N.G. Chandavarkar, J.
1. It is contended that the lower Court has erred in law in upsetting the decree, which was passed in terms of what purported to be a compromise between the parties. The compromise ended in a decree, because it was represented to the Court that the present opponent (defendant) Bhimangouda, who was represented by his pleader, had authorized the latter to enter into the compromise. Bhimangouda, after the decree had been passed, applied to the Court to set aside the compromise on the ground that the pleader had not been instructed to appear for him in the suit and that he had given him no instructions in the case, authorizing him to enter into any compromise. If that was so, the compromise was not binding upon Bhimangouda, and the decree passed upon it was void as to him. It was ultra vires. The Court had been asked to put its seal upon and sign a document, which had no legal foundation to rest upon, and if that decree goes out, then the whole suit is re-opened. But it is said that the procedure adopted by Bhimangouda is not in accordance with law; that there is no section in the Code of Civil Procedure which entitles a party in the situation in which the defendant is, to ask the Court to re-open the suit and set aside the decree in a summary manner. Now, where limited authority was given to counsel to enter into a compromise and the counsel entered into a compromise beyond that authority, it has been held by the House of Lords that the counsel having exceeded his authority the party was entitled to have the agreement to refer set aside and the cause restored to the list for trial: Neal v. Gordon Lennox (1902) A.C. 466. What the defendant says is that there was a suit against him, and that the suit was declared to have ended by reason of a decree passed with his consent. He never consented, and the result has been that there has been fraud committed upon the Court. The Court was persuaded to sign a decree to which the defendant had never consented, and that upon the representation that he had consented to it. Therefore, once the Court is asked to go back upon its own procedure, it is not a question whether there is any section in the Civil Procedure Code to warrant the action of the Court in amending its proceedings. It is an inherent power of every Court to correct its own proceedings where it has been misled. We must, therefore, discharge the rule with costs.