1. This appeal raises a point of Hindu Law which has not yet formed the subject of judicial decision. The facts are simple. A woman named Rakhma was twice married. By her first husband Narsu she had a son Bali, who died in 1924, and by her second marriage she had a son Bapu, the present defendant. Bali left two widows. The property in question is admittedly stridhan property of Rakhma, and the question is whether her sons by two different husbands inherit it, or whether Bapu, the son of the second husband, is the sole heir. The plaintiff is a purchaser of half of the share in the property from the widows of Bali. There has been a lengthy argument on this point with, quotations from the original text of Manu and the Mitakshara, but it has to be admitted that this point is not covered by the texts or by authority The texts do not recognize the remarriage of a Hindu widow, and the arguments have to proceed on analogy, the principal contention of the appellant being that as by remarriage a widow ceases to have any connection with the family of her first husband, her son by her first husband can have no claim to any stridhan property of hers after her marriage. The rights of a Hindu widow after remarriage are defined by the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act of 1856. The various cases quoted are not on the point now under discussion. It has been held by this High Court in Chamar Haru v. Kashi I.L.R. (1902) Bom. 338 : 4 Bom. L.R. 73 and Basappa v. Rayawa I.L.R. (1904) Bom. 91 : 6 Bom. L.R. 779 following Akora Suth v. Boreani (1868) 2 Beng. L.R. 199 that a remarried Hindu widow could inherit to her son by her first husband. We are not here concerned with the rights of the widow, but with the rights of the son, and I am unable to see why the remarriage of the widow should render her son by the first husband any the less her son. The text quoted by the learned District Judge referring to uterine brothers, and the remarks in Banerjee's Hindu Law, p. 365, stating that the law of succession to stridhan is based mainly upon grounds of natural love and affection and upon a principle of equitable distribution, are in favour of the heirs to the stridhan being the children by both husbands. There seems to be no valid reason why the son by the second husband should inherit the stridhan of his mother to the exclusion of the son by the first husband. If the argument regarding the prohibition of remarriage of a Hindu widow under the text is pushed to its logical conclusion, the son by the second husband would be illegitimate, and would, therefore, not inherit.
2. In these circumstances, the view taken by the learned District Judge appears to be correct, and the appeal will be dismissed with costs. The cross-objections are not pressed, and are dismissed.