1. The applicant is the owner of a field bearing Section No. 1038 situated at Dhandhuka in the Ahmeda-bad District. The second opponent was a tenant of the applicant and on 27-3-1950 the applicant gave a notice to the second opponent asking that the second opponent should hand over the said field to the applicant by 1-4-1951.
As the second opponent failed to comply with the notice, the applicant filed an application before the Tenancy Aval Karkun. Dhandhuka, claiming possession under Section 29, Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural bands Act, 1948, The Extra Aval Karkun allowed the application made by the applicant and directed that the possession of the suit land should be handed over to the applicant after the appeal period was over.
Prom the order made by the Aval Karkun, the tenant went in appeal before the Assistant Collector, Dholka Prant, Dholka, and the authority reversed the order of the Aval Karkun and held that the possession of the tenant should not be disturbed. Prom the order made by the Prant Officer, the applicant went before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal and by an order of 12-5-1955, that authority confirmed the order made by the Prant Officer. The applicant-landlord now applies under Article 227 of the Constitution.
2. Upon this application, Mr. Lavingiya for the applicant contends that both the Prant Officer as well as the Bombay Revenue Tribunal were wrong in refusing his application. Now, the application out of which the present petition arises was an application made under Section 29 read with Section 34; and under Section 34 a landlord is required to give one year's notice in writing stating in the notice the reasons as to why the landlord would want to terminate the tenancy of a tenant. In the notice given by the applicant it was stated in the first instance that the landlord required the land for his personal cultivation. Then the notice went on to say as follows:
'My client has also started personal cultivation. You are not properly cultivating the said field and also you are not properly spending for improvements. And in the current year, even though a portion is cultivated, another portion is kept fallow and if you had sown wheat in the said portion, our client would have got to his share 26 maunds approximately. It being so, you have intentionally caused a loss of Rs. 300 to my client'.
3. The question is whether this was sufficient compliance with Section 34. Now, the Tribunal held that the notice given by the applicant was a valid notice. It was valid in the sense that the tenant knew as to what the notice was and there was no suggestion that the tenant was ever misled by the notice or could not understand what he was called to do.
But the Revenue Tribunal then considered the question whether the applicant wanted the lands for his bona fide personal cultivation and, having considered the evidence in the case, came to the conclusion that it was not proved that the landlord wanted the lands for his bona fide personal cultivation. Now this is a finding of fact and it would not be open to us to interfere with that finding.
But Mr. Lavingiya for the applicant contends that it was wrong of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal to hold that this notice was a valid notice. Now, in the notice given by the applicant, al-though it was stated that the applicant wanted the land for personal cultivation, various other reasons were given and if the notice is read as a whole there is no doubt that the landlord wanted the land not so much for his personal cultivation as for the fact that the tenant was not cultivating the land properly, was not properly spending for the improvements, that he had kept a part of the land fallow and he had intentionally caused a loss of Rs. 300/- to the applicant.
Now, it is possible to construe the notice as suggesting that the landlord wanted the land for personal cultivation and also because the tenant caused injury to the land. Now, if the complaint of the applicant is the injury to the land by the tenant, then the case would obviously fall under Section 14 of the Act because Section 14 (1) provides that 'notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of a Court of law, the tenancy of any land held by a tenant shall not be terminated unless such tenant has done any act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the land'.
If the notice is read as one falling under Section 14, then there is no doubt that this notice under Section 34 would be bad. But, even if the notice is construed as a combined notice both under Section 14 and Section 34, there is no doubt that the intention of the landlord in requiring the land was not so much for his bona fide personal cultivation as for the fact that the tenant was not properly taking care of the land.
Mr. Lavingiya says that in the notice if was not necessary for him to allege that he would want the land for personal cultivation and also bona fide. But the fact remains that in the notice the applicant did not say that he wanted the land back in his possession because he would want the land to be cultivated personally.
Then, when one goes to the application made by the applicant under Section 29, in the application itself there was no suggestion that the applicant would want the land bona fide though there is an allegation that the applicant would want the land for personal cultivation.
If therefore, the notice of 37-3-1950 is not a due notice as required by Section 34, it follows that the Bombay Revenue Tribunal was right in holding that the landlord did not make out a case that he wanted the land bona fide for his personal cultivation. On this ground, the application is liable to be rejected.
4. There is also another ground which appears to be fatal to the present application. The order made by the Bombay Revenue Tribunal was on 12-5-1955. The present petition was filed on 28-7-1955. Now, a reference to the order of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal shows that the matter was heard on 11-4-1955. The applicant was represented by a pleader before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal and it is impossible to conceive that the applicant did not know as to what the decision of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal was.
Now, in all writ petitions under Section 227 it is incumbent upon the applicant to approach the High Court as early as possible and without undue delay and in this case it has taken the applicant more than three months to file the present application. On this ground also, we think that this application must be rejected.
5. For all these reasons, the view taken by the Bombay Revenue Tribunal is right. The application, therefore, fails and the rule will be discharged with costs.
6. Application dismissed.