1. The plaintiff sued the six defendants for partition of his half share in certain lands in his possession on the strength of a sale-deed of 1879. The six defendants joined in one written statement denying his possession as purchaser. The trial Court, however, found the purchase proved and gave a decree for partition with the exception of a plot of land entered in the name of defendant No. 6 in the Survey Records. The first appellate Court modified the decision by including in the partition the plot standing in the name of the sixth defendant. In second appeal it has been urged that this plot ought to be excluded, on the ground that the entry of the name of defendant No. 6 in the Survey Records was conclusive as to her title, under Section 21 of the Khoti Settlement Act.
2. It is unfortunate that we have not in evidence the particular entry of the sixth defendant's name in the Survey Records. All we have is the document, Exh. 26, in which the validity of the sale-deed was expressly admitted by defendant No. 6 before the Survey Settlement Officer. There can, in my opinion, be no doubt that on that evidence the particular plot entered in the name of defendant No. 6 ought not to be excluded from the partition, and effect would have to be given to that conclusion unless clear legal objection should appear under the provisions of Section 21 of the Khoti Settlement Act.
3. Now that section makes conclusive certain decisions of the officer defined as the Recording Officer. What those decisions are is to be gathered from the preceding sections and a perusal of those preceding sections seems to me to make it clear that the mere entry of the name of some particular person as occupant was not intended to be included among those decisions of the Recording Officer. What were contemplated as conclusive were decisions as to the class of tenure and as to the complicated rights of the Khots. The appellants, could not, therefore, in this appeal, have recourse to the provisions of Section 21 of the Khoti Settlement Act.
4. The appeal ought, therefore, in my opinion, to be dismissed with costs. A similar view was taken by another Bench of this Court in the case of Mahomed Ibrahim v. All Mahomad All Pangarkar See supra page 351 (F.N.).
5. I agree.