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B. Rajendra Oil Mills and Refinery Vs. Collector of Central Excise - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtCustoms Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal CESTAT Delhi
Decided On
Reported in(1985)(21)ELT607TriDel
AppellantB. Rajendra Oil Mills and Refinery
RespondentCollector of Central Excise
Excerpt:
1. the facts giving rise to this appeal are that m/s. b. rajendra oil mills & refinery (hereinafter called the appellants are the manufacturers of vegetable oils. during the period april 1966 to april, 1977, they paid a sum of rs. 22,544.22 as cess levied and collected under this act. out of this amount, a sum of rs. 16,348.20 related to castor oil for which they filed a refund claim on the ground that section 6 of the produce cess act, 1966 provides that when oil is exported refund will be granted. during this period they had sold the castor oil through commission agents and exported by the shippers and, therefore, they arc entitled to the refund of the cess duty paid on this exported oil. the assistant collector (refunds) before whom the refund claim was filed, rejected the said.....
Judgment:
1. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that M/s. B. Rajendra Oil Mills & Refinery (hereinafter called the appellants are the manufacturers of vegetable oils. During the period April 1966 to April, 1977, they paid a sum of Rs. 22,544.22 as cess levied and collected under this Act. Out of this amount, a sum of Rs. 16,348.20 related to Castor oil for which they filed a refund claim on the ground that Section 6 of the Produce Cess Act, 1966 provides that when oil is exported refund will be granted. During this period they had sold the castor oil through Commission Agents and exported by the shippers and, therefore, they arc entitled to the refund of the cess duty paid on this exported oil. The Assistant Collector (Refunds) before whom the refund claim was filed, rejected the said refund claim by his Order dated 16-11-1973. The appeal before the Appellat Collector of Central Excises, Madras was also rejected vide his order dated 5-8-1974.

2. Being aggrieved by the said Order of the Appellate Collector, the appellants filed Revision Application before the Government of India which now stands transferred to this Tribunal and is treated as an appeal.

3. We have heard Shri C.S. Lodha, Advocate, counsel for the appellants and Mrs. Vijay Zutshi, S.D.R. for the department and gone through the record.

4. Shri Lodha, the learned counsel for the appellants raised a preliminary objection that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear and entertain this appeal. According to him, Section 35P(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944(1 of 1944) gives jurisdiction to the Tribunal to decide the transferred matters pending immediately before the appointed day before the Central Government under Section 36, as it stood immediately before that date. According to Shri Lodha, the present case which is now before this Tribunal has not been validly transferred to this Tribunal as these proceedings which were pending immediately before the appointed day before the Central Government were not under Section 36 of the Act. These were under Section 10 of the Produce Cess Act, 1966. Shri Lodha further submitted that Section 10 of the Produce Cess Act, 1966 lays down the procedure of appeal to such authority as the Central Government may by Notification in the official gazette appoint in this behalf. Shri Lodha submitted that when the Produce Cess Act, 1966, under the provisions of which this case has arisen contains elaborate procedure for appeal etc., the provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 cannot be invoked for this purpose.

Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966, only provides that the provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and the rules made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duty, shall so far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of duties of excise on any produce specified in the Second Schedule as they apply in relation to the levy and collection of duties payable to the Central Government under that Act. According to Shri Lodha, the words "so far as may be" are very significant. It is only in those enactments like the Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1966, the Salt Cess Act, 1953, the Tobacco Cess Act, 1974, etc. where no provision for appeals etc. has been provided, recourse to the provisions under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 in this regard will have to be taken but where there is specific provision of appeal provided in the Act itself like the Copra Cess Act, 1979 and Produce Cess Act, 1966, the provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, in this regard cannot be invoked. He cited three decisions of the Supreme Court, viz., Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1979 S.C. 798, C.I.T. Bangalore v. H.N. Harayana and Ors. AIR 1976 S.C. 2403 and Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Ors. AIR 1975 S.C. 17 in support of his contention. He submitted that the words "so far as may be" occurring in Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966, indicate that the provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, are to be invoked only to the extent they are applicable. Shri Lodha argued that when an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act as they had been "bodily transposed into it". According to Shri Lodha, the result is to constitute the later Act along with the incorporated provisions of the earlier Act an independent legislation which is not modified or repealed by a Modification or a Repeal of the earlier Act. He cited three decisions of Supreme Court, namely, Narotam Dass v. State of M.P.(AIR 1964 S.C. 1667), Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa (Supra) and Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India (Supra) in support of this contention.

