John Beaumont, Kt., C.J.
1. This is a revision application against an order passed by the Sessions Judge of Bijapur.
2. The material facts are that on January 24, 1939, the Police Sub-Inspector lodged a complaint against the present applicant under Section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Magistrate of Muddebihal asking him to take action. On May 5, 1939, the learned Magistrate caused a notice to issue under that Section, and that notice recites :
Whereas I have received credible information from the Sub-Inspector of Police, Muddebihal, that you Hanmantrao Annarao Kalgi of Muddebihal within my jurisdiction are habitually committing extortion and cheating,...
Matters have proceeded some distance, and the learned Magistrate has been hearing evidence on the application ; but an objection has been taken by the applicant that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction, because at the time when the information was lodged and the notice was issued, the applicant was not within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate. Now, Section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that whenever a Magistrate of the class there mentioned receives information that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction is by habit a robber, or otherwise falls within the class of wrong-doers referred to, such Magistrate may require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond. The evidence before us shows that on January 24, 1939, when the information was received, the applicant was residing at Bijapur, which is not within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate of Muddebihal, and the position was the same on May 5, 1939, when the notice was issued. The learned Sessions Judge took the view that all that was required under Section 110 was that the acts, which enabled the accused person to acquire the undesirable reputation referred to in the Section, must have been done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and that it was immaterial where the person proceeded against resided. It would appear from the recital in the order directing notice to issue to which I have referred that the learned Magistrate took the same view of the Section. The learned Sessions Judge relied on the case of Emperor v. Durga Halwa I.L.R. (1915) Cal. 153, where no doubt the learned Judges observed in the course of their judgment (p. 157) :
It was undoubtedly within the local limits of the Presidency Magistrate's jurisdiction that the habits of all these six persons, which are now complained of, were practised, and their evil reputation, if any, acquired.
3. But that was not the basis of the decision, because the accused was there within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at the time when the information was received, and the observations seem to me to be irrelevant. Section 110 is quite clear in its language. A Magistrate, in order to have jurisdiction, must receive information that the person to be dealt with is within the limits of his jurisdiction. The Section cannot grammatically be read as referring to the place where the acts on which an order is to be based were committed. The words of the Section do not refer, as does the notice issued by the learned Magistrate, to the place where the person proceeded against became a robber or a receiver of stolen property and so forth ; it refers merely to the place where he was when the information was received. When it comes to proving the truth of the information, no doubt the words of the Section must be construed in a common-sense manner, and a person can be said to be within the jurisdiction of a Magistrate if he was ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. The mere Tact that on the particular date on which the information was received he had gone temporarily out of the jurisdiction would not, I think, prevent the Section from applying. As the evidence in the case shows that the applicant was not in fact within the local limits at the time when the information was received, and had not left such limits for a purely temporary purpose, I think that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to proceed against him. We think, therefore, that the proceedings must be quashed.
4. I agree.