Basil Scott, Kt., C.J.
1. The Mukhtyarnamah (Ex. 68) was executed by Krishnappa in order to provide for the management of the estate (including the settlement of money debts and pecuniary claims) both during Krishnappa's life-time and after his death until the attainment of majority by the eldest minor in the family, i. e., the first plaintiff. The document 'was similar in design to the Hibbahnamah in Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder (1869) 13 M.I.A. 209 but was dissimilar in that instead of prohibiting the guardian and manager from making gifts or sales it gave Manjappa after Krishnappa's death power to manage as he thought fit.
2. In a family consisting in other respects of minors and women .' it is a matter of practical convenience that the dying adult male should be able to make arrangements for guardianship and management, otherwise a dead lock and loss would be arrived at through various widows quarrelling among themselves.
3. The Privy Council in the case above-mentioned have recognized the right of the dying adult to appoint managers and trustees without interfering with the succession. So also in Soobah Doorgah Lal Jha v. Rajah Neelannnd Singh (1867) 7 W.R. 73, the Bengal High Court held that a Hindu might by will appoint one widow guardian of all his sons to the exclusion of the natural mother of two of them even though the will should prove invalid so far as it purported to affect the devolution of the property.
4. If the right of the father to make a binding arrangement is restricted to the interests of his own sons and wives, (for the cases above cited go no further), yet in the present case the mothers of Krishnappa's undivided nephews acquiesced in the arrangement and they in the absence of any other lawfully appointed guardians were guardians of their sons' interests. There is every reason on the findings of the lower Courts that such acquiescence was in the interests of the minors concerned and the best arrangement that could have been made. Nothing however turns on the question whether Manjappa was the lawfully appointed guardian of Krishnappa's nephews or the agent of such a guardian, for the nephews were all dead before these suits were instituted and their interests devolved by survivorship upon the plaintiffs 1 and 2.
5. It appears to me that the sale by Manjappa was binding on the plaintiffs 1 and 2 as being within the authority conferred by Ext. 68. It was certainly not a nullity and none but the plaintiffs 1 and 2 could challenge it. The 1st plaintiff's right, if any, to challenge it was barred at the date of suit under Article 44. He could on becoming manager (as he did when 18 years of age) have given a discharge and acquittance to defendants of ail claims on them in respect of the leasehold interests if the defendants had chosen to recovery them and such acquittance would have been binding on his minor coparcener the plaintiffs. This plaintiff is therefore barred under Section 7 of the Limitation Act.
6. We affirm the decrees of the lower Courts and dismiss the appeals with costs.
7. I entirely concur.