1. On the 31st of October 1908 the Second Class Magistrate of Pardi granted sanction to two accused persons in a theft case to prosecute the complainants for the offences mentioned in Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. No action was taken upon that sanction, but in the December following a complaint was lodged in the Court of the nearest Magistrate, First Class, by the Karkun of the Second Class Magistrate of Pardi who stated to the Court that he knew the accused who were the complainants in the theft case and that he had lodged the complaint by order of the Second Class Magistrate, that it was a verbal order, that he was given the sanction order and the papers in the case of the complaint of the accused Nagji Ghelabhai and that he produced the Second Class Magistrate's sanction. Thereupon the accused was arrested and put on his trial.
2. An application has now been made to us to quash the proceedings on the ground that they have been instituted under an illegal sanction. The argument is that Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code only contemplates one sanction for prosecution by a private individual, and it does not contemplate a new sanction to a private individual being given, because, that would be an evasion of the proviso to Section 195 (6) which in effect provides that the term of a sanction shall not be extended except by the High Court.
3. The learned Government Pleader, however, has pointed out to us the evidence of the Second Class Magistrate to which we have alluded and we think that having regard to that evidence we ought to accept the Government Pleader's argument that the proceedings which are now going on before the First Class Magistrate are proceedings instituted under Section 476 by the Court itself.
4. The karkun who instituted those proceedings is an officer of that Court and has no personal interest in prosecuting the accused persons.
5. It has been held by this Court in the case of Queen-Empress v. Shankar 13 B. 384 that the existence of a previous sanction under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code is no bar to the institution of proceedings by the Civil Court itself under Section 478, and, we think, that is an authority for the view which we take in this case that the sanction of the 31st October to the private individuals is no bar to the proceedings which are now being taken at the instance of the Second Class Magistrate by his karkun.
6. We, therefore, reject the application.