Norman Macleod, Kt., C.J.
1. The first accused in this case was convicted of an offence under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code, in that he received Rs. 38, which were despatched by one Hari Lahanu Sonar to his son Bhila by Money Order, by inducing the accused No. 2 to sign as if he were Bhila. The accused was asked by the postman whether one Bhila was living in his village, and the accused No. 1 then told the postman that accused No. 2 was Bhila. Whereupon accused No. 2 signed the receipt for the money which came to the hands of the first accused. There was no dispute as regards the facts and considering the relations between the post office and the public there would be extreme difficulty for the first accused to satisfy the Court that he had no dishonest intention or no intention to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person or that generally the provisions of Section 463, Indian Penal Code, would not apply. I doubt myself whether the accused in a case like this would be even entitled to urge that he committed no offence because what he did only resulted in money going straight to his pocket which would have eventually been given to him when paid by the post office to Bhila. Speaking for myself, I should say that when the accused induced the postman to accept the signature of accused No. 2 as the signature of Bhila, and by that action got the money the offence was committed. I do not think that we should interfere with the finding of the Judge that the first accused did not tell Bhila that the money was received. If, immediately after receiving the money from the postman, the first accused had told Bhila Hari that the money which was despatched to him by his father in order that it might be paid to the first accused had been received, then the proof of that fact could certainly be urged in mitigation of the punishment. I do not think for a moment that that fact, even if proved, would be sufficient to justify the Court in deciding that there was no evidence at all of the offence having been committed. I think, therefore, the conviction is right.
2. The next question is whether the sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge should be interfered with. On general principles I am very 10th to interfere with the sentences given by the lower Courts unless it can be shown that a sentence has been imposed without any regard to the facts of the case or the nature of the offence, or is so out of proportion to the facts proved that no Judge would reasonably impose it. Considering that the Judge was of opinion that the first accused did not tell Bhila Hari that the money was paid, and there was even evidence which made it probable that the second payment had been made, although he has given the accused the benefit of the doubt with regard to that fact, I do not think that the sentence which was imposed upon the first accused was one which should be interfered with. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.
3. I agree that the appeal must be dismissed. The point which presents some difficulty to my mind is whether it is shown that the appellant acted fraudulently so as to bring the case within the scope of the definition of forgery. It is essential, in my opinion, that the prosecution ought to establish that the act attributed to the accused was fraudulent or dishonest. If, in the present case, for instance, after receiving money, it was clear on the record that he had given intimation of the receipt of money to Bhila and that in substance and in effect the money was received by the accused on behalf of Bhila, speaking for myself, I should say that the conviction would not be right. But it is far from clear on this record that after receiving the money he ever informed Bhila of the fact as he would have done if the postal receipt was not dishonestly or fraudulently signed. Bhila and his father denied that any such intimation was given to Bhila. It appears from their conduct in making inquiry at the post office after the payment was made that Bhila was not informed of the fact. This omission on the part of the appellant supports the inference drawn by the trial Judge as to the fraudulent intention of the accused. On these grounds I think that the conviction of the appellant is right; and the sentence cannot be said to be unduly severe or inappropriate on the facts of the case.