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Emperor Vs. Kikabhai Ranchhoddas and Chhagan Tribho Van - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtMumbai
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR1917Bom239(1); (1917)ILR41Bom464
AppellantEmperor
RespondentKikabhai Ranchhoddas and Chhagan Tribho Van
Excerpt:
bombay district police act (bombay act iv of 1890), section 61, clause (b) - disregarding rule of the road--driving a bicycle on a wrong side of the road--vehicle--bicycle. - - we are clearly of the contrary opinion. he guides as well as propels it, and may be said to drive it as an engine driver is said to drive an engine......in our opinion, a vehicle. we further think that no difficulty is created by the use of the word 'drive,' and that a bicycle may be said to be a vehicle driven by the man who rides it. that is the view which was accepted in taylor v. goodwin (1879) 4 q.b.d. 228, where it was contended that the person propelling the bicycle drives it, inasmuch as he guides the machine and regulates its pace. mr. justice mellor in giving effect to that argument observed:i think the word 'carriage' is large enough to include a machine such as a bicycle which carries the person who gets upon it, and i think that such person may be said to 'drive' it. he guides as well as propels it, and may be said to drive it as an engine driver is said to drive an engine.2. the decisions of the magistrate must,.....
Judgment:

1. In these appeals, which are brought by the Government of Bombay, the only question for decision is whether a bicycle is or is not a vehicle within the meaning of the word as used in Clause (b) of Section 61 of the District Police Act, Bombay Act IV of 1890. That clause provides a penalty for any person who 'drives a vehicle of any description' otherwise than on the left side of the street along which he is travelling. The learned Magistrate has thought that a bicycle is not a vehicle. We are clearly of the contrary opinion. A bicycle is a carriage and is, therefore, in our opinion, a vehicle. We further think that no difficulty is created by the use of the word 'drive,' and that a bicycle may be said to be a vehicle driven by the man who rides it. That is the view which was accepted in Taylor v. Goodwin (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 228, where it was contended that the person propelling the bicycle drives it, inasmuch as he guides the machine and regulates its pace. Mr. Justice Mellor in giving effect to that argument observed:

I think the word 'carriage' is large enough to include a machine such as a bicycle which carries the person who gets upon it, and I think that such person may be said to 'drive' it. He guides as well as propels it, and may be said to drive it as an engine driver is said to drive an engine.

2. The decisions of the Magistrate must, therefore, be reversed and the cases must be remanded to him in order that they may be retried and decided in accordance with law.


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