1. The applicant before us was, on the 24th of May last, summoned to attend on the 5th of June following before the Sub-Registrar in connection with the proposed registration of an agreement which had been entered into between the applicant and one Dinshaji. The applicant did not attend, and the agreement was registered as against Dinshaji only. On the 3rd of July Dinshaji appealed to the District Registrar praying that the agreement should be registered as against the applicant also. On the 11th of July the District Registrar issued a summons to the applicant to attend on the 19th of July at 11 o'clock in the morning. The applicant did not so attend ; but learning later in the day that the District Registrar had, in consequence of his absence, made an order against him at about 3-30 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon he sought to see the District Registrar. It would appear that the District Registrar saw him, but declined to modify the order already made. That order was an order passed apparently under Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, and directed the applicant's prosecution under Section 174, Indian Penal Code.
2. The present application is, in the words adopted by the applicant, this: ' he prays that your Lordships will be pleased to send for the record and proceedings and reverse the order directing prosecution.' The only question, therefore, we have to decide is whether we should reverse that order or not. It is urged by Government Pleader that we have no jurisdiction or authority to interfere with the order, whatever our views might be concerning it upon its merits, and we are of opinion that that contention must prevail. The application is made under Section 435, Criminal Procedure Code, which defines our revisional power. That section enables us to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court situate within the local limits of our jurisdiction.
3. Ground No. 4 of the grounds taken in the petitioner's own application recites that ' neither the Sub-Registrar nor the Registrar is a Court.' That, therefore, is the view which the petitioner himself has adopted upon this subject. We are of opinion that as it happens the view is correct. We think that the District Registrar is not within the meaning of Section 435 an inferior Criminal Court: and we may refer to Queen-Empress v. Tulja ILR (1887) 12 Bom. 36 in support of our opinion. If that is so, then it is clear that under Section 435, Criminal Procedure Code, the application does not lie and we have no authority to interfere with the action which the District Registrar has taken. That being so, we must reject this application and decline to express any opinion one way or the other with regard to the merits of it.