5. In view of these submissions, Shri Lodha, the learned counsel of the appellants, requested that the matter be sent back to Government of India, to be dealt with under the provisions of Section 10 of the Produce Cess Act, 1966.

6. Mrs. Vijay Zutshi, the learned S.D.R. countered the arguments of Shri Lodha and pointed out that preamble of the impugned order passed by the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Madras shows that the revision proceedings pending before the Government of India which were transferred to this Tribunal after coming into force the Finance Act, 1982, under Section 35P of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, were under Section 36 of the said Act and not under Section 10 of the Produce Cess Act, 1966. She submitted that Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966 makes it crystal clear that the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and the rules made thereunder relating to levy and collection of duty of excise including the refunds and exemptions in totality have been made applicable to these matters under the Produce Cess Act, 1966, and therefore, the question of incorportion of certain provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 by reference does not arise at all. She cited a majority decision of this Bench of the Tribunal being Order No. 781 of 1984 dated 12th October, 1984, in the case of Upper Ganges v. Collector of Central Excise 1985 (19) E.L.T. 455, in support of her contention.

According to her, the proper forum for the decision of this matter is this Tribunal and not Government of India, who ceases to be a revisional authority qua this matter after coming into force the Finance Act, 1982 and, therefore, the objection raised by Shri Lodha, the learned counsel of the appellants, is devoid of any force.

7. The entire case hinges upon the interpretation of Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966 which reads as under : "The provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and the rules made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duty, shall so far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of duties of excise on any produce specified in the Second Schedule as they apply in relation to the levy and collection of duty payable to the Government under that Act." 8. A perusal of this sub-section shows that the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder have been made applicable so far as they apply in relation to the levy and collection of duty of excise including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duty on any produce specified in Second Schedule of the Produce Cess Act, 1966, in the same way and manner as they apply in relation to levy and collection of duties payable to the Central Government under that Act.

9. As per the provisions of the Produce Cess Act, 1966 a cess at the prescribed rates has to be paid on all the oils produced in oil mills.

However, if any quantity of such oils is exported, the miller is entitled to the refund from out of the proceeds of cess levied and collected under the provisions of the Produce Cess Act, 1966.

10. In this case before us, a refund claim of Rs. 16,000 was filed out of the cess paid on castor oil (a product specified in Second Schedule) sold through commission agents and exported by shippers. The present appeal relates to claim for refund on such exports up to the end of December, 1972, and hence in view of the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966, the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and the rules made thereunder are to be applied.

11. The question arises whether the provisions of appeal as laid down in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 would be applicable in this case or the appellate procedure as mentioned in Section 10 of the Produce Cess Act, 1966 is to be followed 12. Under Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which was brought into force on 17th November, 1980, any person can claim refund of excise duty paid by him by making an application to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise within six months from the relevant date. However, prior to 17th November, 1980, the refund of excise duty was governed by the provisions of Rule 11 of Central Excise Rules, 1944 which has been omitted consequent upon the enforcement of the Section 11B of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Rules made thereunder specify an elaborate procedure regarding refunds like manner of presentation of refund claims, time limit for preferring a refund claim, time limit of settling a refund claim and grounds on which the refund claims cannot be granted. These provisions relating to refunds mentioned in Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder are applicable to the present refund claim in view of the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966.

13. Now, the question arises in case of any dispute while refusing and granting the refund, where the assessee should go The answer is very much evident if we scrutinise the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966. The assessee should have to resort to the provisions of redress provided in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and rules made thereunder. It would be a fallacy to suggest that for the purpose of lodging the refund claim and for getting the same sanctioned, one should resort to the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder and if aggrieved by any order passed under the provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 even though concerning refund of the cess as excise duty, that party should resort to the appellate procedure as laid down in Section 10 of the Produce Cess Act, 1966.

