1. In this case the Magistrate having decided to discharge the accused recorded at the same time that he ordered the discharge of the accused his conclusion that the case was one in which subject to any objection which the complainant might urge against making the direction, the complainant ought to be ordered to pay compensation for making a frivolous and vexatious complaint. Ha then, as the law requires, under Clause (a), Section 250 Criminal Procedure Code, recorded, and considered the objection which the complainant urged against making the direction and then under Clause (b) of that section added to his order of discharge a direction that the complainant pay compensation. We are asked to hold that this procedure was illegal because the Magistrate did not make the direction as to compensation a part of the order as to discharge before the complainant was given opportunity as required by law to adduce his objection to such direction being made. The case of Safdar Husain ILR (1903) All. 315 has been cited, because in that case Banerji J. held that when a Magistrate on finding a complaint to be frivolous or vexatious, thinks it right to award compensation to the complainant, he must do so by his order of discharge or acquittal and where a Magistrate made such an order in a separate proceedings after the accused had been discharged, held that his order was not merely irregular but without jurisdiction.
2. In my opinion the procedure adopted by the Magistrate on the case before us was a sufficient compliance with the law as enacted in Section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
3. The rule must be discharged.
4. It seems to me on the face of the proceedings in this case that the direction as to the payment of compensation was in reality made by the Magistrate's order of discharge and acquittal. (It appears in this case that there was both a discharge and an acquittal). This is none the less so though the ultimate part of the order, made after hearing the complainant's objections is written on a separate sheet of paper from that which contains Magistrate's signature to the principal part of the judgment.
5. The final order awarding compensation bears the same date as the rest of the judgment and was only separated from it in point of time owing to the necessary inquiry as to whether the complainant had good grounds to urge against the, order. Therefore it seems to me perfectly clear that in this case the latter order is incorporated in and is part of the order of the discharge and acquittal.
6. Rule discharged.