Norman Macleod, Kt., C.J.
1. The plaintiff filed this suit to recover possession of the suit property, alleging that it originally belonged to his father Krishna who had secured it under a gift-deed from his maternal grandfather Rama. Krishna died in 1907 leaving a widow Chandra who disposed of the property in question to the first defendant at the time when she was a minor. The second defendant is the father of Krishna who is joined as a co-defendant for some reason which is not very apparent; He claimed that Krishna died joint with him and therefore the adoption by Chandra was not valid. The first Court found that Krishna died separate from his father, the second defendant, but on grounds which do not appeal to us as being correct. The presumption is that Krishna was joint with his father. There is nothing to show that he ever became separate. Admittedly there was some property belonging to the second defendant though its value may have been very small. The trial Judge came to the conclusion that because Krishna lived at Khed where his grandfather lived and not where his own father lived, he had relinquished his right to any share of his father's property. However that may be, that would not amount in law to a separation. I think the learned appellate judge was right in holding that Krishna and his father died joint, although no doubt the property which was gifted to Krishna was his self-acquired property. Then the ordinary rule of Hindu law must apply, that the widow of a coparcener cannot adopt unless she has either the express authority of her husband or the consent of her husband's co-parceners. An adoption cannot be partly valid and partly invalid, so that the person adopted, although excluded from becoming a member of the joint family, may still be entitled to inherit the self-acquired property of his adoptive father. In this case it seems obvious that the widow adopted the plaintiff in 1915 in order that he might make a claim to the property which had been alienated by her at the time she was a minor. She took, when her husband died, a life-interest in her husband's self-acquired property. No doubt to that extent her alienation will be good, unless she is able to upset it on the ground that she was not competent to alienate at the time. But it is quite clear that the plaintiff cannot sat aside the alienation on the ground that he is an adopted son. The judgment of the lower Court, therefore, must be upheld and the appeal dismissed with costs.