Norman Macleod, C.J.
1. The only question in this appeal is when did time begin to run against the plaintiff who had filed this suit for damages for malicious Prosecution. The period of limitation is one year from the time when the plaintiff is acquitted, or the prosecution is otherwise terminated. In this case the plaintiff Was discharged more than a year prior to the suit, and clearly his cause of action would arise immeidately on his being discharged, and would not be suspended because further proceedings might be taken either by Government or by the complainant in order to get the order of discharge set aside. No doubt if a revisional application is successful and the criminal proceedings are directed to be continued, then there is no longer any cause of notion, because the plaintiff is no longer a discharged person, and he has to wait until the prosecution terminates in his favour before his cause of action arises again. It was held in Venu v. Coorya Narayan I.L.R. (1881) 6 Bom. 376 that the discharge of an accused person is the termination of the prosecution. That seems obvious, because if no further proceedings are taken, the accused person is free of the charge made against him, and if the charge was maliciously made he would have a right of bringing an action against the person who instituted it, Then in Narayya v. Seshayya I.L.R. (1899) Mad. 24 it was held that a suit for damages for malicious prosecution brought more than one year from the date of the plaintiff's acquittal, but within a year from the dismissal of a revision petition which had been filed against the acquittal, was barred under Article 23. The only difference between that case and this is that the plaintiff in that case was acquitted instead of being discharged. The result must be that the lower Courts were right in holding that the plaintiff's suit was barred. The appeal will be dismissed with costs