1. The only point which we are called upon to decide in this appeal is whether the learned Judge of the appellate Court was right in passing a redemption decree for the plaintiff on his application when the case came before him in appeal.
2. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the words of Section 15 D, Clause (3), of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act are only susceptible of the interpretation which he contends for, namely, that 'the decree in the suit' means the decree of the original Court and not of the Court of appeal. It would follow that if the Court of appeal reversed the decree of the lower Court and passed an entirely new decree it would not be the decree in the suit' though it would be the only existing decree capable of execution. If the words had been a decree' there would had been more force in the argument. When the decree of the lower Court is reversed in appeal, or varied in appeal, the decree of the lower appellate Court becomes the decree in the suit which is to be executed in execution proceedings.
3. We, therefore, think that the learned Judge of the lower Court acted within his powers in granting the application of the plaintiff for a decree for redemption.
4. We dismiss the appeal with costs.