1. In this case both the lower Courts arrived at the conclusion that it was not established that the promissory note sued on had been executed by the defendants. That is purely a question of fact, and though the judgments of both the Courts are brief, and deal specifically only with certain points, yet I must presume that both the Judges considered all the evidence and all the circumstances in the case. It would, it seems to me, be improper to make any other presumption. But it is represented in argument, in support of the rule, that the pleader, who conducted the case for the plaintiff in the lower Court, was misled by the fact that the promissory-note was admitted in evidence. He apparently thought that, to admit in evidence was equivalent to finding that the document admitted was genuine.' Admitting ' in evidence is a mechanical and formal proceeding. When all the evidence is recorded and when it is all considered, it is in the judgment that the Judge decides) whether a document is, or is not genuine. I cannot, therefore find any substantial reason for supposing that error or irregularity on the part of the Court misled the pleader.
2. Then it is argued, that there has been material irregularity, because the signature of defendant 2 on the promissory note was not compared with his admitted signatures on certain other documents. Either comparison was made or it was not made. If it was made, then obviously neither of the Judges was induced by that comparison to believe that the signature defendant 2 on the promissory note was genuine. If the comparison was not made in either or both the Courts below, I can only presume that this was, because the Judge was never asked to make the comparison. If he had been asked to make it, I cannot conceive that he would have refused. If he was not asked to make a comparison, it is to be presumed it was not thought desirable by those responsible for conducting the plaintiff's case.
3. For these reasons, I hold that the rule must be discharged with costs.