1. The plaintiff sued on a bond dated the 29th November, 1881, and payable in two years. The Subordinate Judge has held that the suit, which was brought on the 29th November, 1886, is barred by time, the right to sue having, in his opinion, accrued on the 28th November, 1883. The plaintiff has, however, correctly stated in the plaint that the cause of action arose on the 29th November, 1883, for the period of two years specified in the bond must be held to have terminated on the day of! the month corresponding with the day on which the bond was dated.
2. In a recent case-(Application No. 46 of 1887, decided on the 2nd August last)-the same Subordinate Judge held that where a bond dated the 14th June, 1883, was payable in six months, the right to sue accrued on the 13th December, 1888, and that a suit brought on the 14th December, 1886, was barred by time. He relied on the ruling in Waman Dhondev v. Mahddu Balu Printed Judgments for 1885, p. 251; but this Court held that his decision was palpably wrong, according to the judgment in that case, and reversed his decision in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. In a previous similar case-(Application No. 26 of 1887, decided on the 21st March last)-this Court, however, declined to interfere with the decision of the same Subordinate Judge, and expressed the opinion that the case was one in which he might properly admit a review of judgment on the ground of oversight in his interpretation of the judgment relied on by him.
3. There can be no question, then, that, in the present case, the Subordinate Judge wrongly decided that the claim was barred by time.
4. We think further that we can correct his error in the exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction, and that we are not precluded from so doing by the decision of the Privy Council in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh I.L.R., 11 Cal 6 . In that case it was held that where a Court had perfect jurisdiction to decide a question before it and decided it, then, even if it decided wrongly, it did not exercise its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity within the meaning of Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There can be no question that where a Court, with a full and correct apprehension of the questions which it is necessary for it to decide in any case, errs, in law or in fact, in its decision of any such questions, with which it has jurisdiction to deal, its error can only be corrected in due course of appeal-Tejram v. Harsukh I.L.R., 1 All., 101 ; and where no appeal is permissible, there would be no remedy under Section 622 of the Code or under the provisions of Section 15 of the Statute 24 & 25 Vic., c. 104 , whatever remedy there might be, in this Presidency, under Clause 2 of Section 5 of Regulation II of 1827. But it would be otherwise in any case where the Court, having a mistaken and wrong apprehension of the questions at issue, proceeded to determine an issue which did not really arise in the case, and based its decision of the case on its determination of that issue. If, for instance, it took a view of the facts contended for by neither of the parties, and which was palpably wrong, then, whether its application of the law to those assumed facts were right or wrong, it would not be an application of the law to the facts of the case before it, and would be outside the case altogether. In the present case, the Subordinate Judge's decision on the question of limitation would be perfectly right and within his jurisdiction if the facts of the case were as he supposed them to be. It is a wrong and illegal decision, not as a bare determination of a question under the Limitation Act, but because the Subordinate Judge has misstated or misunderstood the obvious facts of the case and has so been led to decide an issue which he ought never to have raised. His decision of it has nothing to do with the case actually before him. And by basing his decision of the case on his decision of that issue, he has, we think, acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction, even if he has not failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him.
5. We, therefore, make absolute, with costs, the rule granted in this case, and direct the Subordinate Judge to try the case on its merits.