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Bhimangauda Konapgauda Patil Vs. Hanmant Rungappa Patil - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtMumbai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1918)ILR42Bom689
AppellantBhimangauda Konapgauda Patil
RespondentHanmant Rungappa Patil
Excerpt:
.....he belongs to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, it cannot be a ground for quashing the complaint. after ascertaining the facts during he course of investigation it is always open to the investigating officer to record tht the accused either belongs to or does not belongs to schedule caste or scheduled tribe. after final opinion is formed, it is open to the court to either accept the same or take cognizance. even if the charge sheet is filed at the time of consideration of the charge, it si open to the accused to bring to the notice of the court that the materials do not show that the accused does not belong to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. even if charge is framed at the time of trial materials can be placed to show that the accused either belongs to or does not belong to..........by allowing an appeal back from a superior to an inferior tribunal. on this ground i myself should have gravely doubted the line of reasoning followed in several of the cases to which we have been referred and the use of the terminology which overlooks what i believe to be the plain and clear policy of section 54. however that may be and however the facts in cases in which the decisions went the other way are distinguishable, it is plain that the facts in the case before us cannot be distinguished in the minutest particular from the facts which were before the court in shrinivas hanmant v. gurunath shrinivas (1890) 15 bom. 527. i am content to decide the case upon that authority.2. i would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with all costs.heaton, j.3. i concur.
Judgment:

Beaman, J.

1. The facts of this case are in my opinion substantially the same as those in the case of Dev Goal Savant v. Vasudev Vithal Savant (1890) 15 Bom. 527 and absolutely identical with those in the case of Srinivas Hanmant v. Gurunath Shrinivas (1890) 15 Bom. 527. That being so, I should have thought it unnecessary to add a word, the case being covered by such high authority, but for the use made of other cases in argument by Dewan Bahadur Rao, for the appellant, one of these being a recent decision of this Court in the case of Ramchandra Dinkar v. Krishnaji Sakharam (1915) 40 Bom. 118. Such cases whether in this Court or as in the case of Chinna Seetayya v. Krishnavanamma (1896) 19 Mad. 435, in other High Courts, when reduced to the bare decision they give, appear to me to amount simply to saying that in every case there is an appeal from the Collector acting under Section 54 to the Court under whose decree he has been making that partition I think that that view is in direct conflict with the view taken in the cases I have first mentioned, but I am also sure that a very little examination of those in our High Court would show that the learned Judges responsible for them found grounds of distinction in the facts before them; else they would certainly have followed the earlier decisions, of this Court. This was undoubtedly so in the latest case where the decision of the Court went upon the findings of the Courts below that the terms of the decree had been contravened. As I understand Section 54, its policy is plain. For all purposes of effecting partition of lands within its contemplation, the Legislature thought that the Collector would be better qualified than the Court to carry out Such partitions. In other words that so far from, being an inferior agency the work was now entrusted to a better qualified and superior agency. If that were really so, the policy of the Section would at once be defeated by allowing an appeal back from a superior to an inferior tribunal. On this ground I myself should have gravely doubted the line of reasoning followed in several of the cases to which we have been referred and the use of the terminology which overlooks what I believe to be the plain and clear policy of Section 54. However that may be and however the facts in cases in which the decisions went the other way are distinguishable, it is plain that the facts in the case before us cannot be distinguished in the minutest particular from the facts which were before the Court in Shrinivas Hanmant v. Gurunath Shrinivas (1890) 15 Bom. 527. I am content to decide the case upon that authority.

2. I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with all costs.

Heaton, J.

3. I concur.


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