John Beaumont, Kt., C.J.
1. This is a revision application made by the defendant. The plaintiff, who is a son of the defendant, alleges in the plaint that the defendant is wasting the joint family property, and misappropriating it, and he-asks in the plaint for a declaration that he is entitled along with the defendant and a cousin to the joint possession, enjoyment and management of the joint family property, and then he asks for injunctions, both prohibitory and mandatory, against the defendant. The claims were valued, for the purposes of the Court-fees Act at Rs. 230, but it is admitted by the pleaders on both sides, in a purshis which they signed, that the value of the immoveable and moveable properties in suit is more than Rs. 15,000. The suit was started in the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge, and two preliminary issues were raised, the first one, as to whether the. plaint was adequately stamped, and, secondly, whether the Court had pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned Judge answered both the preliminary issues in the affirmative. It is contended on this revision application that the answer to the second preliminary issue, which goes to jurisdiction, is wrong, but in the first instance Mr. Shah on behalf of the respondent has taken the preliminary objection that no revision application lies under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, and for that contention-he relies particularly on a decision of this Court in Senaji v. Pannaji : AIR1932Bom81 , where Mr. Justice Baker reviewed the authorities. That was a case in which the-preliminary issue was one as to res judicata, whereas in the present case the preliminary issue goes to the jurisdiction of the Court, and this Court in: Secretary of State for India v. Narsibhai Dadabhai I.L.R. (1923) 48 Bom. 43 : 25 Bom. L.R. 992, held that a revision: application under Section 115 was competent in respect of a preliminary order passed by a Judge where that preliminary order went to the jurisdiction of. the Court. The subject-matter of the preliminary issue in that case was whether the Secretary of State was a necessary party, but the basis of the-decision was that the preliminary issue involved a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court. In my opinion that case was rightly decided, and in any case it binds me. Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code provides, that the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been, decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no-appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears-
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. I think that Mr. Justice Baker in Senaji v. Pannaji went too far when he held that a finding on an interlocutory matter followed by an order is not a case decided within Section 115. That view would really involve this, that 'a case decided' within Section 115 means a case finally decided and that the section has no application to interlocutory orders. The case of Secretary of State for India v. Narsibhai seems to me inconsistent with that view, and I have myself acted in revision in more than one case in respect of interlocutory orders, although I entirely agree with the caution which has been laid down many times that this Court should be very slow to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction with orders which are merely interlocutory. But, in my view, there is jurisdiction to do so, and the jurisdiction can be exercised in a proper case, I think, therefore, on the authority of Secretary of State for India v. Narsibhai, I have jurisdiction in this case to deal with the matter in revision.
2. Now on the merits the contention of the applicant is that under Section 24 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act the jurisdiction of a Second Class Subordinate Judge is limited to suits wherein the subject-matter does not exceed in amount or value Rs. 5,000, and he says that admittedly here the subject-matter of the suit, that is the property which is the subject-matter of the suit, exceeds Rs. 5,000. But then one has to read the Bombay Civil Courts Act in conjunction with the Suits Valuation Act of 1887, which again has to be read in conjunction with the Court-fees Act of 1870. Section 7, Clause (iv)(c), of the Court-fees Act provides that the amount of fee payable under this Act in suits to obtain a declaratory decree or order where consequential relief is prayed or (d) an injunction is sought shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. Now here the relief sought appears to be no more than a declaration and an injunction, and the value of that relief is placed in the plaint at Rs. 230, though, no doubt, the property which is the subject-matter of the declaration and injunction is worth over Rs. 15,000. Then one comes to Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887, which provides :-
Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs v. vi and ix, and paragraph x, Clause (d)(and this case does not :fall within any of those paragraphs), Court-fees are payable ad valorem under the -Court-fees Act, 1870, (and here the Court-fees are payable ad valorem under the First Schedule), the value as determinable for the computation for Court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.
No doubt the result is rather startling, but the effect of it seems to be that inasmuch as the plaintiff has valued his relief for declaration and an injunction at Rs. 230, that necessarily governs the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction. I should point out that the preamble to the Suits Valuation Act states that 'it is expedient to prescribe the mode of valuing certain suits for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of Courts with respect thereto.' So that clearly the Act is dealing with valuation of suits for the purposes of jurisdiction, and therefore must affect the construction of Section 24 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, which deals with the same subject. In my opinion, therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that he had jurisdiction to entertain this suit.
3. The decision seems to me to be in accordance with the view which has been adopted by this Court in a good many cases which were cited to me, particularly Ishwarappa v. Dkanji Bhanji I.L.R. (1931) 56 Bom. 23 : 34 Bom. L.R. 44, Balkrishna Narayan v. Jankibai I.L.R. (1919) 44 Bom. 331 : 22 Bom. L.R. 289 and Dagdu v. Totaram I.L.R. (1909) 33 Bom. 658 : 11 Bom. L.R. 1074. The application must be dismissed with costs.