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Sakalchand Moti Vs. Ambaram Haribhai - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectArbitration
CourtMumbai
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Extraordinary Application No. 52 of 1923
Judge
Reported inAIR1924Bom380; (1924)26BOMLR280
AppellantSakalchand Moti
RespondentAmbaram Haribhai
Excerpt:
arbitration-extension of time-oral application.;an application to the court for extending the time within which to certify the award need not necessarily be in writing.;monji premji set v. maliyakel koyassan koya haji (1880) i.l.r. 3 mad 59, distinguished. - maharashtra scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, de-notified tribes (vimukta jatis), nomadic tribes, other backward classes and special backward category (regulation of issuance and verification of) caste certificate act (23 of 2001), sections 6 & 10: [s.b. mhase, a.p. deshpande & p.b. varale, jj] caste certificate petitioner seeking appointment against the post reserved for member of schedule tribe his caste certificate was invalidated subsequently held, his appointment would not be protected. the observations/directions issued by..........an application to the court for extending the time should be in writing and monji premji set v. malivakel koyassan koya haji i.l.r. (1880) mad. 59 has been cited in support of that proposition. but all that the learned judges said in that case was as follows:-we must, accept the declaration made by the subordinate judge that extensions of the period for the submission of the award were from time to time granted, though we may observe, that applications tor such extensions should ordinarily be in writing and that, must certatiuly orders thereon should be. 4. it cannot possibly be deduced from those words that an oral application to the court is void, and that any order passed thereon, even though in writing, as in this case, was equally void. it must follow that these rules must be.....
Judgment:

Norman Macleod, C.J.

1. There were two brothers Sakalchand Moti and Jadav Moti who entered into a partnership to supply bricks to a certain company A field was purchased in partnership, but the sale deed was taken in the name of Sakalchand. Disputes arose between the partners, and two suits were filed in which other parties were impleaded. It is not necessary to refer to the detailed pleadings. The suits were referred to the arbitrament of a pleader of the Court by the joint wishes of the parties on January 10, 1922. The arbitrator gave his awards on August 31. 1922. Objections were tiled against the awards by both the brothers. The mam ground that the applicants relied upon was that the awards were illegal and void as they were not delivered within the time fixed by the Court. There were also allegations that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct.

2. It was represented to me when the application for revision was entertained that the time for filing the award as originally fixed in the orders of reference was February 10. Certainly it appears from the judgment that the learned Judge considered that that was the correct time, and consequently he said that it had been urged by the plaintiff's pleader that the arbitrator examined the witnesses between February 10 and 28, 1922, after the time had expired before it was extended, and therefore the whole proceedings were vitiated. It was only on that ground that I entertained the application. Now it appears that there was an error in the judgment, and that as a matter of fact the original time was February 28. The only question then would be whether due applications had been made to the Court, and admittedly the Rojnama shows that time was extended until August 31 when the awards were made.

3. It has been argued by the petitioners' pleader that an application to the Court for extending the time should be in writing and Monji Premji Set v. Malivakel Koyassan Koya Haji I.L.R. (1880) Mad. 59 has been cited in support of that proposition. But all that the learned Judges said in that case was as follows:-

We must, accept the declaration made by the Subordinate Judge that extensions of the period for the submission of the award were from time to time granted, though we may observe, that applications tor such extensions should ordinarily be in writing and that, must certatiuly orders thereon should be.

4. It cannot possibly be deduced from those words that an oral application to the Court is void, and that any order passed thereon, even though in writing, as in this case, was equally void. It must follow that these rules must be discharged with costs. If the true facts had been placed before me, I should not have granted them.


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