1. The lower Courts have rightly, in our opinion, held that the first respondent is not answerable to the claim of the appellant.
2. The question is as to the liability of the second and the third respondents. Their father had been a guardian appointed by the Court and, when the minor died, the Court made a declaration discharging him so far as his liabilities under the Guardians and Wards Act were concerned. Under Section 41, Clause (4), of the Guardians and Wards Act, when a guardian has delivered any property in his possession: or control belonging to the ward or accounts as required by the Court, the Court may declare him to be discharged from his liabilities, save as regards any fraud which may subsequently be. discovered.' Such a declaration has the effect of protecting the guardian from all suits in connection with the management of the minor's property except in the case of fraud discovered after the declaration. No such fraud is found proved in. the present case; but it is contended for the appellant that the declaration actually made, by the Court saves the guardian only from suits concerning liabilities arising under the Guardians and Wards Act, not from, those arising under the common law. Assuming such a distinction to exist between the liabilities under the Act and those under the ordinary law here the complaint is that the second respondent invested his ward's money in an imprudent manner by letting it lie as a deposit without interest with the first respondent. That means that the second respondent did not deal with his ward's property in the manner he was bound to deal with it by the provisions of Section 27 of the Act. That section says that a guardian of the property of a ward is bound to deal therewith as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with it if it were his own,' A man of ordinary prudence invests his money for interest; and this is what the father of the second and third respondents failed to do in respect of his ward's money. There can be no question in this of any liability outside the Act. It arises under the Act itself. The order of the Court discharging the second respondent is, therefore, a complete protection to him so far as the, present claim goes.
3. The decree of the Court below must, therefore, be confirmed with costs. Separate sets being allowed in the case of the first respondent and the second and third respondents.