"Any occupier of a mill, who is aggrieved by an assessment made under Section 9, may, within three months of service of the notice referred to in Sub-section (1) of that Section, appeal to such authority as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf, for the cancellation or modification of the assessment and, on such appeal, the said authority may cancel or modify the assessment and order the refund to such occupier of the whole or part, as the case may be, of the amount paid thereunder : Provided that the authority so appointed shall not be inferior in rank to the Collector by whom the assessment was made." 15. A persual of this Section shows that resort to the provisions of this Section can be made only if an occupier of a mill is aggrieved by an assessment made under Section 9 of the Act. Assessments under Section 9 are made on the basis of returns filed under Section 8 of the said Act. Section 8 does not speak of the refund of cess. It is only Section 6 of this Act which talks of refund of cess on oils exported, which is the case before us. From the scheme of the Produce Cess Act, 1966, it is clear that the orders relating to refund of cess on oil exported are not redressable under Section 10 of this Act, which talks only of assessment made under Section 9 of the said Act. In these circumstances, in view of the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966, one has to take recourse to the appellate procedure as laid down in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 from time to time regarding orders for refund of cess on oils exported.

16. In this case before us, the claim for refund of cess filed by the appellants was rejected by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad II Division by his Order C. No. V/12/30/7/69 dated 16-11-1973. Aggrieved by that order, an appeal was filed by the appellants before the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Madras as per the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Appellate Collector of Central Excise also rejected the appeal by his order No. 1368/74/HNR dated 5-8-1974 issued under C. No. 23/74 dated 5-8-74. The preamble of this order shows that the person aggrieved by this order can prefer a Revision Application to Central Government under Section 36 of the said Act and that is why the appellants filed a Revision Application before the Government of India against the impugned order passed by the Appellate Collector, This Revision petition under Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

was pending before the Government of India when the Finance Act, 1982 came into force. Section 35P(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (as amended) reads as under : "(2) Every proceeding which is pending immediately before the appointed day before the Central Government under section 36, as it stood immediately before that day, and any matter arising out of or connected with such proceeding and which is so pending shall stand transferred on that day to the Appellate Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may proceed with such proceeding or matter from the stage at which it was on that day as if such proceeding or matter were an appeal filed before it : Provided that if any such proceedings or matter relates to order where- (a) in any disputed case other than a case where the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment is in issue or is one of the points in issue, the difference in duty involved or the duty involved; (b) the amount of fine or penalty, determined by such order, does not exceed ten thousand rupees, such proceedings or matter shall continue to be dealt with by the Central Government as if the said Section 36 has not been substituted :" 17. In this case, the proceedings were pending before the Government of India under Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and the amount of refund involved was more than Rs. 10,000 and, therefore, the Revision Application pending before the Government of India, was rightly transferred to this Tribunal under Section 35P(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 to be treated as an Appeal.

18. The words "so far as may be" occurring in Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966 nowhere restrict that the Appellate procedure as laid down under Section 10 of this Produce Cess Act, 1966 will only be applicable in the matters under the said Act.Mahindra and Mahindra v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1979 S.C. 798 had the occasion to interpret the words "as far as may". According to their lordships, the words "as far as may" are to be invoked only to the extent they are applicable.

19. In this case, as we have discussed above, the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder regarding levy, collection, refund and exemption of duties are applicable to the Produce Cess Act, 1966. When there is no provision under the Produce Cess Act, 1966 to give redress to aggrieved party regarding the matter of refund, naturally the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which have been made applicable under Section 15(2) of the said Act are to be invoked. The words "so far as may be" occurring in Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966 shatters the entire case of the appellants. The appellate provisions in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 concerning the refund matters are to be applied to the Produce Cess Act, 1966 as per the provisions of Section 15(2) of the said Act as the Produce Cess Act, 1966 does not contain any machinery to give redress to the aggrieved party regarding refund claims.

