Norman Macleod, Kt., C.J.
1. We are asked to interfere in revision with an order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, on October 25, 1922, in which, after finding that there was a prima facie case against certain persons, he directed that the case should be sent for inquiry to the First Class Magistrate. The principles, which the High Court should follow in dealing with an application in revision in such a case, were considered in In the Matter of the petition of Alamdar Husain I.L.R. (1901) 23 All. 249. The Chief Justice said (p. 251):
Now it has been held by this Court that the High Court has power j in revision to 8eb aside an order passed by a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court under Section 478 of the Code ; and I assume that this view is correct. Still, one must have regard to the nature of the revisional jurisdiction, and must not, in a case arising under Section 476, any move than in any other case, allow what would virtually be an appeal from the order of the Court below. It is necessary, as in all other oases, to see whether there has been any error of law, any irregularity, any abuse of, or failure to exercise judicial discretion, such as would justify interference in revision. Now let us see whether there is any fault of that kind to be found in the Collector's proceedings The condition of his acting under Section 476 is his forming the opinion that there was ground for inquiring into any offence referred to in Section 195. The test is his opinion, and not the opinion of any superior Court; and if he has formed a real opinion to the effect stated, he has power to act under the section, and he commits no error or irregularity in doing so, even though another Court may think the opinion erroneous. I say, if he forms a real opinion, because, no doubt, if a case arose in which the Court acted on merely fanciful grounds, on grounds so empty, so obviously wrong that it Could not be said to have formed a serious judicial opinion at all, then this Court would probably hold in revision that there had been no such action as Section 476 contemplates.
2. With respect we entirely agree with the learned Chief Justice. On a consideration of all the arguments addressed to us, we cannot say that any grounds have been put forward on which we can possibly interfere with the direction given by the District Magistrate. It cannot be said that he gave those directions on grounds merely fanciful, grounds so empty and so obviously wrong that he cannot be said to have formed a serious judicial opinion. We discharge the Rules in these three applications. The only amendment we make in the order is that we set aside the amendment made by the District Magistrate himself on October 30, 1922, adding '195' after '193' in the original order.