Lawrence Jenkins, C.J.
1. The only question that arises on this appeal is whether in Gujarat daughters succeeding to the non-technical Stridhan of their mother take joint interests with rights of survivorship, or several interests.
2. Under the law as established in this Presidency they would take absolute interests and according to the decision inBulakhidtis v. Keshavlal I L R (1881) 6 Bom 85 those interests would be several.
3. The appellant seeks to escape from this position by reliance on the decision of the Privy Council in Raja GhelikaniVenhayyamma Garu's case .
4. What was there determined was that under the Mitakshara law the two sons of a Hindu's only daughter, being members of a united family, succeed on their mother's death to his property jointly with benefit of survivorship and that each did not take a divided share, which on his death devolved on his representatives or assigns.
5. This is considerably removed from the matter here in dispute. But it is claimed that the reasoning, or at any rate certain phrases, of their Lordships mark a new departure, which if carried to its legitimate result establishes theappellants contention that the daughters in this case succeeded jointly with benefit of survivorship.
6. Thus it is argued that ''ancestral property' can no longer be confined to that which comes from a paternal ancestor, andmuch is sought to be made of the statement that, 'It is the right to partition which determines the right to take by survivorship. But passages such as these must be read not as absolute expositions of the law, but in relation to the facts of the case in which they were used.
7. It was (in our opinion) a determining factor in that case that the brothers were members of a united family. Express mention, is made of this status and immediately following on it comes a citation, which indicates the importance attached to it. This is made clear by Mr. Mayne's argument, which prevailed with their Lordships; for his contention was that 'being sons of the same daughter and her husband, they were in fact members of a joint Hindu family with all the incidents of joint ownership as understood in Mitakshara Law.'
8. And in this connection it is not inappropriate to observe that in Jogeswar Narain Deo's case I L R (1896) Cal. 670 their Lordships of the Privy Council remarked that 'the principle of joint tenancy appears to be unknown to Hindu Law, except in the case of a coparcenary between the members of an undivided family.'
9. Here the daughters were both married and therefore could in no sense be regarded as members of a united family and they lived in a part of this Presidency where the Vyavahara Mayuka is a principal authority.
10. I therefore hold that the decision in Rdja Chelikani Venkayyafnma Garu's case does not involve any proposition of law that would require a departure by us from what was decided in Bulakhidas v. Keshavtal.
11. This conclusion gains support from the decision of a Pull Bench of the Madras High Court in Karuppai Naohiar v. Sari' karanardyanan Ghetty I L R (1903) Mad. 300, where a critical and valuable examination was made of the decision on which the appellant relies.
12. The decree must be confirmed with costs.