1. The plaintiff's land was sold by the revenue authorities for default of payment of assessment, and was purchased by the second defendant, who was placed in possession on the confirmation of the sale on the 30th July, 1879. The plaintiff, on the 4th October, 1886, brought this suit to recover possession, on the allegation that the sale was brought about by the fraudulent representation of the first defendant, the inamdar of the land that the assessment was in arrears, whereas the fact was that it had been duly paid to him by the plaintiff himself. The Subordinate Judge held the suit to be time-barred. The Assistant Judge reversed that decree, and remanded the case for trial on the merits. We are of opinion that the Subordinate Judge was right. The sale was one in pursuance of an order by a Collector, or other officer of revenue, and if not for arrears of Government revenue was at any rate a sale for arrears of rent recoverable as arrears of revenue, and, therefore, fell under Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 12 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act XV of 1877. The plaintiff, as occupant of the land, was bound by that sale, unless and until it was reversed; and the title of the defendant, who purchased at the sale, is a perfectly good title until the sale is set aside in due course of law--Abul Munsoor v. Abdool Hamid I.L.R. 2 Cal. 98 Article 12 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act would, therefore, apply to the suit if no fraud were alleged. See Vishnu Keshav v. Ramchandra Bhaskar I.L.R. 11 Bom. 130 . The fact that the plaintiff alleges that the sale took place in consequence of the fraud of the defendant No. 1 would make, not Article 144, but Article 95 applicable to the case. See Parekh Banchor v. Bai Vakhat I.L.R. 11 Bom. 130 Article 95 would give the plaintiff three years for his suit from the time when the fraud became known to him. It is clear that the fraud now alleged became known to him before the confirmation of the sale, for he applied to the Mamlatdar to have the sale set aside on the ground of that very fraud. The sale was nevertheless confirmed., The suit, therefore, not being brought within the, period prescribed by Article 95, is barred; and it is unnecessary for us to consider the question of jurisdiction raised with reference to the provisions of Clause (c) of Section 4 of Act X of 1876.
2. We reverse the order of remand passed by the Assistant Judge and restore the decree of the Subordinate Judge with costs.