1. In this case the petitioner complains of an order made by the learned Magistrate under Section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby the petitioner is directed to pay compensation to certain persons whom he groundlessly accused of the offence of theft. The learned Magistrate, as his judgment clearly shows, came to the conclusion that the charge was deliberately false ; but if it was false it was also vexatious, and therefore he was entitled t6 apply the provisions of Section 250. Having regard to the current rulings of all the High Courts it is now settled that the provisions of Section 250 may be used to supply one form of punishment for a serious false charge deliberately and maliciously made. The decisions of! the Courts show that 250 is as applicable to such false charges as it is to a merely frivolous charge brought with the sole intent of annoying. Upon this point it will be enough to refer to Emperor v. Bai Asha (1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 128 and Beni Madhub Kurmi v. Kumud Kumar Biswas ILR (1902) Cal. 123. But then it was said that in this case the Magistrate's order is objectionable and ought to be discharged, because, not content with making this order for compensation, he has also given expression to his opinion that the complainant and his witnesses should be prosecuted under Sections 211 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and, as we are informed, proceedings to obtain sanction for such prosecution are actually pending.
2. In support of this argument -reliance is placed upon the decision in Bachu Lal v. Jagdam Sahai ILR (1898) Cal. 181 where the learned Judges thought that it was an improper exercise of the Magistrate's discretion to award compensation under Section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code and also to direct or sanction the prosecution under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no Bombay decision bearing-directly upon this point, and upon the best consideration which we can give to the provisions of the Code, we think that we ought not to interfere with the Magistrate's order. It is indisputable that the Magistrate had power to make that order and with great respect to the learned Judges .who decided Bachu Lal v. Jagdam Sahai ILR (1893) Cal. 181 we are not prepared to say that the Magistrate's exercise of his discretion was perverse or unwise. In Adikkan v. Alagan ILR (1897) Mad. 237 the Madras High Court on considering a similar position of affairs point out that the sanction to prosecute for making a false charge is granted on grounds of public policy for an offence against public justice, whereas the order for compensation is granted partly in order to deter complainants from making vexatious or frivolous complaints, and partly in order to compensate the accused persons for the trouble and expense to which they have been put by reason of the false complaint. Their Lordships add. 'We can see no ground in law or reason why compensation should not be granted in a case in which the Magistrate also directs a prosecution for making a false charge'. We agree with this interpretation of the sections of the Criminal Procedure Code, and we think that it is justified by the manifestly diverse purposes which the two remedies provided-by the Code are intended to serve. We do not think-that as a result of such orders any prejudice should necessarily be created against a complainant when proceedings in regard to sanctioning his prosecution coma up for decision. No complaint on this score could have been made if the Magistrate had merely expressed his opinion that the acccusation was false, as he was perfectly entitled to do; and the accused seems to us to be in no worse position so far as regards the further proceedings, merely because the Magistrate gave effect to his opinion by making an order for compensation.
3. On these grounds we think that there is no reason for our interference in revision with the Magistrate's order, arid we must, therefore, discharge this rule.