1. This is an application under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. We are asked to hold in this case that the decree of the Small Cause Court of Ahmedabad is, to use the words of the section, not in accordance with law, and for that purpose we are invited to examine the facts of the case in order to decide whether the appreciation of the evidence in the Court below is correct or incorrect. It has 110 doubt been laid down in this Court in Nathuram Shivnarayan v. Dhularam Hariram I.L.R. (1920) 45 Bom. 292 22 Bom. L.R. 1199 that under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act IX of 1887, the High Court can interfere on questions of fact, such at least is the first paragraph of the head-note to that report. But if the judgment in that case be read, it seems to be a clear inference that what the learned Judges meant to decide was that the High Court would only interfere upon a question of fact where the decision was so perverse or so obviously incorrect in its nature as to amount to an error of law. It is extremely difficult to draw a hard and fast line in all the cases between points where the Court has obviously gone wrong upon a question of fact and those cases where some real point of law is involved. And far from saying that it can never be the case that the High Court will interfere upon a question of fact, I think that it is safe to say that the High Court will not interfere solely upon a question of fact where there is no obvious injustice involved or no obvious perversity in the decision upon a finding of fact. It is plain that the case which was before the Court in Nathuram v. Dhularam was of a very peculiar nature, and the point upon which the Subordinate Judge in that case declined to accept the evidence of account books was one which suggested immediately that he had so erroneously dealt with the evidence as to have been guilty of an error of law. It was held that certain corrections made by the plaintiff in his accounts must necessarily be regarded or treated as incorrect, because ho had not obtained the defendant's initials or signature thereto, and upon that point alone, in the face of other and apparently convincing evidence the Subordinate Judge declined to decree the plaintiff's claim. It was in those circumstances that that decision was passed, and, in my opinion, speaking with all possible respect, it should be confined in its operation to cases, which, to some extent at least, resemble it. There is nothing of the kind in the case before us. Should we accede to the prayer of the learned counsel that the case is within the decision cited, we should be allowing an appeal upon a question of fact from cases tried by the Small Cause Court. That was obviously never intended when Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was enacted. We have heard all that can be urged upon the facts of the case, and after all is said and done, it merely comes to this that though one Court may have taken one view another Court may take a different view. It would be extremely difficult in my judgment, sitting here, to say that the conclusion arrived at is obviously a wrong conclusion, and when that is said the case is removed from the category of cases to which alone Nathuram v. Dhularam can be held to apply. That being so, I think this application should be dismissed with costs.
2. I agree. In regard to Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, I accept the view enunciated by Farran C.J. in Poona City Municipality v. Ramji I.L.R. (1895) 21 Bom. 250 in preference to the wider words in the head-note in Nathuram v. Dhularam I.L.R. (1920) 45 Bom. 292 22 Bom. L.R. 1199. And in fact in the case of Poona City Municipality v. Ramji as well as in Turner v. Jagmohan Singh I.L.R. (1905) 27 All. 531 there was a question of law on which the rule was granted. But in this case I see no such point of law, with the single exception perhaps of the refusal by the lower Court to admit a chit with the application (Exhibit 25). It appears from the Rojnama, however, that the chit which purported to be passed by Shivlal was not tendered to Shivlal while Shivlal was under examination, but was produced subsequently although on the same date, and in these circumstances the Subordinate Judge did not act contrary to law in declining to admit it. The application fails and the rule must be discharged with costs.