Lawrence Jenkins, K.C.I.E., C.J.
1. The rule of damdupat does not (in ray opinion) divest rights that have accrued ; it merely limits accruing rights.
2. If therefore the interest claimed was not at its accrual barred by the rule of damdupat, but actually became a debt due to the plaintiff; the subsequent payment of the principal sum in respect of which it accrued would not cancel or avoid the debt of interest.
3. To hold otherwise would lead to the result that if A owed B Rs. 1000 for principal and Rs. 1000 for interest A by paying B Rs. 1000 and intimating that the payment was to be applied to the discharge of the principal, would deprive his creditor of his right to the Rs. 1000 due to him in respect of interest.
4. Reliance has been placed in the reference on the decision in Dagdusa Shevakdas v. Ramchandra (1895) I.L.R. 20 Bom. 611, but in the principle there laid down there is nothing opposed to the view I have expressed.
5. Mr. Justice Jardine, it is true, says 'I have had the advantage of seeing the judgment written by my brother Ranade, and I concur in his impression that the Courts have been in the habit of interpreting the word principal as meaning the balance of principal unpaid at the time of suit'. But it is clear that Jardine J. did not intend to lay down any thing at variance with the principle adopted by Ranade J.
6. Then what is that principle? It is, I think, to be found in 'that part of his judgment where, dealing with Mr. Khare's reference to Kulluka's comment, he says 'There is nothing in these words to justify the contention that it is the original principal and not the principal due when the arrears of interest accrued'.
7. Obviously the learned Judge takes the limit imposed by the rule of damdupat to be the principal due when the arrears of interest accrued, and not as Jardine J. supposed 'the balance of principal unpaid at the time of suit.' The variation introduced by Jardine J. was immaterial for the purposes of the case then before the Court, as the principal sum on which the arrears of interest accrued still remained unpaid and undischarged at the date of the suit.
8. I would therefore answer the question submitted for our opinion by saying that a suit against a Hindu debtor for interest actually and legally accrued is not barred merely because the principal sum lent has been paid off.