Norman Macleod, C.J.
1. The main question which has been argued in this appeal is whether the adoption by the first defendant of her daughter's husband was valid. The question arose in second Appeal No. 911 of 1915 in a case amongst Sudras, and although there is no judgment, the appellate Court confirmed the decision of the lower Court that the adoption was valid. No authority has been cited for the proposition that in Hindu law there is a direct prohibition against the adoption of the daughter's husband. We are asked to hold that it is invalid on the ground that by the adoption the husband in effect becomes the brother of his wife, and, therefore, we should ourselves lay down that according to the rules of Hindu law the adoption of a daughter's husband is invalid. For myself, I should say in the absence of a prohibition it would be difficult to hold that such an adoption, however undesirable it may be in ordinary circumstances, is invalid. In this case the widow appears to have been endeavouring to carry out as far as possible the wishes of her husband, who had expressed a desire that the sons of one of his daughters should be adopted. However both the sons of the second respondent died, and therefore no daughter's son was available for adoption.
2. It was also argued that there was an implied prohibition against the adoption of any one other than a daughter's son, but all that the evidence shows is that it was the desire of the husband that a daughter's son should be adopted, and it cannot be inferred that if a daughter's son was not available the husband prohibited the adoption of any one else. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
3. I agree.