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Vishnu Nagappa Venkatesh Bhat Vs. Narasinha Pandurag Prabhu - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation
CourtMumbai
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 171 of 1923
Judge
Reported inAIR1923Bom461; (1923)25BOMLR490; 73Ind.Cas.1011
AppellantVishnu Nagappa Venkatesh Bhat
RespondentNarasinha Pandurag Prabhu
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Excerpt:
indian limitation act (ix of 1908), article 182 - step-in-aid of execution-application for compromise. ;an application made to the court to postpone a darkhast pending before it with a view to enable the parties to arrive as a compromise, is not a step-in-aid of execution. ;abdul kader rowther v. krishnan malaval nair (1913) i.l.r. 38 mad. 695, followed. - - if the suggestion for a compromise failed, then it was necessary for the decree-holder, within three years from the date of the darkhast, to file another darkhast......of execution. there was no application made to the court to do something which would assist the decree-holder in furthering the execution of the decree. on the other hand the application was similar to the application in abdul kader rowther v. krishnan malaval nair i.l.r. (1913) mad. 695 which was called an application to get an order in retardation, which would not in the ordinary course be considered as a step-in-aid of execution, j we think the learned judge was right in saying that this application was not intended as a step towards execution, but it was intended as a step which, if successful, would avoid the necessity for execution. if the suggestion for a compromise failed, then it was necessary for the decree-holder, within three years from the date of the darkhast, to file.....
Judgment:

Norman Macleod, Kt., C.J.

1. This is an application made by the decree, holder for execution of his decree, the application having been made on June 15, 1921. The previous application for execution was presented on May 25, 1918, and it is conceded that the present application must be time-barred unless between these two dates something has been done which would set a new period of limitation running. The appellant relied upon an application made by both the parties to the Court to postpone the application in the Darkhast of May 25, 1918, with a view to a compromise being arrived at between the parties. It is difficult to see how such an application can be considered as a step-in-aid of execution. There was no application made to the Court to do something which would assist the decree-holder in furthering the execution of the decree. On the other hand the application was similar to the application in Abdul Kader Rowther v. Krishnan Malaval Nair I.L.R. (1913) Mad. 695 which was called an application to get an order in retardation, which would not in the ordinary course be considered as a step-in-aid of execution, j We think the learned Judge was right in saying that this application was not intended as a step towards execution, but it was intended as a step which, if successful, would avoid the necessity for execution. If the suggestion for a compromise failed, then it was necessary for the decree-holder, within three years from the date of the Darkhast, to file another Darkhast. The appeal therefore, is dismissed.


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