Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.
1. In this second appeal, on the facts as found by the lower appellate Court, the 1894 lease set up by the appellant-plaintiff is held not proved, nor is there any evidence that the defendants were tenants after 1890. It is, however, contended in appeal that the tenancy must be presumed to have continued, and that in effect the defendants are estopped from denying their landlord's title, and that consequently the defendants cannot rely on the plea of limitation. The suit having been brought in 1923 it follows from the findings in the lower Court that it is Some thirty-three years since the defendants were proved to have been tenants of the property. The tenancy which was proved was for a fixed period, i. e., one year, and, on the other hand, the defendants have since been in possession of the property for some thirty-three years and paid no rent.
2. Under those circumstances we think the case is concluded by authority in this Court, with which we respectfully agree. I refer in the first instance to the case in Kantheppa v. Sheshappa I.L.R. (1897) 22 Bom. 893 which my brother Crump J. originally decided as an Assistant Judge and which was confirmed on appeal by the then Chief Justice Sir Charles Farran and Mr. Justice Candy for the reasons there given. There had been an earlier case in Krishnaji Ramchandra v. Antaji Pandurang I.L.R. (1893) 18 Bom. 256 decided by Mr. Justice Telang and Mr. Justice Fulton, where a different conclusion had been arrived at. There the land had been originally leased for life, and on the death of the life tenant, an adopted son continued in possession without obtaining a further lease or paying any rent. It was, however, fully argued in Chandri v. Daji Bhau I.L.R. (1900) 24 Bom. 504 2 Bom L.R. 491 before Sir Lawrence Jenkins and Mr, Justice Candy as to whether Krishnaji Ramchandra's case ought to be followed in preference to Kantheppa's case and the Court there came to the conclusion that the decision in Kantheppa's case ought to be followed, and they followed it accordingly.
3. Coming next to the recent times, in Shravan v. Fattu : (1926)28BOMLR1357 Mr. Justice Percival and I followed those two cases of Kantheppa v. Sheshappa and Chandri v. Daji Bhau in a suit which was one, I agree, not by a landlord to recover possession from the tenant, but a suit by an ex-tenant to recover possession of land. The point, however, arose as to what was the effect of a continued occupation by the ex-tenant after the expiration of the lease and until his dispossession. Stopping there I would hold that as a result of those three bench decisions in Kantheppa v. Sheshappa, Chandri v. Daji Bhau and Shravan v. Fattu the case of Krishnaji Ramchandra v. Antaji Pandurang is to be treated as overruled. But, if necessary, this view receives confirmation by reason of the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mohunt Bhugwan Ramanuj Das v. Ramkrishna Bose (1919) 26 C.W.N. 722 where the decision in Chandri v. Daji Bhau was cited to the Calcutta High Court, and where the Board upheld the view of the Calcutta High Court that the landlord was barred by limitation.
4. I wish to make it quite clear that there is nothing here to show that there was any express or implied agreement between the landlord and tenant that the tenancy was to continue. For instance, as already stated, there was no payment of rent. Under those circumstances I would hold that the lower appellate Court arrived at a correct conclusion, and that this appeal ought to be dismissed with costs.