1. The plaintiff-appellant obtained permission from the defendant-respondent, the Dohad Municipality, in March 1924 to erect his privy, and in August to use it, In September he paid the tax and in October he opened a trap-door shown in the plan (Exhibit 28) to the south according to the original permission of the managing committee. In October 1924, on the complaint of the appellant's neighbour the Municipality ordered him to alter it to the east. The appellant objected and filed the suit.
2. The question between the parties was, whether having put in the trap-door to the privy to the south with the permission of the managing committee, it was open to the Municipality to order him to alter it to the east, The trial Court held that it had not the power. The lower appellate Court held that it had. The plaintiff appeals.
3. Various sections such as 26, 36 as well as the general law of principal and agent as applied to the Municipality and the managing committee are relied upon for the appellant. The question in this case, however, is not as to these general powers, the law as to which has been settled by Mulji Tribhovan v. Dakor Municipality (1921) 24 Bom. I.R. 178., in which the previous decisions have been referred to and criticised. The single point in appeal is whether the respondent Municipality possesses that power under Section 106(3) of the Bombay District Municipal Act. Under that clause 'the Municipality may by written notice require the owner or occupier...to alter as they may direct any privy door or trap-door which opens on to any street, and which they deem to be a nuisance.' In the present case, the appellant's neighbour alter an experience of two months deemed it to be a nuisance, the Municipality agreed and required him to alter it. The present trap-door opens to the south but that south is also in the street as is clear from the plan. Nothing more is necessary under the section. It is not open to the Courts to consider whether the trap-door as now ordered to open on to the east will not also be even a greater nuisance to the passers-by. I agree with the lower appellate Court that the respondent had the power.
4. The appeal is dismissed with costs.