1. The first question which was raised in this appeal was that no appeal lay because it was, it is urged, an appeal against a decree and such appeal is barred by class. (2) of Section 21 of the second Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code. But we think that the proceedings, and the Judge's order, and the Memorandum of Appeal, make it quite clear that the appeal is not against a decree but is against the order directing that the award be filed.' And that is an appeal which is specifically allowed by class. (f) of Section 104 of the Code. There is therefore nothing in that question which was raised as a preliminary point by the respondent. Three separate objections have been taken by the appellant.
2. The first is that the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution. This objection can be taken under Section 14 of the second Schedule. A careful reading of the award itself discloses that the objection to it, if any, is rather that it is too definite and not indefinite. In one or two matters it was argued, even after this conclusion had been arrived at, that there was indefiniteness. Without going into details it will suffice to say that we are not satisfied that the incapacity to execute any part of the decree to be made on the award will arise from indefiniteness. The only incapacity that will arise will be from the circumstance that a portion of the decree will be declaratory. That of course is not an objection of the kind urged. We think, therefore, that there is no substance in the objection taken under Section 14 of the second Schedule.
3. Then it was objected that the Court had no jurisdiction to order the award to be filed. This objection in the first instance was based on Section 20 of the second Schedule, and it took this form. The award deals amongst other things with manpan, matters relating to a compliment or dignity, and so forth: matters of a kind such that the civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain suits arising out of disputes regarding them. Therefore, it was argued that in respect of part of the subject-matter of the award the Court has no jurisdiction, and that as the Court is bound to take the award as a whole and to accept or reject it as a whole, it must in this case reject it. But I do not think that this objection can be upheld under Section 20 of the second Schedule.
4. That section, I think, is devised for the purpose of enabling, where the subject-matter of the award lies within more than one jurisdiction, any Court within whose jurisdiction a part of the . subject-matter lies to direct that the award be filed; and I do not think that the section contemplates an objection of the kind here taken.
5. Nevertheless, although the purpose of Section 20 of the second Schedule is plain enough and does not support this objection, it is maintained on general grounds. It is said that apart from Section 20 of the second Schedule altogether, as a matter of fundamental principle, if the Court is without jurisdiction in respect of a portion of the subject-matter of the award, it cannot order the award to be filed. Now the difficulty about suits relating to what is called manpan arises out of Section 9 of the Code, and it arises when disputes relating to manpan prove to be disputes which are not of a civil nature within the meaning of those words as used in Section 9 ; the disability of the Court to try these suits arises out of the circumstance that jurisdiction is conferred by Section 9. The jurisdiction to file an award is not conferred by Section 9 at all but by Section 20 of the second Schedule. Section 20 does not suggest any disability of the kind that arises on a consideration of Section 9 of the Code. So that the words of the law do not suggest such a disability. Then do the underlying principles, does the policy of the law, suggest it It seems to me that it does not. The policy of the law is to enable parties who by private arrangement settle a dispute to have that settlement made legally effective. And provided that there is something to arbitrate on, that there is a reference and an award, then the policy of the law is that that award should be given, effect to without minute inquiry by the Court. Disputes about manpan which cannot be settled in the Courts can often only be effectively settled by arbitration. Surely, the policy of the law is to encourage the possibility of an effective settlement rather than to make such a thing impossible. If, because an; arbitration had decided a dispute as to manpan, therefore the-civil Court were to refuse to order the award to be filed, it would be equivalent to denying any effective settlement to- disputes of this character. It seems tome that the policy of the law cannot possibly mean this. We find, therefore,-; that-the ;words of the law do not support this objection and the] policy of the law is against it. Therefore that objection The last objection was one taken under the Pensions Act. The award provides :-' As to cash allowances becoming due from Government in respect of the two villages of Murmath and Muttatta, Raghavendra Ayaji and Bhimaji Ayaji should conjointly take an eight anna share from Government and Gururao Raghavendra the other eight anna share. ' It is said that if this term finds a place in the decree then we are entertaining a suit relating to a pension within the meaning of the Pensions Act of 1871. In answer to that it may be said that we are not entertaining a suit at all. But there is another answer. The parties are quite at liberty without in any way going against the words or the spirit of the Pensions Act to agree amongst themselves that when the cash allowance is received from Government it shall be distributed amongst them in a certain way. This, as I read the passage in the award, is exactly what the arbitrators have done for the parties, and the decree when passed will be no more in effect than a declaration that the money, when received from Government by the pensioner appointed by the Government, shall be distributed in a certain way. That is not against the provisions of the Pensions Act. If that distribution is not in any particular instance made, it may be that the injured claimant will have to bring a suit. Whether in that suit he would need a certificate under the Pensions Act it is not for us to determine.
6. All the objections that have been urged against the order having failed we must dismiss the appeal with costs.