20. There is no dispute regarding the plea of the learned counsel of the appellants that when an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been bodily transposed into it. A distinction has been drawn between a mere reference or citation of one statute into another and incorporation. In the former case a modification, repeal or re-enactment of the statute that is referred will also have effect for the statute in which it is referred, but in the latter case any change in the incorporated statute by way of amendment or repeal has no repercussion on the incorporating statute. In this case, Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, 1966 does not show that some of the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 have been incorporated into the Produce Cess Act, 1966. It is not a case of incorporation by reference. Section 15 shows that in certain matters regarding levy and collection of duties of excise including refunds and exemptions on any produce specified in the Second Schedule, shall be applicable as they apply in relation to levy and collection of duties payable in Central Government under that Act. It shows that the provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as amended from time to time, shall be applicable to the Produce Cess Act, 1966 with respect to the produce specified in the Second Schedule of that Act relating to levy and collection of duties of excise including refunds and exemptions from duty. The decisions of the Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel of the appellants do not at all help the appellants in the present circumstances of the case. The legal proposition as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not at all disputed nor there can be any dispute about it. A statute must be read as a whole as words are to be understood in their context. Extension of this rule of context permits reference to other statutes in pari materia, that is, statute dealing with the same subject matter or forming part of the same system. The Produce Cess Act, 1966 is not an exhaustive Act inasmuch as imposition of cess under this Act is levied and collected as a customs duty or as an excise duty and that is why in certain matters that is, in relation to the levy and collection of duties of customs or excise including refunds and exemptions from duty, the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder have been made applicable. These two enactments are pan materia and, therefore both these statutes must be read together in a harmonious way. It is not a case where the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 have been bodily lifted and put in the later Act, that is, Produce Cess Act, 1966. It is the case where the provisions of the earlier Acts like Customs Act and Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 have been made available for certain purposes.

21. In view of our discussion above, we find no force in this primary objection raised by the learned counsel of the appellants and reject the same.

22. Subject to what follows, I agree with the order proposed by my learned brothers. However, I must add a note of my own in view of the conclusion I had reached in order No. C-781/84 dated 12th October, 1984 in Appeal No. 269/80-C. 1985(19) E.L.T 455. In that order, I had taken the view that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear transferred revision applications (preferred before the Central Government) without making a distinction between proceedings arising under Section 9 of the Produce Cess Act and other proceedings. Since then, in the present case, we have had the benefit of detailed arguments by counsels for both sides and in the light thereof and also the order proposed by my brothers, I have come to the conclusion that the amended provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act would apply in relation to appeals and subsequent proceedings other than those arising out of orders under Section 9 of the Produce Cess Act.

"The provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), and the rules made thereunder including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duty, shall so far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of duties of excise on any produce specified in the Second Schedule as they apply in relation to the levy and collection of duty payable to the Central Government under that Act." This Section does not make a reference to any particular Section or Sections of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. This, therefore, appears to be more a case of legislation by reference rather than by incorporation.

24. We have to determine the effect of the amendment of the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 in so far as they relate to the appeals and related matters on similar proceedings under the Produce Cess Act. The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with a more or less similar situation in AIR 1982 S.C. 697-Western Coal Fields Ltd. v.Special Area Development Authority, Korba. The provision to be construed in the judgment was Section 69(d) of Madhya Pradesh Act 23 of 1973 which read as follows : "69. Powers.-The Special Area Development Authority shall-* * * * (d) for the purpose of taxation have the powers which a municipal corporation or a municipal council has, as the case may be, under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (No. 23 of 1956) or the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961)-".

Construing this provision, the Supreme Court observed in para 16 (page 703 of the report) as follows : "The Act of 1973 did not by Section 69(d) incorporate in its true signification any particular provision of the two earlier Acts. It provides that for purpose of taxation the Special Area Development Authority shall have the powers which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council has under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 or the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961.

The case, therefore, is not one of incorporation but of mere reference to the powers conferred by the earlier Acts." 25. Similarly, in Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act, there is no reference to any particular provision or provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act. The reference to the Central Excises and Salt Act is in a general way and is obviously intended to apply all the provisions of that Act and the Rules made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and exemptions in relation to levy and collection of Produce Cess. This is, of course, subject to the qualifying phrase "so far as may be". There is a striking similarity between the scheme in that Section and Section 69(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Act 23 of 1973.

Following the ratio of the Supreme Court's judgment, it is clear that Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act must be deemed to be an instance of legislation by reference and not by incorporation.

