1. The action of the defendant, on which the present suit is grounded, began and ended with his complaint to the Magistrate. The subsequent proceedings were those of the Magistrate himself. The defendant could not escape all responsibility for them as a basis on which damages were to be estimated, since, even in a case originating in negligence, 'the person guilty of it is equally liable for its consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or not' Smith v. L. & S.W. Ry. Co. L.R. 6 C.P. 21 much more than for the consequences, at least the natural consequences, of a wilful wrong. But these would be taken into computation by way of better enabling the Court to estimate the proper compensation for an act, which in itself could not be changed as to time by the longer or shorter series of results traceable to it. In the case of a prosecution the conduct of the prosecutor is looked on as a continuous act prolonged until the close of the case, and limitation is to be computed from that point (Act XV of 1877, Schedule II, Article 23); but when the complaint made is the only act done, the date of the complaint is that of the wrong--see Huree Narain Mytee v. Ojoodhya Ram Sein 10 Cal. W.R. 308. And the Limitation Act does not prescribe or allow see Goma Mahad Patil v. Gokaldas Khimji I.L.R. 3 Bom. 74) any deduction on account of irregular proceedings of a Magistrate not moved by the defendant in the suit.
2. Here the complaint was made on 26th July, 1878. The property was attached on 10th August, 1878, and then at latest--see Goma Mahad Patil v. Gokaldas Khimji (3)--the injury to the plaintiff by the defendant was done. The present suit was instituted on 13th November, 1881; and whether we apply Article 23 or Article 36 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, XV of 1877, it was then barred. We must, therefore, reverse the decree of Courts below, and reject the claim. The parties respectively are to pay their own costs throughout.