1. The first point argued in support of these appeals is that the order of the District Judge, directing the Collector to pay the amount mentioned in the darkhast in Court, is not sustainable, having regard to the Pensions Act and the rules framed under it. This argument rests upon a misapprehension of the nature of the liability of the Collector, which is in dispute, and of the payment into Court which he has been directed to make. It is admitted before us, and, indeed, the Court below has found upon unchallenged evidence, that the amount, which is claimed by the applicants in the present darkhast, had become payable to the deceased Bhagvandas during his life-time, because he had been recognized as holder of the haq by the Collector under the Pensions Act. The power of the Collector under the rules framed under the Act had been exhausted, and there was no discretion for that officer to exercise, either under the Act or the rules, so far as Bhagvandas's right to receive the allowance for the years in dispute was concerned. If the amounts somehow remained unpaid, the Collector held them for him and on his behalf, as monies due to him, and as monies, therefore, recoverable on his death by his heirs, independent of any question arising under the Pensions Act or the rules under it.
2. The District Judge has gone beyond the darkhast in making an order in his decree as regards the amounts that may become annually payable after the date of his order. The question was not raised, and indeed could not be raised, by the present darkhast, with reference to these amounts. They stand upon a footing different from that of the arrears claimed in the darkhast. Presumably and probably these amounts payable in future would be recoverable on Bhagvandas's death by the person recognised by the Collector according to law. Whether that is so or not we do not decide, but that is a question which cannot be decided unless it arises actually for adjudication. This direction in the decree ought to be struck out.
3. The order as to interest cannot be interfered with because there can be no doubt that the amount was wrongly withheld. As to the rate of interest, that is entirely a matter of discretion.
4. The learned Government Pleader also addressed us on a question as regards the rights of the co-sharers inter se with reference to the amount which the District Judge has directed to be paid into Court. The District Judge has merely directed the payment of the amount into Court without deciding the rights of the claimants and their co-sharers inter se. The question as to what is to become of that amount after payment into Court has been made, that is, to what particular person it is to be paid, has yet to be decided. Therefore, we say nothing upon that point. The decree will be modified by striking off the portion relating to amounts that may become annually payable. In other respects it is confirmed. Each party will bear his own costs of this appeal.
5. The same order governs First Appeal No. 107 of 1906.