1. The property in question in this suit is a vritti. The plaintiff claims to be the alienee of three-quarters of the cash-allowance paid for the due performance of ceremonies and the worshipping of the idol. The first Court held that the alienation was good and decreed the plaintiff's claim. On appeal the learned Judge remanded certain issues inviting an inquiry into any local custom which would justify the alienation of such a peculiar right as this to one who was not a member of the original family which enjoyed the priestly privilege. The findings on the remanded issues were all against the plaintiff. His suit was accordingly dismissed.
2. On appeal it has been strenuously contended that the learned Judge of first appeal adopted a wrong method. It is said that the general principle is that vrittis are alienable to suitable persons, unless a local custom to the contrary or some prohibition by the founder can be proved. This certainly does appear to be the effect of Melvill J.'s decision in the case of Mancha-ram v. Pranshankar I.L.R (1982) Bom 298. On the other hand there is a much later decision by Ramade J. in the case of Rajaram v. Gamsh I.L.R (1898) Bom 131., which, in our opinion, states both the underlying principle and method of dealing with cases like this more correctly. It is true that in that judgment the learned Judge refers with seeming approval to the case of Mancharam v. Pranshankar (1882) I.L.R. 6 Bom 298, but the principle he lays down is that the general rule is against the alienability of vrittis. Vrittis may be alienated in special cases and under special conditions provided that such alienations can be supported by local usage and custom. That this was his ground is clear enough from the issues which he framed and remanded for trial. The learned Judge of first appeal appears to have followed exactly the course adopted by the learned Judges in Rajaram v. Ganesh I.L.R (1898) 23 Bom 131., and having regard to the character of these huks and the desirability of preventing too free alienations of what in essence is a sacred and personal right, we are not prepared to say that the learned Judge of first appeal was wrong. We, therefore, think that his decree must now be confirmed and this appeal dismissed.