Norman Macleod, Kt., C.J.
1. The plaintiff sued to recover Rs. 9,782-8-0 as the balance still due on a mortgage bond, dated June 17, 1914, with costs and future interest. The lower Court found that the principal was Rs. 4,999, that the amount of interest due up to the date of suit was Rs. 4,783-8-0 but only allowed further interest after the date of suit so as to make the total of interest awarded equal to the amount of the principal. A preliminary decree was passed directing that the defendants should pay Rs. 9,998 with costs on or before July 15,1923. Interest after July 15, 1923, was to run on the whole of the above amount at six per cent, until realisation.
2. The plaintiff has appealed on the following grounds :-(1) The lower Court wits wrong in holding that the rule of damdupat applied in calculating interest in a mortgage suit from the date of the suit to the date fixed for redemption. (2) The lower Court should have at least allowed interest on Rs. 9,782-8-0 at the agreed rate from March 26, 1922, till which date interest was calculated as stated in the plaint, up to July 15, 1923, the date fixed by the decree for redemption, after taking into consideration the payment of Rs. 8,100 made on or about April 30, 1923.
3. In Hiralal Ichhalal v. Narsilal Chaturbhujdas I. L. R. (1913) 37 Bom. 326 Section c. 15 Bom. L. R. 489 P. C., the suit was brought for redemption of a mortgage. The plaintiff claimed to be allowed interest on the redemption money for the period between the date of the suit and the actual date of redemption. It was held by the District Judge that the rule of damdupat applied, and therefore the amount of arrears of interest to be allowed was limited to an amount equal to the capital sum, but awarded no interest from the date of suit. It was contended that the omission to give interest was due to an oversight as no reference was made in the judgment to the question whether such interest could be allowed. The High Court treated the matter as if the District Judge had in the exercise of his discretion declined to allow interest, and it thought that there had not been an unreasonable exercise of his discretion. Their lordships of the Privy Council agreed with this decision and the grounds on which it rested. There is therefore a discretion vested in the Court to decide whether interest should be allowed on the redemption money from the date of the suit. There is nothing hi the judgment of the lower Court in this case from which we can deduce that the Judge dealt with this particular question. He has allowed interest after the date of the suit so as to make the total sum decreed for interest equal to the amount of the principal. We are entitled, therefore, to consider whether in appeal we should allow any further interest from the date of the suit. The plaintiff has succeeded in getting a decree for double the amount of his capital which was invested on June 17, 1914. It cannot be said that a person, who has invested his money in a mortgage and has succeeded in doubling his capital in less than ten years, has any particular claim on the Court to award him any further amount. The Court has awarded interest from July 15, 1923, on the total redemption money, and consequently if the defendants failed to redeem, the plaintiff would recover interest not only on the capital but also on a similar amount of interest. We think, therefore, that the appeal should be dismissed with coats.