Charles Sargent, C.J.
1. The real question to be determined in this case is, whether Ardesir Dhanjishah could alienate the four villages in question granted to him by the sanad of 22nd September, 1830, beyond the period of his life. The sanad is as follows: 'In consideration of the active and zealous performance of the duties entrusted to him by Government the Honourable the Governor in Council hereby gives and, betows upon Ardesir Bahadur, son of Dhanjishah, and his heirs for ever as jaghir, the following four villages-Bhestan and Sonari in the Chorasi Pargana, Kumwada and Boriach in the Chikhli Pargana' in the zilla of Surat, with the jama and moglai of the same-now yielding an average net sum of rupees two thousand nine hundred and ninety-two, one quarter, and ninety-six reas (Rs. 2,992-1-96). The revenue of the said villages hereafter, whether more or less, to be collected, by the said Ardesir Bahadur and his heirs from the 5th June, 1830, and such lawazims and haks as are at present settled on those villages are to be disbursed by the said Ardesir Bahddur in the same manner has [? as] heretofore.' The grant is, therefore, in express terms one of an absolute estate of inheritance in the revenue of 'the villages in question as a reward for past services, and, in the absence of the words 'as jaghir' would, it cannot be doubted, have vested in Ardesir the absolute right of alienation at his pleasure.
2. The question, therefore, is whether those words had any and what restrictive effect on the power of alienation which was otherwise inherent in the estate of the grantee. Now, no authority has been cited to show that they have that effect ex vitermini. A grant of a jaghir or saranjam is, doubtless, prima facie, a personal grant for the life of the donee; but, when made in terms or suffered to become perpetual, the distinction between such a jaghir and an inam, which is generally alienable at the pleasure of the holder, is not easily drawn (as pointed out by Westropp, C.J., in Krishnarav Ganesh v. Ramrav 4 Bom. H.C. R I. A.C.J).
3. The conclusion, we think, to be drawn from a perusal of the proceedings of the Inam Commissioner and the Government Records is that the question, whether a particular jaghir is alienable or not, must, as Mr. Justice Tucker says in the case above cited, p. 24, 'be governed by the terms of each particular grant,' in the construction of which we may add, as pointed out by the Privy Council in Guidbdas Jugjivandas v. The Collector of Surat I.L.R. 3 Bom. 189 the Court may seek for aid 'in the surrounding circumstances and the object for which the sanad was granted. In that case the Privy Council by resorting to the history of the grant, which showed that the object was 'to make a permanent provision for the maintenance of an important family,' arrived at the conclusion that the jaghir was not alienable beyond the life of the actual holder, although they held it to be, in terms, an here ditary one. The same conclusion would probably be arrived at when the grant is to ensure the rendering of certain services to the State. But in the present case the correspondence which passed between the Collector of Surat and the Governor in Council can leave no doubt that the sole object the Government had in view was to reward Ardesir, on his retirement from the police, for the faithful services he had rendered to Government for many years in that force.
4. It may be asked, what was the object the Government had in view by inserting the words 'as Jaghir' into the grant. It may be that the intention was to reserve to itself a right to nazrana, as was directed to be done by the letter from the Secretary to Government, of 26th May, 1830, to the Collector of Surat; but, however that may be, we think that, having regard to the special language of the sanad, which is the most appropriate mode in an English document of conveying an absolute estate in fee simple to the grantee, and also to the object with which the grant was made, the introduction of the words 'as jaghir' was not intended to control the right of alienation inherent in the operative terms of the grant. We must, therefore, confirm the order appealed against with costs on the appellant, including the costs of the finding on the issue.