26. So far as legislation by incorporation is concerned, the result of incorporation, as pointed out in Craies on Statute Law, would be-"There is a rule of construction that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second as the incorporated provisions have become part of the second statute." The same would be the result with reference to the amendments also in the first statute. But even with reference to such a provision, the Supreme Court, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Narasimhan (AIR 1975 S.C. 1835) pointed out that there are four exceptions. This is stated in paragraph 16 of the judgment (page 1841 of the report) which is as follows :- "16. On a consideration of these authorities, therefore, it seems that the following proposition emerges : Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases : (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other ; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act." The present case would be one in which the third exception above mentioned would appear to apply. If the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, as they stood before the amendments brought about by the Finance (2) Act of 1980 (given effect to from 11-10-1982), are to be held to apply even now to proceedings by way of appeals and further proceedings (except proceed-dings under Section 10 of the Produce Cess Act), the result would be that so far as appeals are concerned, they will have to be preferred to the Appellate Collectors of Central Excise though, subsequent to the amendments, with effect from 11-10-1982, of the Central Excises and Salt Act, the institution of Appellate Collector of Central Excise has been abolished and, in its place, the institution of Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) has been set up. Therefore, unless the amendments in the Central Excises and Salt Act are imported into Produce Cess Act also, the provisions regarding appeals and further proceedings (except under Section 10) would be wholly unworkable and ineffectual. Applying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision, it has to be held that even if the provisions in Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act are to be construed as an instance of legislation by incorporation, the amendments to the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act would have to be deemed to apply to appeals and further proceedings under the provisions of the Produce Cess Act even now. This is, however, subject to one exception and that is where Section 10 provides specifically for a right of appeal under that Section itself and provides for further proceedings also which will have to be followed as under those provisions and without reference to the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In other words, in so far as the appeals/revisions arising out of orders under Section 9 of the Produce Cess Act are concerned, by virtue of the specific provisions of Section 10 of that Act, they would continue to lie to the appellate authorities specifically appointed by the Central Government for the purpose, by notification. Central Government in all other matters, appeal proceedings shall be governed by provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act as they stand from time to time.

27. The view I have taken above, namely, that the new provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 in relation to appeals and related proceedings would apply to similar proceedings under the Produce Cess Act (save proceedings under Section 10 of the latter Act) would gain support from the fact that several other enactments levying duties of excise do not have specific provisions concerning appeals and related proceedings but have only provisions on the lines of Section 15(2) of the Produce Cess Act (with the important difference that those enactments do not provide a specific appeal or subsequent proceedings in respect of certain specified matters). A typical example of such enactments would be the annual Finance Acts in recent years providing for levy of special duties of excise. For example, Section 52 of the Finance Act, 1984 provides for levy of special duties of excise on the lines of similar provisions in the Finance Acts of the preceding years.

Sub-section (4) provides that the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act and the Rules made thereunder including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duties shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the special duties of excise leviable under that Section (Section 52) in respect of any goods as they apply in relation to the levy and collection of the duties of excise on such goods under the Central Excises and Salt Act or Central Excise Rules, as the case may be. A similar provision is to be found in Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Good of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (Act No. 58 of 1957) and Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978 (Central Act No. 40 of 1978). These and similar provisions in other enactments do not have their own scheme of appeals and related proceedings in contrast to the Produce Cess Act. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that appeals and related proceedings in respect of matters arising out of such enactments would be governed by the relative provisions in the Central Excises and Salt Act as they stand from time to time. Any contrary view would mean a vacuum in respect of appeals and related proceedings in respect of orders passed under those enactments, in so far as the period subsequent to the constitution of this Tribunal, is concerned when the pre-existing provisions relating to appeals and related proceedings under the Central Excises and Salt Act were deleted and replaced by a fresh set of provisions. Surely, such could not be the intention of the legislature.

28. It was urged before us that the new provisions incorporated in the Central Excises and Salt Act,, 1944, on 11-10-1982 would apply only to appeals and related proceedings under enactments like the Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1976. Section 3A of this Act applies the provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the Rules made thereunder, as in force from time to time, to matters arising under the Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act. The argument was that because of the clause "as in force from time to time" the amendments and insertions made in the Central Excises and Salt Act become automatically applicable. While there can be no doubt about the automatic application of amendments and insertions in the Central Excises and Salt Act to proceedings under the Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act and similar Acts, I do not think that the absence of the above qualifying words in the Produce Cess Act would make for any difference in the light of the Supreme Court decisions cited and discussed in the earlier part of this order.

29. In the present case, the impugned order is, on the face of it, not one passed against an order of assessment under Section 9 of the Produce Cess Act. Therefore, the present appeal before the Tribunal, which has come as transferred proceedings, is competent.


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