Kalo Nilkanth Vs. Lakshmibai Kom Kalo Nilkanth - Court Judgment
|Judge||Michael Westropp, C.J. and ;Pinhey, J.|
|Respondent||Lakshmibai Kom Kalo Nilkanth|
suit for maintenance - limitation--act xiv of 1859, section 1, clauses 14 and 16. - maharashtra scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, de-notified tribes (vimukta jatis), nomadic tribes, other backward classes and special backward category (regulation of issuance and verification of) caste certificate act (23 of 2001), sections 6 & 10: [s.b. mhase, a.p. deshpande & p.b. varale, jj] caste certificate petitioner seeking appointment against the post reserved for member of schedule tribe his caste certificate was invalidated subsequently held, his appointment would not be protected. the observations/directions issued by supreme court in para 36 of judgment in the case of state v millind reported in 2001 91) mah. lj sc 1 is not the law declared by supreme court under article 141 of the..........to have occurred prior to the bringing of this suit, which is in itself a sufficient demand, and the defence is a sufficient refusal.2. we must, accordingly, on those grounds affirm the decree of the district judge.
Michael Westropp, C.J.
1. It is not competent for this Court to re-open the question of co-habitation of the plaintiff and, defendant, or of the continence of the plaintiff. Those are questions of fact disposed of by the Courts below. The District Judge has, on the point of limitation, erroneously applied Act IX of 1871 to this cause, which was commenced in 1872 before that Act came into force. Section I, Clause 14 of Act XIV of 1859, is also inapplicable, as this is not a case of maintenance chargeable on any estate. The provision of that Act which is applicable, is Section 1, Clause 16, which gives six years from the accruer of the cause of action, and it does not accrue until there has been a demand and refusal. (See special appeal 1041 of 1864, and the note to vol. 2, West's Acts, p. 139). No demand or refusal has been proved to have occurred prior to the bringing of this suit, which is in itself a sufficient demand, and the defence is a sufficient refusal.
2. We must, accordingly, on those grounds affirm the decree of the District Judge.