed in Revision proceedings before the Government of India. Nevertheless, the entire amount claimed was not refunded on the basis of trade notices and circulars issued. Further, the assessee was told that duty would be continued to be collected on a basis other than that approved finally in the Revision proceedings. In a writ petition for enforcing a refund of the amounts collected in excess earlier and for directions for assessment on an appropriate basis, it was held that, notwithstanding the axiomatic rule that the principles of res judicata and estoppel are inapplicable to tax cases, a decision in assessment is not to be departed from capriciously but for good and cogent reasons. There should be- (c) a failure to notice material facts or considerations, to warrant any departure from the decision of the Central Government in Revision. In the facts of that case, it was concluded in the aforesaid decision that it was not open to the Excise authorities to take a different view without any valid reasons. It was further observed that it is not as if the Excise authorities were without any remedy other than a review in a case of an erroneous decision earlier. It was specifically indicated that it was open to the higher authorities to exercise their powers of revision or review under the Act. "But if this has not been done or if in revisional proceedings for an earlier year, the ultimate Revisional authority has taken a view in favour of the assessee, fresh proceedings cannot be launched against the assessee merely because the department later thinks that the previous view is untenable or the matter should be re-agitated and a fresh decision obtained".

(vii) It will be observed that while in the first of the cases, Rule 10 was indisputably applicable seeing that it was a case of erroneous refund in consequence of an assessment, the second was not in relation to competence or jurisdiction for a review. It is a decision in which, once a review is competent or within jurisdiction, the reasons justifying a review were laid down. Both the decisions emphasize, however, that what can be reviewed is an order of assessment (from which either a short-levy or an erroneous refund, resulted).

(viii)(a) In any view of the matter, it is abundantly clear" that in terms of the aforesaid decisions, there should have been a i)short-levy or an erroneous refund in consequence of an assessment for Rule 10 to apply. [See 1983 E.L.T. 338 (Devidayal Rolling and Refineries Pvt. Ltd. v. Superintendent of Central Excise) in this context].

(b) An assessment is a quasi-judicial process which involves due application of mind to the facts as well as the requirements of law.

[Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National Tobacco Company (India) Ltd.] (supra). Further, "it is not a factual or presumed levy which could, in a disputed case, prove an 'assessment'. This has to be done by proof of the actual steps taken which constitute 'assessment" (ibid).

(c) Now, a short-levy or an erroneous refund in consequence of an assessment may be due to variety of factors. An approval originally accorded erroneously to a Classification List or a Price List is not, however, one of them seeing that it is an act that precedes the assessment itself and once the approval has been accorded, right or wrong, such approval is the very basis of the assessment and there could be no short-levy in consequence when the assessment is made in accord with the approved list.

(d) If there was no short-levy in assessment, Rule 10 cannot be called in aid for a review of the earlier order of approval of the list.

(e) In other words, a power of review implicit in Rule 10 of an earlier assessment in consequence of a short-levy or an erroneous refund does not, in my opinion, extend to a reconsideration of an approval previously accorded to a Classification List or a Price List. Although such approval was quasi-judicial, it is an act that precedes the assessment, and if it is only the order in assessment that could be reviewed, obviously, there could be no review of a quasi-judicial act prior to such assessment.

(f) If it were otherwise, and a power of review of an approval accorded to a Classification or Price List earlier was implicit in Rule 10, the terminus a quo for the period of limitation-namely the date of payment or adjustment of duty or grant of refund-was meaningless. The approval in such a case precedes the date of payment or adjustment of duty or grant of refund. The commencement of a period of limitation in Rule 10 is not relatable to the date where an approval was originally granted-which would have been the case, if, in terms thereof, a power of review had, indeed, been granted.

(g) This does not mean that the Revenue are stuck with an erroneous approval without any remedy for rectification or modification. It could have been effected by the Collector by way of revision under Section 35A(2) as it read at the material time or presently by way of an appeal to the Collector (Appeals) under Section 35E(2).

(ix) To re-state, therefore, the conditions pre-requisite for review in terms of Rule 10 are an assessment and a short-levy in consequence thereof. There was no assessment at the time the approval was accorded.

Nor was there any short-levy when assessment was made in accordance with an approved Classification List or Price List. In the premises, Rule 10 is altogether inapplicable for a reconsideration of an approval originally given for a Classification List or Price List, however, erroneous it may be. A power of review of the erroneous approval is not conferred upon the proper officer either expressly or by necessary amendment in terms of the said Rule. The aforesaid decisions of the Delhi High Court are, with respect, decisions relating to a short-levy or erroneous refund in consequence of an assessment, and are, hence, inapplicable.

24. In the instant appeal as well, Rule 10 that was sought to be relied upon was the same as the one applied in the aforesaid decisions. There was no assessment-much less a short-levy resulting from it. The commencement of the period of limitation in terms of Rule 10 confirms its inapplicability to a review of a previous approval to a price or classification list, and it must be held that, such a power cannot be inferred from it. The decisions in 1981 E.L.T. 565{Madras Rubber Factory v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise) ; 1983 E.L.T. 34 Undo Organic Chemieals v. Union of India) and 1977 E.L.T. 144 (Kazanchi Paper and Board Mills v. Superintendent of C.E., Kanpur) lay it down that no such review is competent.

26. In accordance with the view of the majority, the appeal is rejected.


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