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Dayaram Parashram Marwadi Vs. Laxman Runja Teli - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation
CourtMumbai
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Reference No. 9 of 1910
Judge
Reported in(1911)13BOMLR284
AppellantDayaram Parashram Marwadi
RespondentLaxman Runja Teli
Excerpt:
.....15th june 1910, to a conciliator for a certificate under section 39 of the dekkhan agricultures relief act 1879. the certificate was granted on the 8th august 1910; and the present suit was filed on the 10th august 1910. the plaintiff sought to bring his claim within time by urging that he was entitled, under section 48 of the dekkhan agriculturists relief act, 1879, to exclude the whole of the time taken by him in obtaining the conciliator's certificate :-;that the suit was barred by limitation, for section 31 of the limitation act of 1908 gave a period of grace, which was not extendable by excluding any period of time within it. - maharashtra scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, de-notified tribes (vimukta jatis), nomadic tribes, other backward classes and special backward category..........of computing the period of limitation prescribed for any such suit and application.3. now the period prescribed for any such suit or application, as is referred to in section 48 is, according to the judgment of the privy council, twelve years. that period is prescribed by article 132 of the limitation act (xv) of 1877 and of the limitation act (ix) of 1908.4. 'the period prescribed' is an expression which is used in the same sense in various provisions of the legislature in part materia: for example, in section 72 of dekkhan agriculturists' relief act, in sections 4 and 5 of the limitation act of 1877, and section 3 of the limitation act of 1908; and we, therefore, conclude that in section 48 of the dekkhan agriculturists' relief act also it was intended to refer to the period.....
Judgment:

Basil Scott, C.J.

1. We answer the question referred to us in the negative.

2. Section 48 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act provides for the exclusion of the period intervening between the application for a conciliator's certificate and the grant of the certificate under Section 46 for the purpose of computing the period of limitation prescribed for any such suit and application.

3. Now the period prescribed for any such suit or application, as is referred to in Section 48 is, according to the judgment of the Privy Council, twelve years. That period is prescribed by Article 132 of the Limitation Act (XV) of 1877 and of the Limitation Act (IX) of 1908.

4. 'The period prescribed' is an expression which is used in the same sense in various provisions of the legislature in part materia: for example, in Section 72 of Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, in Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act of 1877, and Section 3 of the Limitation Act of 1908; and we, therefore, conclude that in Section 48 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act also it was intended to refer to the period prescribed in the Schedule.

5. Section 31 of the Limitation Act, however, is relied upon, and it is contended that in effect that adds a period of two years to the period prescribed by the Article, that is to say, the period of two years from the date of the passing of the Act can be extended by excluding the time elapsing between the date of an application for a conciliator's certificate and the grant of the certificate.

6. This, we think, is an erroneous view. Section 31 was enacted in order that hardship might be obviated in particular cases. It gave a period of grace of two years from a definite date, that is to say, from the date of the passing of the Limitation Act.

7. No argument has been advanced to us which would induce us to suppose that that period was extendable by excluding any period of time within it.

8. The Court is indebted to the pleaders who have undertaken the duty amid curice in arguing this Reference.


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