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Gopal Parshottam Vs. Morar Punja - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtMumbai
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 234 of 1912
Judge
Reported in(1913)15BOMLR555; 20Ind.Cas.249
AppellantGopal Parshottam
RespondentMorar Punja
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Excerpt:
.....of the dekkhan agriculturists' belief act 1879, must be read as ejusdem generis with the preceding words which refer to section 92 of the indian evidence act, and does not point to any other act, as for instance, the indian registration act.;the legal restrictions intended to be removed by section loa are those which would stand in the way of pursuing the enquiry beyond the written words ; but when that inquiry is opened the court is as usual bound by the ordinary laws of evidence or otherwise. - section 31(4) (since repealed) :[tarun chatterjee & h.l.dattu, jj] jurisdiction of high court - respondent, a government company, chartered appellants vessel to carry rock phosphate from togo to west coast india - dispute arose between parties - under agreement, respondent had chosen mumbai as..........because it is an agreement without consideration. on both these points we are of opinion that the learned judge was right.2. mr. gokuldas has taxed his ingenuity to supply some kind of consideration for ex. 23, but, we think, without success. as regards the bar of the registration act, the learned pleader has endeavoured to evade that by referring to section 10a of the dekkhan agriculturists' relief act which gives the court power to go behind the written instrument notwithstanding anything contained in section 92 of the indian evidence act or any other law for the time being in force. the argument is that the words 'any law for time being in force' must include the registration act, but it seems to us that the words ought to be read as ejusdem generis with the preceding words which.....
Judgment:

Batchelor, J.

1. This appeal is brought by the defendants and the original suit was a suit to redeem. The lower Court has granted a decree for redemption. That is now resisted by the appellants on the ground that the lower Court was wrong in not looking at a certain Exhibit, viz., Ex. 23, which, it is contended, if it had been looked at, would have satisfied the Court that no power to redeem was left in the mortgagor. The learned Judge below has declined to look at Ex. 23, first, because it is an unstamped and unregistered agreement, and, secondly, because it is an agreement without consideration. On both these points we are of opinion that the learned Judge was right.

2. Mr. Gokuldas has taxed his ingenuity to supply some kind of consideration for Ex. 23, but, we think, without success. As regards the bar of the Registration Act, the learned pleader has endeavoured to evade that by referring to Section 10A of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act which gives the Court power to go behind the written instrument notwithstanding anything contained in Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act or any other law for the time being in force. The argument is that the words 'any law for time being in force' must include the Registration Act, but it seems to us that the words ought to be read as ejusdem generis with the preceding words which refer to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. We think that the legal restrictions intended to be removed are those which would stand in the way of pursuing the enquiry beyond the written words, but, when that enquiry is opened, we are of opinion that the Court is as usual bound by the ordinary laws of evidence or otherwise.

3. The appeal, therefore, seem to us to fail and should, we think, be dismissed with costs.


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