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Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Vs. Ace Camera Equipment Pvt. Ltd. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectDirect Taxation
CourtMumbai High Court
Decided On
Case NumberReview Application No. 17 of 1983 in Income-tax Reference No. 84 of 1974
Judge
Reported in(1984)43CTR(Bom)2; [1984]150ITR231(Bom); [1985]23TAXMAN457(Bom)
Acts Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 32(1) and 43(6)
AppellantCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay
RespondentAce Camera Equipment Pvt. Ltd.
Excerpt:
direct taxation - revision application - sections 32 (1) and 43 (6) of income tax act, 1961 - review application placed for admission - rehearing of matter demanded on ground that some further arguments have been discovered regarding same - application was totally misconceived as rehearing of matter cannot be directed merely because some further arguments have been discovered - application filed beyond time and no explanation for same has been furnished - revision application rejected. - .....is furnished for the delay nor is consideration of delay sought. on this ground itself the review application deserves to be rejected in limine.2. what is more fatal, however, is that we find that the review application is totally misconceived. it is not open, in our opinion, to the party aggrieved by a judgment to attempt to have a rehearing of the matter in the guise of a review petition merely because some further arguments have been discovered or views of some authors elicited which may seem to support the position taken by the party, which position was negatived by the court. if it be conceded that a review application would be maintainable merely because some further argument has been though of, which ought to have been thought of earlier, then a review application would be.....
Judgment:

Desai, J.

1. This review application has been placed for admission. It deserves to be rejected on a two-fold basis. In the first place, it is beyond time by five days, although the principle signed by the Advocate for the Central Government states that it is within time. No explanation is furnished for the delay nor is consideration of delay sought. On this ground itself the review application deserves to be rejected in limine.

2. What is more fatal, however, is that we find that the review application is totally misconceived. It is not open, in our opinion, to the party aggrieved by a judgment to attempt to have a rehearing of the matter in the guise of a review petition merely because some further arguments have been discovered or views of some authors elicited which may seem to support the position taken by the party, which position was negatived by the court. If it be conceded that a review application would be maintainable merely because some further argument has been though of, which ought to have been thought of earlier, then a review application would be filed in almost every matter. The remedy of the party is to take assistance of such argument or commentary supporting it in the higher court to which the matter may be taken, if so advised.

3. In the instant case, apart from citing the views of three reputed authorize, nothing further has been brought to our attention in the review application or during the course of arguments. We have gone through the three passages set out in paragraph 3 of the review application. It is true that read by themselves they contain sentences which support the stand of the Revenue. However, during the course of the arguments in the income-tax reference, counsel for the assessee had made submissions on the phraseology employed by section 32(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and had submitted that this phraseology would not help the Revenue if depreciations as sought on second-hand items acquired by the assessee. Counsel for the assessee had pressed into service the difference in the phraseology employed in clause (ii) as contradistinguished from that employed in clause (iii) of the same sub-section. None of the three authors, with respect, seem to have considered this aspect specifically. The said plea has found favour with us and on that plea we decided in favour of the assessee. Ordinarily, a review application would lie if some statutory provision having direct relevance or a binding authority has not been considered by the Bench. No such provision is brought to our attention. Counsel for the revenue referred us to the definition of 'written down value' to be found in section 43(6) of the Income-tax Act 1961. In our opinion, the definition of 'written down value' applicable in the instant case would be the one provided for in clause (a) of section 43(6) which is the actual cost of the dies to the assessee.

4. On both the counts, therefore, the review application will stand rejected. As notice has been given to the assessee and advocate has appeared, we direct the petitioner, namely, the Commissioner of Income-tax, to pay to the respondent the costs of the review application quantified at Rs. 100.


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