(1) One Kamalakar Prabhakar Juvekar, who will herafter the referred to as the acused was charged before the Presidenc Magistrate, 12the court, Bandra, Bomaby in Case No. 1953/p of 1958 , for offences punishable under Ss. 279 and 337 I.P.C It was the case for the prosecution that on 10-10-1958 the accused drove S.K.M.M Cos.Bus No BYL 4441in a rash and negligent manner and caused injuries to compoing the offence under S. 337 I.P.C. and asked for the permission of the court in that and asked for the permission of the Court in that behalf. The trial Magistrate granted leave to compound and acquitted the accused of that charge. He then observed that the charge under S. 279 I.P.C also failed in view o the order of acquittal under S. 337 I.P.C and in support of that view he relied upon an nreported decision of this court in Homi Jehangir Lali v. State criminal Appl. No. 672of 1951 /- 1.10.1951 Agaist the order of acquital for the offence under S. 279 I.P.C the State has appealed to this court.
(2) Section 279 I.P.C penalises rash driving or riding on a public way. A person who drives any vehicle or rides on any publi way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person is liable to be punished under S. 279 I.P.C This offence falls within Chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code which is a chapter dealing with offences affecting public health, safety, convenence etc. An offence under S. 279 is essentially an offence against public saftey. By S. 337 I.P.c causing hurt by an act endangerin life or personal safety of others is penalised. Bu that section, whoever cayses hurt to any person by doing an act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others is liable to be punished in the manner provided thereby. This section occurs in Chapter XVI, which deals with offences affecting the human body. Under S. 279 I.P.C. the maximum sentence which may be imposedis rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or withboth. the offence punishable under S. 337 is the offenceof hurt committed in certain defined circumstances. Undoubtedly S. 279 penalises rsh or negligent driving which endangers human life or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, but on that account the offence under other person, but on that account the offence under S. 337 I.P.C. and the offence under S. 279 are not of the same nature or character. By S. 336 I.P.C. an act, endangering life or personal safety of others. evidently the offence punishable under S. 337 I.P.C. is an aggravated form of the offence defined by S. 336 I.P.C. the offences undr Ss. 279 and 337 I.P.C. are however, offences of different nature and the conduct referred to terein is penalised with different objects. An act, which is rash or negligent or is likely to endangerhuman lfe, may be the result of driving any vehicle or riding on a public way. there is not doubt that the two sections overlap but that does not, in our judgment, make those offences of the same character. The offence under S. 279 I.P.C. is non compoundable and the compounding of the offence under S. 337 I.P.C. will not prevent the prosecution from being continued under S. 279 I.P.C. when compounding of an offence under S. 337 I.P.C. is permitted the court permits the aggrieved party to accept private satisfaction for the injury caused to him, but thereof an act, which is dnagerous to the public. The composition of the offence under S. 337 I.P.C. sanctioned by the learned Magistratetherefore did not result in the acquittal of the accused for the offence under S. 279 I.P.C
(3) Mr. Nadakarni, for the accused, contended that whenever on account of rash or negligent driving simply hurt is caused to any otherperson a grievous hurt is caused, a charge under S. 338 I.P.C. may be mde against the accused and in neither case a prosecution for a charge under S. 279 I.P.C may be sustained. We are drives a vehicle or rides on a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injurty to any other he commits an offence, against public safety If by so driving a vehicle or riding on any public way, be causes an injury to any other person he also commits an offence punishable under s. 337 I.P.C. and if he causes grievious hurt, he commits an offence punishable under S. 338 I.P.C If by such rash or negligent driving the accused has cuased injury to some person, offences punishable under Ss. 279 and 337 I.P.C willbe committed, and injury to some person, offences punishable under Ss. 279 and 337 I.P.C. will be committed and acquittal result of the compounding will still leave the charges under S. 279 I.P.C. outstanding.
(4) Strong reliance was sought to be placed by MR. Nadakarni upon a judgment Criminal Appln. No 672 of 1951 D/ 1/10/1951 The accused in that case who was charged with offences under Ss. 279 and 338 I.P.C. was permitted by the trial Magistrate to compound te offence under S. 338 I.P.C with the complainant and was acquitted of that offence. An express order acquitting the accused of the offence under S. 279 I.P.C. wa not passed, but that charge was abandoned and no proceeding in the case against the accused remained outstanding. A fresh summons was there after issued by the trial magistrate to the accused for offences under S.s. 279 and 338 I.P.C read with Secs.74, 124 and 116 of the Motor vehicles Act. The accused then applied to this court for quashig the proceedings on the ground that as he was acquitted of the offence under S. 338 I.P.C. no fresh proceedings could lie against him for an offence aleged to be committed in the same incident for which a charge under Ss. 279 and 338 I.P.C. was made against him. This court upheld the contention raied by the accused and quashed the charge observing - though it was not necessary the or the purpose of the decision of the case to do so that the offence under S. 338 I.P.C. was no that aggravated form of the offence under S. 337, where this offence is the result of rash and negligent driving, may constitute independently an offence punishable under S. 279 I.P.C With respect, we are unable to agree with that view an offnce under S. 279 I.P.C. in an offence under S. 279 I.P.C. agains public safety and the fact that one of the components ingredients of the offence under S. 337 where this offence is the result of rash and negligent driving may constitute independently an offence punishable under S. 279 I.P.C will not, in our judgment, justify the view that the offence under S. 337 I.P.C is an aggravted form of the offence penalizd by S. 279 I.P.C. It may appear some what incongfruous if the argument of the petitioner be accepted that an offence punishable under S. 337 for which rthe maximum sentence of the fine prescribed is lighter than the sentence prescribed by S. 279 I.P.C. is an aggravated form of the later offence. Where is an person accused of one offence under S. 337 I.P.C. is acquitted, the acquittal may mean that the accused was not guilty of causing hurt to the person or that he was not acting rashly or negligently. Where an offence under S. 337 I.P.C. is compounded, the composition can, in very nature of the offence, be of causing hurt to the person so injured and not of doing a rash or negligent act, especialy when the rash or negligent act is driving a vehicle or riding on a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to that person.We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view of the trail Magistrate that the order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused for the offence under S. 337, I.P.C precludes the prosecution of the case under S. 279 I.P.C.
(5) On that view of the case, we set aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Magistrate for the offence under S. 279 I.P.C. and direct and that the accused be tried for that offence. The order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused for the offenceunder S. 337 I.P.C will, however, stand.
(6) Order set aside.